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Abstract 
This thesis provides an investigation of the production, transfer and 
application of the knowledge associated with counter-kidnap. I 
examine the processes and contexts that shape transnational 
knowledge transfer and its application. As far as I am aware, this 
qualitative research is the first one adding an empirical detail to our 
understanding of these processes with respect to kidnappings for 
ransom. 
The first two parts of the thesis provide a breakdown of the 
information provided by formal counter-kidnap documents, other 
ways of transferring high-security knowledge, and their barriers. A 
number of formal institutions and processes exist for transferring 
knowledge and practices around mitigating serious crime and I 
explain in detail in which respects they can be problematic. The 
third part identifies an implementation gap, since local practices 
and processes impede transnational initiatives. I discuss the effects 
of the specific police sub-culture which hinders the transfer and 
application of the relevant knowledge. In the final part I review the 
so-called risk management companies, which represent a fairly new 
private field responding to kidnapping risks, both preventatively 
and reactively. I suggest that the emergence of these companies 
results from the high prices of knowledge transfer and inter-
institutional barriers to that transfer, as well as the poor outcomes 
of the responses to kidnappings by the public sector. 
The overall picture emerging is that the transfer of high-security 
information is not as fluid as we might think. There are informal 
processes and practices that influence the transfer and application 
of knowledge and my data demonstrate the detail and complexity 
around the type of knowledge work police engage in.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 For this research I am using kidnappings as a vehicle for the 
analysis of knowledge dissemination and application. I am 
examining what can hinder or prevent the transfer and application 
of the kidnap-related knowledge and how these barriers have as a 
result led to the creation of the private counter-kidnap, kidnap 
prevention and risk-management businesses. The core areas of 
inquiry in this thesis are concerned with how kidnappings are 
understood and explained in formal documents, and also the role of 
state and non-state actors in the production, transfer and 
application of counter-kidnap knowledge. In more detail, I explore 
how knowledge is produced and then moved from one location to 
another, how this transfer takes place, how those who receive it 
make sense of it, whether this knowledge is modified, or whether 
people resist it, and the nature of how the operational environment 
actually integrates this knowledge.  
A kidnapping can be for the purposes of extortion (a ransom 
kidnap), between or within criminal groups, for sexual exploitation, 
from within a family (domestic), as a form of revenge, for 
fraudulent purposes, or those which are politically and ideologically 
motivated (UNODC, 2003: 7-8). Interestingly, Briggs (2001: 3) has 
a more simplified (and maybe superficial) view of kidnapping-
motivations and states that there are only economic and political 
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kidnappings, overlooking the crime-terrorism interrelation. 
Simplified or not, all kidnappings are about the illegal detention of a 
person against their will and there are different responses and 
prevention mechanisms towards most of the types.  
A Kidnapping is a type of crime which does not have a broadly 
accepted legal definition (Wright, 2009: 32)1. Usually, a kidnapping 
refers to the illegal seizing of someone who is then taken to an 
unknown location, against their will, alongside deception or fraud, 
and the desire of something in return for the hostage. When it 
comes to English legislation, kidnappings are defined as „an attack 
on and infringement of, the personal liberty of an individual‟ (The 
Law Commission, 2014: 2), with characteristics such as the taking 
or carrying away of someone by force or by fraud, without their 
consent and without lawful excuses. It is sometimes described as 
an aggravated form of false imprisonment. Practically, the way a 
kidnapping is framed is over-inclusive and vague. It overlaps with 
other types of crimes, such as abduction, and imprisonment, 
creating a legal loophole. This is also reinforced by the fact that in 
this law, by using the words „fraud‟ and „force‟, it ignores children 
and generally those who are mentally unable to give consent. In 
addition to that, there have been kidnapping cases where parents 
                                                          
1
 Etymologically, kidnappings were originally related to the stealing or ‘carrying off (of children or 
others) in order to provide servants or labourers for the American plantations’, and later a broader 
meaning was given to this crime.  In many cases there is confusion between the term abduction and 
kidnapping.  An abduction, in most jurisdictions, is the unlawful taking of a young person under the 
age of 16 (Noor, 2013: 5), without a demand for ransom or anything else in exchange for the child’s 
freedom. 
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consent to be kidnapped in exchange for their children. In these 
cases there is a form of consent but the kidnapping is still a criminal 
act, which highlights a grey area in the legal definition of 
kidnapping in the UK, which can be problematic.  Similarly, the 
Greek law on kidnappings (article 322 on kidnappings and 
abductions), states that a kidnapper is someone who uses fraud, 
violence, or threats of capture, kidnaps, holds illegally someone, or 
takes them as a hostage and deprives them of personal freedom, 
preventing the state from protecting them, then this person will be 
punished with imprisonment. 
Costa, in the UN manual (2005: 2), states that setting 
international trends around kidnappings is difficult and the number 
of cases is unclear. He also supports that „there are different 
definitions of the term “kidnapping” and different recording and 
reporting systems used in some countries, […] which contribute[s] 
to a lack of clarity and difficulties in making comparisons‟. There is 
indeed a lack of clarity surrounding kidnappings. Not only there is 
unclear data and statistics about kidnappings, but also there is a 
multiplicity of kidnap-types, and what can be called „kidnapping‟ has 
a very vague and somewhat individual meaning. Through my 
research I found that police, possibly unconsciously, have a set of 
characteristics that need to be fulfilled in order to call something a 
kidnap. On the one hand, there is international knowledge (from 
shared training-events and formal documents), and on the other 
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hand there is a very domestically defined understanding and 
definition of what constitutes a kidnap from those who are in 
counter-kidnap positions. There is, therefore, a very selective 
interpretation of kidnappings based on the environment and the 
culture of the practitioners.  
A kidnapping can be a multi-faceted crime which creates a 
variety of terminology, legal responses and counter-kidnapping 
strategies. This is why the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime argues that in order to be effective towards a counter-
kidnapping strategy, there should be, amongst other elements, an 
attempt to harmonize the definitions and the constituent elements 
associated with kidnappings.2    
„In 2006, with the contribution of law enforcement and 
judicial experts from 16 countries, UNODC developed the 
Counter-Kidnapping Manual, offering guidelines to 
policymakers and law enforcement authorities for sound and 
practical responses to kidnapping. The Manual addresses the 
typologies of kidnapping, policy and legislation 
considerations, coordination at the national and international 
levels and a framework for operational response. It also 
includes an aide-memoire offering practical and operational 
guidance to investigators and a trainers‟ guide for future 
capacity-building‟ (UN, Economic and Social Council, 2010: 
19).  
There is a lot of global fear around kidnapping ransoms being used 
to finance terrorist activities, but without following up the ransom it 
is not always possible to know how it will be used. From what the 
Greek police interviewees have said, in all cases the serial numbers 
                                                          
2
 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/law-enforcement.html (accessed 10.10.2013) 
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of the banknotes were registered in an attempt to later follow up 
the ransom. In most cases the ransom has later been found and 
returned to those who paid it. 
There is an extended literature on knowledge transfer and 
policing, but this research will provide a number of contributions on 
issues linked to a specific police subculture and the kidnap-related 
knowledge that not many people have. Knowledge transfer is often 
seen as a process that comes quite naturally, or that it is a 
characteristic of all organisations which aims at ensuring that others 
have access to it. It is argued that knowledge transfer is the life-
blood of policing (Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012) and although this 
might be generally true, in the specific context of kidnappings this 
is not something as straightforward as we might think. It is also 
suggested that there are factors beyond the nation-state which are 
influencing the way crime is dealt and controlled (Newburn, 2002). 
Contrary to these beliefs, it is argued that things are more complex, 
that globalisation is produced locally and then gets transferred and 
applied to other locations which leads to one place having layers of 
practices and knowledge coming from other parts of the world 
(Massey, 1994) and at the end states are those deciding if they will 
adopt the suggested practices (Valverde and Mopas, in Larner, 
Walters, 2004). There is also the view of specialised police 
knowledge as something that is retained in order to be used later 
on in someone‟s career (Papanicolaou, in Jones and Newburn, 
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2006). Workers from all professions develop their own occupational 
subculture which is a pattern of assumptions, ideas, beliefs, 
language, or behavior and this is how certain occupation-related 
tasks and events are managed (Schein, 1985; Van Maanen in 
Manning and Van Maanen, 1978). Police, like other organisations, 
do not have one common culture and as I will explore in this thesis 
the specific counter-kidnap police sub-culture is playing an 
important role in the transfer and application of knowledge.  
In this thesis I discuss three distinct modes of moving 
knowledge around; formal documents, international trainings and 
intranational ones. From my research I found that the police culture 
itself is a primary barrier of the transfer and application of counter-
kidnap knowledge, usually dismissing guidance coming from 
abroad. There is the idea of knowledge being borderless and shared 
seamlessly, but the reality is more complicated. There are filters of 
the flow of knowledge and the police counter-kidnap sub-culture is 
one of them, making the governance of counter-kidnap more 
complex. The role of the National Crime Agency in moving 
knowledge around is really interesting; it is a national body, that is 
also above the state (through collaborating with the United Nations) 
and below the state (through acting as a private cooperation and 
adopting commercial attributes). There are various filters and 
barriers mitigating the counter-kidnap knowledge and there are 
third parties coming in and private contractors aiming to prepare or 
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protect those who are one way or another affected by kidnaps. 
Garland‟s (1996) idea of resposibilisation is not something new, but 
we can see that when it comes to kidnappings, placing the 
responsibility on individuals is a tactic that is still present and 
prominent. 
It is important to say that transferring someone‟s knowledge 
is not necessarily going to be useful to those receiving it, because it 
has been produced under specific circumstances and contexts. 
Although one might transfer knowledge, what the others receive is 
contextual information. The sender has knowledge but this 
knowledge is the result of a variety of factors, such as hard work, 
practice, research, and personal experiences, thus what is being 
shared and what the receiver gets is information. Knowledge is not 
transferrable and loses its character and value the moment 
someone decides to transfer it. All the people interviewed for this 
research have referred to the process of transferring and the 
content of this transfer as “knowledge transfer” and “knowledge” 
respectively. However, what is actually shared is information, which 
is an earlier version of knowledge. Although information and 
knowledge are two different terms, in this work I will be using the 
words and phrases of the interviewees, “knowledge”, “knowledge 
transfer”, and “knowledge production”, in order to avoid any 
confusion between the two terms.  
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A way to explain the relationship between information and 
knowledge is through presenting them as a triangular structure. 
Knowledge is part of a hierarchical structure, with data at the very 
bottom, knowledge at the top and information in between these 
two. Data is the raw material and, for instance, it is everything that 
can or might be related to kidnappings. Information is data which is 
relevant to a specific case and has some purpose. Information is 
organised data and facts used to define and characterise a specific 
situation. This implies that the situation and its facts are interpreted 
and transformed from data to more meaningful information. 
Contrary to information, knowledge works at a higher level of 
abstraction, and it can easily be everything and nothing, 
appropriate or simply acontextual. Knowledge is made up of 
judgments, assumptions and expectations of the received 
information, and the way this information should be evaluated, 
analysed, or interpreted so it can be used. In addition to that, the 
information received, which is the theoretical understanding, is very 
different from the practical understanding, and the accuracy of the 
information does not, on its own, guarantee success in an 
operation. If we wanted to make this triangular structure more 
complicated, apart from data, information and knowledge we can 
also add intelligence on the very top of this structure. Intelligence is 
about problem solving through applying knowledge to particular 
problems, is about having the ability to understand and interpret 
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the environment. Intelligence is being goal oriented and having the 
ability to use information for specific purposes and at the same time 
be aware of what is going on in the world, as well as be able to 
understand and interpret the environment. The NCA is an 
intelligence oriented organisation which is using the collected 
intelligence in order to prevent or solve crimes either inside the UK 
or outside. With intelligence either a crisis can be prevented or 
managed in case their prevention is not possible. 
For this thesis I am looking at the United Kingdom, and 
particularly at Greece and Cyprus. These nations have been chosen 
because I am interested in the ways knowledge moves around 
either across the geographical borders or inside a state. The UK has 
created and disseminates the counter-kidnap knowledge, Greece is 
both a receiver and later transmitter of knowledge, and last, Cyprus 
is receiving information from Greece or straight from the UK. I have 
no intentions on making any generalisations. I might be using 
different countries to talk about the transfer and application of 
knowledge, but it should be stated that I am not trying to compare 
these countries. I am analysing the gaps in the transfer and 
application of the counter-kidnap knowledge without comparing or 
telling how things need to be done. I am leaving the solution to the 
police makers and hopefully this research can be used by those who 
are in the position to make positive changes.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The processes of moving knowledge around are less transparent 
and straightforward than it has often been described in academic 
research. This literature review will focus on two major themes and 
their subsections which emerge throughout the analysis of the data, 
and even though they have been produced in a different context, in 
each case they will be used in relation to ransom kidnappings and 
the specific police group dealing with such cases. Although the 
criminological literature covers a plethora of issues, kidnappings 
have not received the same kind of attention. Compared to other 
types of crime, this specific type of crime and those dealing it have 
gone largely unnoticed and neglected by academic research. The 
point of this research is to use kidnappings as a case study and 
investigate how things work in reality in terms of knowledge 
transfer and application. To do so, this thesis will look at four 
different components of a broader discussion: how knowledge is 
produced and transferred, the general barriers towards the 
dissemination, reception and application of knowledge, the role of 
the police as a barrier of knowledge transfer, and, finally the limits 
of the states to protect their citizens. 
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2.2 Transnational Policing and Mobilities of Knowledge 
In our globalised world, „human action and interaction is no longer 
bounded by the territorial limitations of an earlier age‟ (Sheptycki, 
2011: 154), and many varying forms of human conduct can have a 
transnational aspect. As Goldsmith and Sheptycki argue, with 
transnationalisation „the boundaries between the internal and the 
external order of states have become blurred‟ (2007: 31). There is 
the idea that with the blossoming of globalization, there are also 
more criminal opportunities, leading to the production of 
transnational crimes and criminals, something which justifies the 
need for transnational policing (Sheptycki, 2002). Globalisation 
might facilitate the illegal collaborations, but it also assists the legal 
ones. Telecommunications have created a sense of global 
interconnectedness which „opens up new possibilities for 
“horizontal” communication and collaboration among police officers‟ 
(Bowling, 2009: 151). For Bowling (2009), this ease in 
communications and collaborations can reduce the bureaucratic 
drag which often contributes to the lack of productivity.  
In the original notion of policing, the police force was 
„designed to control populations and secure territories‟ (Bowling, 
Sheptycki, 2012: 15), whereas in the modern notion it is argued 
that policing is regulating the „internal order of states‟ (ibid), with 
external influences. The new dynamics created between the internal 
and the external influences might add extra complexity to the 
17 
 
already complicated picture of policing, creating a gap between 
ideas and actual practices. Bigo (2001) interestingly questions the 
dualism of internal and external security, arguing that these two 
are moving closer and closer to each other towards the point at 
which we are talking about their complete merging. Modernity is 
characterized by an increasing blurring of the boundaries between 
domestic matters and global affairs, taking policing beyond the 
geographical boundaries of a state, signifying the importance of 
international contacts, intrastate coalitions, knowledge-transfer 
networks and cross-state interactions (Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012: 
23). Undoubtedly, our notion of borders and the differentiation 
between internal and external security is in transition, the once 
local security agencies are moving beyond their borders, while 
those from „outside‟ can influence what is happening „inside‟. „The 
international is now both a constitutive and explicative dimension of 
internal security and police work‟ (Bigo, 2000: 321). Specialized 
police forces and institutions from the various countries are driven 
towards a closer collaboration and an exchange of information 
Furthermore, for Bigo, this „transnationalisation of security opposes 
national (and societal) security‟, creating border-related ambiguity, 
and underlying the need for the adaptation of policing (ibid). There 
are observable trends in the field of policing, where there is a shift 
from local to global policing. Global and transnational criminal 
actors are involved in criminal activities which are also usually 
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sustained and maintained by criminal networks spread across more 
than one countries. These networks can potentially become both 
domestic and international threats, which creates incentives 
towards a more internationally and globally constructed policing. 
According to Bowling and Sheptycki, policing has become 
transnational, characterised by global relationships where „actions, 
activities and organisational structures transcend […] national 
boundaries‟ (2012: 23), and there are networks and coalitions 
which are not directly controlled by the nation-states. Mann 
recognised five networks of interaction which, although different, 
are not separate and tend to blend with each other (Mann 1997, in 
Bowling, 2009). These networks are the local, the national, the 
international, the transnational and the global.   
Massey in her (1994) „Global Sense of Place‟ refers to space 
compression and discusses its three different levels of influence: 
„from the household to the local area, [and then from the local 
area] to the international‟. From her point of view, all flows leave 
their traces and the local is not faceless, on the contrary, 
globalisation is actually produced locally (in specific locations such 
as the City of London and the Wall Street of New York). Places do 
not have only one entity, and Massey‟s sense of „place‟ includes 
linkages with the global and different layers added in one place, all 
originating from different parts of the world. Although it is usually 
thought that the local is the „victim‟ of the global forces, for Massey 
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however, global actions take place within local places, putting the 
responsibility of global happenings within the local level. A place is 
linked with other places beyond and a local place can have a global 
character, as well as a global sense of the local.  On a similar note, 
what is internal or external, domestic or transnational is very 
complicated, creating a messy reality. There is a constant interplay 
between these, and now there are many knowledge producers. 
Nations are in closer collaboration but at the same time there is 
always a local sense of policing, of knowledge, or practices, as well 
as private security businesses dominating the security and crime 
management/prevention field. Newburn (2002) discusses the 
growing insignificance of the nation-state by stating that in a 
globalised world characterised by „Atlantic crossings‟ (ibid), it is 
„increasingly recognised that factors beyond the nation state are 
influencing and shaping domestic crime control policies‟. Beck 
states that globalism, globality and globalisation are three 
important dimensions of global policing. Accordingly, globalisation is 
„the process through which sovereign national states are criss-
crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying 
prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks‟ (Beck 
2000, in Held, McGrew, 2003: 101).  
Globalisation means global networks in local places from both 
the perspective of the offenders and those battling the crime. 
Globalism is defined by the neo-liberal rule of the world market 
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where, as Beck  argues, the true meaning is reduced to a single 
economic aspect, while undermining other important dimensions 
such as culture, society and politics (Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012: 22-
23). When referring to globality, it can be said that there are 
patterns of „worldwide interconnectedness‟ (ibid). Apart from these 
three dimensions of global policing, it could be argued that there is 
also the aspect of „glocality‟ (Hobbs and Dunnighan, 1998 in 
Ruggeiero, South and Taylor; Hufnagel, Harfield, Bronitt, 2012; ) 
where the global meets the local, creating a link between the 
transnational and the local. At this point it should be stated that by 
“transnational” we refer to these activities which transcend „national 
boundaries, passing through them without necessarily being 
affected by them‟ (Mann 1997, in Bowling, 2009: 152). Since in 
some cases crimes are transnational, it is often implied that there 
should also be transnational policing. It is widely believed that the 
globalization of crime should be accompanied by the globalization of 
crime-control, because otherwise all those efforts of combating 
transnational crime would remain fruitless (Robertson, Das, Singer, 
Raton, 2010; Block, 2008) For Bowling (2009), the current policing 
„requires collaboration across international boundaries‟. Similarly to 
Bowling, Block mentioned that the contemporary crimes might 
involve activity in more than one country and, in order to be more 
successfully tackled, „police need to seek cooperation partners 
across borders to share intelligence, coordinate operations, secure 
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evidence, and track down suspects‟ (2008: 74). When it comes to 
the United Kingdom, there can only be speculations about the 
effects of Brexit in transnational policing. There might be big 
changes, although considering the role of that nation in organising 
collaborations and accomplishing transnational policing, it is quite 
likely that not many things are going to change in the post-Brexit 
era. The United Kingdom is a major producer of knowledge and a 
contributor of intelligence inside the European Union, and with 
Europol or the Shengen Information Services, information is being 
shared and knowledge is transferred, so it is definite that these will 
have to be modified strongly if the UK is excluded from these 
transnational policing networks.   
When it comes to policing, there is a great diversity between 
countries and even between cities, because the politics of policing in 
one city are different from the politics of policing a few kilometers 
away. „Policing is a set of practices that are experienced in localities 
and therefore the issues raised are very often local issues‟ 
(Sheptycki, 2002: 138). However, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) 
believe that there is a pattern of similar experiences and 
methodologies followed by different nation-states, and this is 
accomplished through the process of sharing information and 
knowledge. This sharing is considered to be the „life-blood‟ 
(Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012: 85) of policing, which underlines the 
importance of gathering key information, storing it, organising it 
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and of course transferring it and sharing it with the others who 
might be facing the same or similar issues. The transnational police 
cooperation and the collaboration between different policing 
organisations illustrates two things. First, it shows the increasing 
demand for managing the movement of information through 
sending it in different directions, and second, it shows the need to 
see how others respond to specific situations. My case study is 
going to interrogate these issues, and I am going to show how 
complicated and messy the reality actually is. In theory, knowledge 
is being transferred around in order to be used by different agents, 
however, the state plays a very big role, both as a recipient and as 
a producer of knowledge, which can become a filter of, or a barrier 
to knowledge. 
At the moment, there are many different types of 
supranational governance institutions, such as Interpol, Europol, 
and the United Nations. In an era of globally illegal goods, mobile 
money, and mobile people (both victims and offenders) there is the 
need for cooperation between the police and the institutions of the 
various nations. As Guille supports, Europol has successfully 
managed to provide a broader „information market, providing better 
quality data and more relevant and “hot” information for 
practitioners‟ (Guile, in Lemieux, 2013: 35), something which, as 
he argues, resembles an intelligence-oriented organization which 
provides knowledge sources and knowledge itself. Similarly to 
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Guille‟s point of view, Gerspacher and Lemieux (2013) argue that 
Europol is steadily turning into a knowledge broker, but they also 
add that it plays a more important role, since Europol fills the void 
between operational assistance and police cooperation. Europol has 
expanded over the years and it has gained credibility by assisting 
practitioners through creating CEPOL (European Union Agency for 
Law Enforcement Training). Europol‟s CEPOL develops, implements 
and coordinates trainings for police officers all across Europe. 
Europol, as Gerspacher and Lemieux believe, „has contributed to 
the identification and shaping of the demand for coordination and 
joint investigations to compensate for a lack of adequate 
organization and national institutions and for the limited expertise 
of the national police services in the area of international 
cooperation‟ (Gerspacher, Lemieux in Lemieux, 2013: 75). 
International and transnational police cooperation organisations 
such as Europol and Interpol „differ from the adhoc police 
cooperation initiatives by the resources they enjoy and the member 
government commitment that allows them to establish legitimacy‟ 
(Gerspacher in Lamieux, 2013: 145).  
On a similar note, the United Nations is an intergovernmental 
organisation which was established in 1945, aiming to achieve 
international cooperation around a variety of issues. In the United 
Nations there are, at the moment, a hundred and ninety-three 
member countries, five of which have more power than the other 
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countries. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States can veto any resolution, authorising a collective 
action. Puchala has been quite critical of the United Nations. As he 
has said, the organisation is an American creation, and „many […] 
view it as the servant of a long-standing US hegemony‟ (Puchala, 
2005: 572), which, practically, means that the United Nations tends 
to be controlled by the United States. It is part of a „transnational 
alliance of elites‟ (576) and shows „indifference to cultural 
differentiation‟ (581) while supporting universality. Just like other 
international and intergovernmental organisations, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has produced a 
variety of manuals and documents.  However, there seems to be an 
accessorial use of these documents, where the aim is to recycle 
trainings, information, and resolution-steps with a very 
homogenous mentality, neglecting other important factors (Puchala, 
2005). In addition to that, the UNODC counter-kidnapping manual 
creates ambiguity by not fully explaining some things around 
kidnap-resolution. As McGoey has stated, this ambiguity is in some 
cases used „strategically by those in the best position to take 
advantage of the fluidity of possible interpretations‟ (2012: 11). 
Ultimately, this intentional ambiguity creates difficult conditions for 
individuals or institutions when it comes to maintaining their fame 
and strategic advantages (ibid).  When it comes to policing, a 
number of formal institutions and processes exist for transferring 
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knowledge and practice around mitigating serious crime. However, 
as I am going to show later on, my research identifies an 
implementation gap.  
 
2.3 Knowledge Transfer 
Risks are „fluid‟ (Beck, 1999); they move across borders, and so 
does the approach to them. The police linkages which have 
emerged from the ease of travel, the expansion of communication 
networks, the joint training programs, the team trainings, the 
creation and dissemination of manuals and documents  are being 
„consolidated by supranational governance institutions and justified 
politically by persistent anxieties‟ (Bowling, 2009: 158). Rising 
anxieties over potential problems are motivating organisations and 
institutions so as to identify and later manage these –potential– 
risks. According to Ericson and Haggerty (1997), anxieties for 
safety and security are reinforcing the members of the so called 
“risk societies” to predict the future through probabilities and 
knowledge sharing. However, security is not something tangible 
which can be potentially based on probabilities. „External 
institutions are able to routinely access police for knowledge useful 
in their own risk management‟ (Ericson, Haggerty, 1997: 5). In this 
thesis, among other things, I investigate the extent to which 
kidnapping practice is as future oriented as other policing 
approaches. Academics (Bayley, Bittner 1984; Ericson, Haggerty 
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1997), have talked about policing and the knowledge transfer as 
something that happens very smoothly and it is also future 
oriented. However, with my research I have identified some things 
that shape knowledge transfer within the police. Not only is 
information kept back because it is powerful for those having it, but 
also there is the existence of some filters and barriers which hinder 
both the transfer and the application of knowledge.   
 Knowledge transfer is seen as part of transnational policing 
and police cooperation. “Police cooperation” refers to the 
„international or uninternational interaction between two or more 
police entities (including private and public agencies)‟ (Lemieux, 
2013: 1), aiming to share criminal intelligence, information, 
knowledge and take part in investigations. When it comes to the 
public sector, knowledge transfer is an important process as it can 
lead to more efficient results and better performance through 
creating a knowledge base and developing the outdated information 
(Riege, Lindsay, 2006). In relation to police performance and 
knowledge transfer, the success or not of an investigation depends 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of that transfer (Glomseth, 
Gottschalk, Solli-Sæther, 2007: 100). At the same time, knowledge 
transfer can decrease the risk associated with the decision making, 
while at the same time as Riege and Lindsay (2006) believe, issues 
are resolved faster. When it comes to the planning of a police 
activity, whether it is kidnap-related or not, through knowledge 
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sharing, different facts and ideas can be integrated into the plan 
(Glomseth, Gottschalk, Solli-Sæther, 2007: 101). The final reason 
for the importance of knowledge transfer is that through the 
process of receiving and giving knowledge, one can achieve the 
most cost-effective delivery of services, showing responsibility 
towards the tax payers. At the individual level, when the knowledge 
that is derived by experiences is shared, it increases the cultivation 
and enhancement of the individual‟s skills (Cong, Pandya, 2003). At 
the organizational level, knowledge management is increasing the 
output, which is linked with the improvement of the performance of 
those employees using this specific knowledge (Seba, Rowley, 
2010). At this point it should be stated that McAdam and Reid 
(2000) have constructed a model which is related to the knowledge 
management process, and it consists of four parts: the construction 
of knowledge, the embodiment of knowledge followed by its 
dissemination, and finally, the use of this knowledge.  
Transferable knowledge tends to be based on „regularities of 
some kind, patterns of events or observations which can be 
predicted to apply if certain conditions are present‟ (Ekblom, 2002: 
145). It is important to have a clear understanding of the processes 
and contexts that inhibit and shape the transnational knowledge 
transfer, and my research adds empirical detail to our 
understanding of them. This transferable knowledge that Ekblom 
(2002) talked about is created through recognizing perpetual 
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patterns of activities and specific practices aiming to deal with a 
crime, while at the same time, the constant reforming of all these is 
a crucial aspect of creating and maintaining knowledge on this 
subject. Knowledge is created in a specific context and it does not 
exist in a vacuum. These things refer to the applicability of that 
knowledge in a different setting to the one in which it has been 
created. Ekblom has also identified five „Ks‟ as types of crime-
prevention knowledge. The first „K‟ is the „know-about‟ which is 
related with the “modus operandi” of the offenders, the 
„consequences for victims and society, [and the] legal definition of 
offences, patterns and trends‟ (Ekblom, 2002: 142). The second is 
the „know-what‟ which means knowing what works, mechanisms, 
techniques and their effects. The third „K‟ is the knowledge of the 
legal powers or limits and the skills needed to achieve something 
(know-how). The fourth is the knowledge of the right people, 
potential collaborators, having many contacts and the needed 
service providers (know-who), while the final „K‟ is the know-why 
which means trying to find the –symbolic or not– meanings 
underlying a crime. 
  Codified knowledge is usually used during knowledge 
transfer processes. This is an „explicit‟ type of knowledge and it is 
the outcome of a long process of codifying what is known and it is 
also the result of different types and dimensions of knowledge. In 
order to achieve the transfer of knowledge, regardless of its type, 
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there initially needs to be the formation of this knowledge. In the 
epistemological dimension of knowledge formation, there is the 
„tacit‟ type of knowledge which is informal, personal and subjective, 
and it is about those things which are not formally known. It might 
take years to develop this type of knowledge, and undoubtedly its 
prolonged period of production and its subjectivity are some 
characteristics which make this knowledge harder to be transferred. 
Tacit knowledge is based on the individual‟s perspective of the 
world and as Paz Salmador and Bueno (2007) state, „it is 
entrenched in values, ideas, customs, routines, and emotions. 
Hence, tacit knowledge relates to the “right now” […] making it 
difficult to communicate‟ (368). One can add that tacit knowledge 
does not only relate to the „right now‟, but it also relates to the 
„right here‟, making it time and location centered. Tacit knowledge 
has some very technical details which, if not making it impossible to 
be transferred, definitely make it more difficult. However, on the 
other hand, the „explicit‟ type of knowledge can be expressed both 
verbally and in written form, making it easier to be transferred from 
one individual to other(s), or creating instructional documents and 
manuals for a wider transfer of knowledge (Paz Salmador, Bueno, 
2007: 369). From an ontological point of view, every human being 
has a certain form of knowledge, and individuals are very important 
because from their experiences they can create knowledge. Later, 
this personal knowledge can turn from tacit to explicit and become 
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written, codified and more collective, in order to be shared with 
other individuals. In a sense, knowledge creation is an interplay 
between tacit and explicit knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
discuss this interplay in more detail, and they refer to four modes of 
knowledge conversion: the socialisation, the externalisation, the 
combination and the internationalisation. “Socialisation” is when 
there is sharing of experiences (meaning that people are sharing 
their tacit knowledge on a specific subject). “Exteranlisation” is 
when there is the transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge. It is the „process of articulating the knowledge gained 
from the experience, into concepts, hypotheses, models, metaphors 
and analogies, by means of communication‟ (ibid).   „Combination‟ 
of knowledge occurs when there is a transfer of different forms of 
explicit knowledge, of these concepts, hypotheses, models, 
metaphors and analogies, and, finally, „internationalization is when 
explicit knowledge becomes tacit knowledge. 
 
2.4 Criticisms and Barriers Associated with the 
Knowledge Transfer 
A number of barriers exist in relation to the transfer of high-security 
knowledge, and in this thesis I will look at kidnappings as a way of 
identifying these barriers. In the second paragraph of article 28 of 
the Palermo Protocols, it is suggested that „States Parties shall 
consider developing and sharing analytical expertise concerning 
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organized criminal activities with each other…‟ (30). It is also stated 
that states „shall assist one another in planning and implementing 
research and training programmes designed to share expertise…‟ 
(31). On a similar note, in article 10, it is advised that authorities 
„cooperate with one another by exchanging information…‟ (46) and 
Kofi Annan mentions in the foreword of the document that „if crime 
crosses borders, so must law enforcement‟ (iii). Despite the formal 
claims of knowledge transfer and sharing between nations and 
institutions, this is not always happening. Criticism exists in the way 
knowledge transfer seems to take place, which is not free of values 
or politics, making its content dependent on the individual 
transferring it. Knowledge transfer takes place between different 
nations which are dealing with different variations of the same 
crime, different typologies, terminologies, legislations and 
approaches. There is a broad spectrum of kidnappings, from 
ransom kidnappings to piracy and bride kidnapping. Costa (2005), 
in a synopsis of the counter-kidnapping manual, supports that 
„there are different definitions of the term “kidnapping” and 
different recording and reporting systems used in some countries‟. 
All of these contribute to a lack of clarity and difficulties, since in 
many cases, kidnappers have connections to more than one country 
in order to carry out the different aspects of a kidnapping, such as 
hiding or money laundering. This creates a muddle of terminology, 
both within the legal response and in the counter-kidnapping 
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strategies. This is why the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime argues that in order to be effective towards a counter-
kidnapping strategy, amongst other things, there should also be an 
attempt to harmonise the definitions and the constituent elements 
associated with kidnappings.3    
Regarding the process of knowledge formation and „best-
practices‟, its realisation begins with the local police who are 
developing and sharing their existing knowledge with international 
policing organisations such as the UN, Interpol and Europol, in 
order for this knowledge to be transferred to others. These 
developments have led to the view of supranational organisations 
and institutions as knowledge brokers, even though these 
organisations produce their knowledge through the assistance of 
practitioners. The international policing organisations are collecting 
and compiling the data identified as useful, and later they make this 
data accessible to nation-states through a variety of ways. With the 
contemporary scenario of transnational policing, „Interpol has 
expanded its activities significantly‟ (Newburn, 2008: 128) and 
there has been a similar change in many other transnational 
policing agencies. Valverde and Mopas (in Larner, Walters, 2004) 
have a different view, and they refer to Interpol-like institutions as 
flamboyant „policeman‟s club[s]‟ (248). They also emphasize the 
„non-global character of much policing, even of supposedly 
                                                          
3
 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/law-enforcement.html (accessed 10.10.2013) 
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international policing‟, (italics in original, 236) since they believe 
states remain the key venues for adopting and using the suggested 
“best-practices”. Sheptycki underlines the importance of knowledge 
within the police by saying that transnational police are mainly 
knowledge workers (2002: 49), The literature on policing is 
explaining superficially the knowledge-transfer processes, without 
looking deeper into how things work. This knowledge transfer is 
often explained as a process that runs very smoothly, without any 
issues or forces working as barriers, not only towards its transfer, 
but also towards its application. What I have seen from my 
research is that things are more complicated, and the counter-
kidnap personnel are not matching Sheptycki‟s view of the police 
officer as a „knowledge worker‟. There is resistance, unwillingness 
to cooperate, antagonism and misinformation and knowledge does 
not get transferred easily. 
 Sheptycki (2011) also noted the distinction between 
information and intelligence.  As it has been explained to him by a 
European Liaison Unit officer, background knowledge and 
experience are needed in order to transform information to 
intelligence. „Being able to get the appropriate information, 
transform it into useful intelligence, and see that it reached the 
attention of an operational officer who could make use of it [… is] 
an essential part of contemporary police work‟ (Sheptycki, 2011: 
91).  In the same way that information differs from intelligence, 
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one can also posit that information differs from knowledge. 
Knowledge management researchers have referred to the different 
nature of knowledge, information and data. Earl (1996) has 
suggested that knowledge is information that is tested and 
validated, and it is information that can be meaningful and useful to 
other people. For Primiero, „information has not in itself a truth 
value‟ (2008: 168), and on a similar note, others have discussed 
the hierarchical structure of data, information and knowledge: „data 
are required to produce information, but information requires more 
than just data […] Similarly, information is required to produce 
knowledge, but knowledge involves more than just information‟ 
(Gupta, Sharma, 2004: 188). Many theoreticians have added 
another layer of complexity by also referring to intelligence. For 
example for Weinberg (1989) intelligence is about having problem-
solving abilities, seeing all sides of a problem and generally keeping 
an open mind. It can be the ability to adopt effectively to new 
environments, to learn from experience and be able to overcome 
obstacles that might appear (Neisser et al., 1996). Sternberg 
(1999), among other things mentioned that intelligence is 
connected to problem-recognition and definition, strategy 
formation, resource allocation, and later the monitoring of the 
problem solving and its evaluation. Additionally, for Sternberg (ibid) 
an equally important role of intelligence is the analysis, the 
judgment, the evaluation and the assessment of the environment 
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around. Intelligence is goal-oriented and intelligence agencies are 
using their skills and knowledge to assess the world around them 
and solve the problems which are appearing.  
When someone transfers knowledge to another person or 
group of people, in many cases the input is received similarly to the 
way in which a body receives an injection, like something alien 
being forced inside. Knowledge acquisition takes time and it is the 
result of something deeper. It is the product of long experience, 
personal norms, world-views, and belief systems. Knowledge is 
very subjective, and it is based on the way each person 
understands and analyses the world around him or her. My 
argument is that people receive information and then it is up to 
each individual to create knowledge based on the information 
received. This can happen through a variety of ways, such as 
extended personal research, and practice, or simply by personal 
skills and understandings. Although the input is the same, different 
people can produce different knowledge as the end product of data 
and information. If someone has no knowledge or experience of the 
informational context received, then they will have to rely on the 
knowledge of others. However, for information to become 
knowledge, one has to evaluate the received information against 
their prior knowledge or ideas.  The mind cannot exist in a “tabula 
rasa” state, and the received information is difficult or even 
impossible to be handled with objectivity. The transition of received 
36 
 
information to knowledge is a very complex process. It is part of 
our human nature to project some elements of prior ideas to the 
incoming information, which can either become a burden to the 
transition or assist it and create knowledge from that information. 
As it has been mentioned before, an important aspect of 
transnational policing is related to the processing and exchanging of 
information around specific types of crimes. However, there is some 
skepticism and a form of resistance related to the activity of sharing 
the „best-practices‟ or simply sharing knowledge. Ekblom (2002) 
recognised some of the potentially problematic areas of sharing 
transnational knowledge. As he suggests, it is often assumed that 
the „path of good practice‟ (Ekblom, 2002: 133) is a „top-down 
implementation of detailed guidelines‟ (ibid). However, sometimes 
this implementation might be affected by a superficial and 
fragmented understanding, supported by inaccurate information 
(135). In many cases, information might be gathered by countries 
with different laws or different reporting and recording systems, 
leading to an incomplete criminological knowledge of the problem 
and consequently its solution as well. There is a „passive 
dissemination‟ (136) of knowledge which is not enough in dealing 
with serious criminal activities. Toolkits and best-practice manuals 
should „aim to supply a strategic and tactical framework for 
understanding local crime problems and contexts, and how to 
identify, implement and evaluate solutions‟ (137). In a sense, the 
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known knowledge is being forced by institutions, toolkits, protocols 
and best-practice manuals which just exist without offering any 
actual help. This knowledge becomes a fact, and it is a form of 
governance from institutions and organisations which have the 
power to influence and shape a reality.  
A number of institutions, protocols, manuals and toolkits are 
developed to assist practitioners in their operational settings. 
However, there is debate regarding how effective these are and the 
degree to which they are instituted in practice, and this is 
something I intend to answer in this thesis empirically. When it 
comes to the “how-to” manuals, they have a series of rules to be 
followed, and intent to create copies of models which were 
successful under specific frameworks. This might often lead to failed 
replications of the allegedly named “best practices” which are 
usually good under particular circumstances. As Ekblom argues, 
„one person‟s intervention method is another person‟s 
implementation principle‟ (149), and in the same way, when it 
comes to kidnappings, one country‟s counter-kidnapping practices 
might prove to be useless or even put the victim‟s life in danger if 
implemented in a completely different frame. Laycock and Webb 
(2000) maintain that organisations such as police, have the power 
to decide whether or not they are going to adopt and follow specific 
practices, but they are not always aware of the “know-how” 
practices. However, if one looks at this argument from a different 
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perspective, it can be said that those transnational organisations 
that supposedly have the “know-how” knowledge towards reducing, 
deterring and dealing with a crime, cannot always affect the local 
practices. On the ground level, the local policing activities appear to 
be different from what the transnational institutions are advertising 
as “best”. 
As Sheptycki has raised, when the collected data is removed 
from where they are locally situated, it becomes irrelevant, blurring 
their validity, veracity and reliability. „Centralization raises the 
potential for erroneous information to be taken at face value, which 
can have negative consequences for […] police operations‟ 
(Sheptycki, 2011: 98). Also, there should be proportionality and 
subsidiarity in the information-traffic, which should be controlled by 
the policy makers who are interested in the transnational policing 
(ibid). When it comes to knowledge transfer, there is an interplay 
between the local and the transnational, a blend of formal and 
informal collaborations. There is also a distinction between 
strategies and operations, what national police are trying to do and 
what they are actually doing.   
The police networks used for communication and knowledge 
transfer are enormous, dense, complex, and very powerful 
(Sheptycki, 2011: 97). With the evolution of information, 
communications technology, and the actual implementation of 
these two characteristics, came the „stitching together [of] agencies 
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which historically have been quite separate‟ (ibid). However, 
Sheptycki is categorical of this “stitching”, because he believes that 
some institutional dichotomies still remain, since the 
communication and knowledge transfer net has not developed 
homogenously. Supra-national institutions overlaying this 
patchwork have added another dimension to the institutional 
complexity, resulting in problematic communication „and potential 
institutional friction‟ (ibid). The national policing structures of a 
nation-state already suffer from the administrative burden, and the 
macro-level institutions (such as UN, Europol, Interpol) definitely 
add another layer of complexity on top of that (Sheptycki, 2011: 
98). He continues by noting that the best way to minimize the 
bureaucratic delay is through having „centralized data exchange by 
direct point-to point communication at the local and regional level‟ 
(Sheptycki, 2011: 97) For Bowling, researches and public inquiries 
have „raised questions about discrimination, corruption, 
incompetence and effectiveness in domestic policing and there is no 
reason to believe that policing “above government” will be immune 
from these problems‟ (2009: 158). 
Stabell and Fjelstad (1998), and later Geoff Dean and Petter 
(2007), when referring to police knowledge transfer, refer to the 
idea of a “value shop”. By that what they are saying is that police 
are problem-centred organisations trying to create value through 
providing a unique solution to unique problems. In the value shop 
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there are five primary activities, and these activities are: problem 
finding and its definition as well as information acquisition, problem 
solving, the solution choice, the solution execution and, finally, 
control. According to Geoff Dean and Petter (2007), these activities 
will define whether or not a police investigation has been or will be 
successful. However, through the modern knowledge sharing 
systems of documents, trainings and manuals, what is actually 
attempted is to eliminate the uniqueness of the solutions, with the 
goal to create “one size fits all” solutions. Even though the transfer 
of security knowledge offers a solution in the way a crime is 
addressed, the process of transferring knowledge does not always 
acknowledge the wide variety of factors affecting the application of 
this knowledge. In many cases, crimes are more complicated, and 
there is interaction between different variables. The knowledge 
about criminal activity and methods of combating crimes are 
derived from the output of very few countries and in the case of 
kidnaps, that knowledge is derived usually from just one nation4.  
Knowledge transfer in many cases offers a myopic view on 
problems, offering ill-suited customized solutions. Although 
knowledge transfer offers an insight to what is happening in other 
countries, it is still fragmentary and creates difficulties towards 
achieving the best possible results. In many cases the public sector 
is experiencing delays, there is no clear strategy or clear goal, and 
                                                          
4
 That nation is the United Kingdom and a few people from the country’s counter-kidnapping team in 
NCA has written the UNODC counter-kidnap manual   
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there might be noticed an inability to manage the knowledge 
received.  
The reality of the counter-kidnap knowledge transfer is very 
messy. All these issues raise significant questions about the quality, 
relativity and applicability of the knowledge that is being 
transferred, and they will be explored in this thesis. Ekblom stated 
that in some cases the available training is superficial and the oral 
transmission of knowledge may be limited, inaccurate, and there 
might also be „lack of contact and cultural common ground‟ 
between the trainers and the other officials (Ekblom, 2002: 135) 
hindering communication, collaboration and the transfer of 
information. An expected problem might be the misunderstanding 
of the transferred knowledge because of the fragmentary nature of 
interpretation and translation. Similarly, Guille (Lamieux, 2010) 
supports that the linguistic factor is an important aspect of 
cooperation and knowledge transfer. In many cases, as he explains, 
communication in a common language is more important than 
having common legislation and policies. Since most police officers 
are not multilingual, the linguistic factor becomes a central issue. 
„Cooperation with Southern countries […], has been mentioned as 
being very difficult […] Even if practitioners can deal with border 
languages, the communication link can easily be broken by other 
linguistic combinations (such as Greek-Finnish), which is a point 
where organizations created at European level could demonstrate 
42 
 
their unique contribution if approached in the right way.‟ (Lamieux, 
2010: 29)  Apart from the linguistic factor, something which 
apparently has a significant importance is having the same culture.  
Yao Kam and Chan (2007) investigated the impact that culture can 
have towards knowledge sharing in a Hong Kong governmental 
department, and the outcome of this research was that the varying 
Chinese culture works as a barrier to the sharing of knowledge. This 
makes us think that if there is a barrier between those who share 
different Chinese cultures, then the barriers between those coming 
from utterly different backgrounds and cultures will be significant.      
Police culture is about all those shared values and assumptions, 
and it can also include their special skills and knowledge, their 
vocabulary, their ways of thinking and operating, as well as written 
or unwritten rules. Police culture is often referred to as “cop 
culture” which is about the orientation of police officers or in other 
cases, referred to as “canteen culture” which can be used to 
describe the way that police officers talk about their cultural 
themes, their fears and frustrations (Bacon in Brown, 2014: 108; 
Hoyle, 1998: 75). However, others such as Crank (2015) and 
Newburn (2011), use the word „cultures‟, showing that there is not 
just one single police culture. This plurality makes sense, since 
there are various police departments, there is specialist and 
generalist police, as well as high and low policing methods. Most 
discussions around police cultures have focused on the generalist, 
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low policing, and street-level police officers. The organisational 
culture or the sub-culture has been recognized as the main element 
affecting the successful or not so successful sharing of information 
and knowledge within the organisation (Abrahamson, Goodman-
Delahunty, 2014: 4). High policing is an intelligence-based model 
that operates proactively, there is secrecy, extralegality, the use of 
informants, the state is identified as the victim or in threat and it is 
the job of those involved in high policing to protect the state 
(Brodeur, 1983; Brodeur, Dupont, 2006; Brodeur, 2007). These are 
some elements that Brodeur identified as characteristics of high 
policing and he insists that this particular mode of policing is carried 
out by the state and is about matters affecting it, such as terrorism 
or organised crime.  
Generalist and low policing are usually about the protection of 
victims and citizens as well as the maintenance of order in the day 
to day life, whereas specialist and high policing are related to the 
hierarchical position of an agency dealing with the cases, the ethos, 
the use of intelligence, the secrecy that is involved and the fact that 
it is about national security matters. However, there is a complex 
environment of low policing entering the terrain of high policing and 
the other way around (Brodeur, in Williamson, 2008). Non-state 
actors participate in the field of high policing and also use high-
policing techniques to protect their interests (O‟Reilly, Ellison, 
2006). There is fluidity of which agency or police section/unit is 
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dealing with which type of crime, and although kidnappings would 
not be considered a high policing matter, they are interestingly 
dealt as such. In the countries I have looked at, kidnappings are 
treated as a high policing matter by specialist police and agencies. 
National Crime Agency‟s Anti-kidnap and Extortion Unit is 
responsible for dealing with kidnaps in the United Kingdom and 
abroad. The NCA is an agency with a strong intelligence-led 
operational model and a police entity which attempts to deal with 
serious and organised crime proactively (Sergi, 2015). In Greece 
and Cyprus only specific people who have received training on 
kidnappings and negotiations participate at kidnap cases, along 
with the counter-terrorism squad. Some of the people I interviewed 
have been involved in the counter-terrorism department prior to 
moving to the department of crimes against life and property (in 
Greece this department is responsible for countering kidnaps). 
Kidnappings might be dealt with extralegality in some cases, there 
is the use of intelligence and informants, those participating 
(negotiators) are non-uniformed and there is secrecy around the 
details of the case. Such a reaction to what we would identify as 
non state-related and as a low policing matter, is possibly for 
funding purposes. By over-reacting to a crime that does not hold a 
threat to the state, and by putting up a show for the media and the 
people to observe with the heavily armed counter-terrorism squad, 
the helicopters, and the big white vans with expensive technical 
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equipment, all work as an excuse to ask for further funding, tools 
and means for those involved in the countering of the crime. In 
countries where there is little threat of terrorism, there is a high 
possibility that the funding, the tools, the technology and the 
knowledge is maintained by having a slightly exaggerated reaction 
to crimes that are not typically identified as major threats to the 
state. By reacting to kidnaps as a high policing matter, it possibly 
helps maintain a certain level of preparedness in case for instance a 
terrorist event happens.  
When it comes to low policing, the police uniform itself becomes 
a tool, bestowing power and authority upon its wearers. De 
Camargo (2012) argues that the police uniform gives a „celebrity‟ 
status to those wearing it. Police officers have a high rate of 
internal solidarity. This solidarity is something achieved through 
their training in the police academy where they acquire an “us 
against the others” mentality (Whitaker, 1982), as well as through 
wearing their uniforms. At this point it should be stated that 
although there has been discussion around the symbolic nature and 
the importance of police uniform, the non-uniformed, plain clothed 
police officers have not received the same attention. Kutz has 
stated that the uniform and pride are two things that are parallel to 
each other, even when as he argues „our own contributions lie at 
the insignificant margin‟ (2005: 171). The individual pride of police 
officers „makes sense because of [… their] participation in a 
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collective accomplishment‟ (Kutz, 2005: 172), and in a sense pride 
is the power of policing. 
There is a plurality of police cultures even inside the same 
organization, and how police are going to deal with a situation is 
dependent on the specific institutional culture. Generally, police are 
sharing their knowledge with other international and global 
institutions. However, it is quite possible that they are sharing only 
selective parts of what they know. When it comes to police 
negotiators, it can be argued that knowledge of such a serious type 
of crime is very valuable, thus it might be kept for personal use. 
Police-culture researchers have talked about the blue „code of 
silence‟ and police brotherhood among other things (Crank, 2015; 
Westmarland, 2006). Based on these findings, there is solidarity 
among police staff and those who do the opposite or complain 
about others tend to be ostracised as a form of punishment. 
However, as it was pointed out before, there are big differences 
between the various police cultures. Although in one culture police 
staff might remain silent to support another fellow police officer, in 
another police culture, staff might remain silent and secretive in 
order to keep information for themselves and move up the career 
ladder. Ericson has an interesting view on the issue of knowledge 
secrecy, and he refers to researches which have focused on the fact 
that „lower ranking officers maintain “low visibility” of their 
knowledge to sustain some autonomy from their superiors‟ 
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(Ericson, 1994: 155). The occupational culture of police has a 
hierarchical environment where any form of specialised knowledge 
is shared at a price which is usually not of an economic nature, but 
it can assist someone‟s career ascendance. Knowledge and 
information are treated as intellectual properties which can 
distinguish one police officer (the knowledge holder), from the 
others. Information and knowledge are transferred very selectively 
through entrepreneurial structures, in informal networks, where the 
„teacher‟ choses a small number of „students‟ (or often only one), in 
order to transfer the knowledge acquired through time and 
experience. This means that it is possible that limited attention is 
given to the formal manual-like documents.  Al-Athari and Zairi 
(2001) suggested that in many cases knowledge is regarded as a 
form of symbolic power, and thus knowledge is protected as a 
means of protecting and maintaining someone‟s work position. In 
addition, „knowledge sharing is often seen as resulting in a loss of 
power, and, as a result, knowledge that should be transferred is 
often withheld, leading to inefficiency‟ (Duan, Nie, Coakes, 2010: 
356). Especially in the public sector, knowledge is coupled with 
power and no one can force people into sharing their knowledge, 
since knowledge sharing might be regarded as a form of power 
loss. In the research of Seba and Rowley (2010) on the knowledge 
transfer in the public sector, an interviewee underlined the power of 
knowledge by saying: 
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…you might want to keep that knowledge and experience 
within so that you can perform better than someone else. 
Generally, people will hold on to the knowledge they have 
… People will hold back certain things it is human nature 
to do so. It makes you more employable […] It is a 
discretionary thing because if you want the organization to 
want to keep you and need you then you are going to 
want to hold a little bit back that makes you more 
employable… (621) 
It is expected that people with the needed experience will 
train others, so as to share the information and not retain it, but 
when it comes to knowledge sharing, as Seba and Rowle‟s (2010) 
interviewee argued, it is noticed that specific strategies are 
adopted. They also suggest that the most important finding that 
their study can offer, „is that no one of the organizations has an 
overarching knowledge management strategy or policy‟ (622). 
Intelligence goes along with policing, however, this intelligence, in 
some cases, is not defined by a free flow of information, due to the 
fact that „much of this knowledge is considered so sensitive [that] it 
can only be disseminated on a “need to know” basis‟ (Sheptycki, 
2002: 120). Secrecy becomes a tactic and, similar to Ericson‟s 
view, Sheptycki (2002) raises that knowledge is used as a 
„mechanism of solidarity for a tainted occupation by shielding police 
agents from the unwelcome gaze of outsiders‟ (121). Interestingly, 
according to Hock, Ling and San (2009), something that can 
influence the process of knowledge sharing in the public sector is 
the notion of trust. Robertson believes in the coexistence of trust 
and cooperation: „where cooperation exists, there is trust and 
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where there is trust, there is cooperation‟ (1994: 112). In a 
research on the factors which are affecting transnational knowledge 
transfer (Duan, Nie, Coakes, 2010), it was noticed that trust, 
combined with good communication and relationship, play an 
important role. Cultural awareness is significant, and also, as 
mentioned previously in this section, so is understanding the fact 
that having different language can be an extra barrier and an 
additional problem, especially when the quality of translation is 
poor. Other significant factors are the openness to accept new 
methods, the selection of the appropriate method to transfer the 
knowledge (seminars, workshops, case studies) and the selection of 
the right partners where there is not a significant knowledge 
distance between them and they all have a similar level. Also, there 
is the „need to have clear objectives and focus‟ (Duan, Nie, Coakes, 
2010: 362), and a common motivation or reason for collaboration, 
and in some cases the acceptance to get knowledge from outside. 
There is a lot of information around the production of knowledge, 
but there is less empirical emphasis on the reception and transfer of 
that knowledge. This is something that will be analysed in this 
thesis, and although it is difficult to make generalisations, it is quite 
likely that my findings can be applied to the transfer and application 
of all the high-security and sensitive policing knowledge.  
There are cases where knowledge is not always welcomed by 
practitioners inside an occupational culture. As McGoey (2012) 
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states, „knowledge is striated: always partial, always selective, and 
always vulnerable to dismissal or manipulation according to varying 
personal interests and structural constraints‟. Nescience is a vital 
barrier when it comes to police knowledge transfer (Dilley, 2010). 
People do not always want to know and in some cases they might 
even prevent it. In other words, negative knowledge is the „active 
consideration that to think further in a certain direction will be 
unimportant‟ (Gross, 2007). This strategic ignorance is a personal 
„self-induced myopia‟ (McGoey, 2012: 3), as well as „an institutional 
(in)action‟ (ibid).  
 
2.5 The Governance of Security and the Private Industry  
There is a steady and continuous tendency of nations to assign 
specific security-related jobs to private companies and individuals. 
Our traditional and archaic view of security being provided by the 
state is changing rapidly, even though Garland in 1996 talked about 
that change, and the new crime prevention approach. The 
“responsibilization strategy” as he said, was a new mode of 
governing crime which aimed at devolving the responsibility of 
security and crime prevention to organisations, agencies and 
individuals.  Programmes like the “neighbourhood watch”, or the 
“town watch” aim at creating active citizens, but this approach 
shows that the state alone is unable to prevent and control crime. 
On many occasions people are „persuaded to change their practices 
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in order to reduce criminal opportunities and increase informal 
controls‟ (Garland, 1996: 453). The states are no longer the only 
providers of security and safety to their citizens inside or outside of 
their borders. Private organisations, individuals and companies have 
sensed the need to fill actual or even perceived gaps created by the 
states, and they are ready to provide a diversity of services and 
products. The feelings of insecurity or of those actual threats have 
led to the emergence of privately sourced security. Security and the 
fear associated with the perceived or real absence of security, have 
become a commodity which is being sold and bought by those who 
can afford it, just like any other goods.  
Among other things, as commercial security we can include 
activities such as guarding, security consultancy, and 
investigations. These commercial security businesses can provide 
services to states, individuals, agencies, non-profit and non-
governmental organisations (Jones, Newburn, 2006: 37-38). Jones 
and Newburn (2006) tried to explain what has led to this global 
expansion of private security and as they state, there are a number 
of reasons which have created this expansion. The reasons they 
provide are only some possibilities and nothing is certain or at least 
they do not apply in every society. Nevertheless, they state that 
this privatization might be deliberate, as a form of transferring 
responsibilities from the state to someone else, in this case to 
private security providers. The division of responsibilities is part of a 
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state‟s governance, where different actors have different 
responsibilities. Such a division of responsibilities can lead to a 
state-corporate symbiosis. The limited budget police usually have, 
and the expenditure constraints, have possibly created a gap and a 
need which has been covered by the private industry. Apart from 
the need to restrict public spending, they also state that late 
modern society, the changing nature of the spaces and structural 
shifts have led to the neo-liberal privatization of crime control 
(Jones, Newburn, 2006: 6-8). Other people have offered a different 
explanation, for example, a reason which has led to the 
privatization of security is the fact that our lives take place in 
privately owned places, which are consequently privately secured 
as well. These places can range from gated communities to 
shopping centres, universities, hospitals and airports (Shearing, 
Stenning, 1987). A big part of our daily lives takes place in such 
privately owned spaces and properties and, on a similar note, Jones 
and Newburn have stated that the weakening of our ties with local 
places and the decreasing of people‟s local interactions have 
created a „heightened sense of (and fear of) the “other”‟ (2006: 8). 
This might potentially create a vicious cycle, since the more people 
see fences and security guards, the more insecure they will feel, at 
least those who cannot afford to keep up with the security-related 
developments. Fear, helplessness, and insecurity have become a 
characteristic of modern life and of course they have been 
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commodified in order to bring more capital to privately owned 
businesses. These businesses are using their reputation and 
connections to professionals across the world to create trust and 
produce a response to these feelings of insecurity and fear.    
The USA and the UK have a history of plural policing, 
meaning that it is not just the national police who are responsible 
for policing, but there are also private businesses ready to offer 
security in a variety of ways and situations. However, other 
countries such as Greece have shown a more cautious approach 
towards the expansion of private security businesses. This is 
possibly due to the fact that security has a very strong political 
usage and is „perceived as one of the core state functions‟ (Jones, 
Newburn, 2006: 7). There is no intention to say that Greece has no 
private security companies, but rather that their presence in the 
country has a short history. At this point it should be stated that 
public and private policing bodies have a complex relationship.  In 
some cases they co-exist, in other cases they are co-operating or 
they are simply competing with one another (Shearing, Stenning, 
1987: 51). The picture is complicated and it is constantly changing. 
As Ericson and Haggerty suggested (1997), there is information 
exchange between the public police and other private or public 
agencies where information is provided in order for others to base 
their strategies and activities. In addition to that, as Papanicolaou 
(in Jones, Newburn, 2006) has noted, although there is some 
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division between the police and the private investigators, there are 
also some similar characteristics and elements since „some of the 
investigators are former police officers‟ (87). Papanicolaou carries 
on to say that having a second, parallel, and in many cases secret 
job, is not something new for police officers.  Apart from secretly 
working for both the state and the private industry, the private 
firms are a place for those retirees who have established their 
position and have created a name whilst working in the police, in 
Special Forces, or in the Secret Intelligence Service. O‟Reilly states 
that when it comes to those security consultancies „informal access 
to powerful networks in their domicile states is another significant 
industry trait. The boardrooms of leading firms are often loaded 
with distinguished retirees from the political and security 
establishment‟ (2011: 184).    
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Within this section I have reviewed current literature and I have 
discussed four main themes which have emerged from my 
research. These themes are transnational policing, knowledge 
transfer and its barriers, and, finally, the privatisation of policing. 
These are the main key issues and there is a lot of scholarship on 
the movement of knowledge, there are documents and strategies 
on its importance, together with problems that might arise and the 
way to transfer it. However, these are only abstract theories but in 
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this thesis I am interested at what happens in real life, in the messy 
reality of police work, how information is received by practitioners, 
and how the protection of civilians from kidnappings has been 
transferred to private companies.  
As some people have stated, in our globalised world police 
are influenced by external forces and there is a blurring of 
boundaries. Some research has discussed that the locale is 
becoming less and less important since organisations and actions 
expand beyond the national borders.  Intranational organisations 
such as the UN, Europol and Interpol have contributed to the 
cooperation between nations and the shape of practices within 
them. Both policies and knowledge are being transferred, but 
policies are transferred and implemented in nations with similar 
cultures and backgrounds.  Knowledge is being transferred more 
liberally and it is not necessarily being transferred between similar 
nations and contexts. Knowledge is first codified and then it gets 
transferred. This is done in order for the police to have better 
performance and efficiency. In addition to that, the decision 
making, according to some researchers, becomes easier and less 
time-consuming. However, there is criticism associated with the 
transfer of knowledge and its feasibility and a reason for that is 
because knowledge differs from information. There are different 
types of kidnaps, different definitions, as well as reporting and 
recording systems from one geographical location to the other, thus 
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is useful for one person can be utterly useless for the person 
receiving it. This uniformed approach is different from the general 
idea of what police do, which is to offer different and unique 
approaches to problems in order to achieve successful results. 
Research has been conducted around the police culture(s) and 
characteristics such as their pride, the uniforms they wear and the 
code of silence when it comes to supporting their colleagues. Some 
believe that a big part of police work is based on knowledge 
exchange and transfer. However, as it has been mentioned in this 
literature review, not all occupational cultures welcome new 
knowledge and also knowledge can have a symbolic power, hence it 
might be kept for personal use. This chapter concludes with the 
section on the privatization of policing, where security has created a 
complex environment. Both private and public organisations provide 
security, and they can have a competitive, co-existing or co-
operative relationship. However, there is a tendency towards more 
and more private security businesses taking over the role of 
providing security to the public.  
In this thesis I will be using kidnappings as an exemplar, 
whilst attempting to unpack the complex environment of high 
security knowledge transfer by discussing how policing practices are 
influenced by external factors. I will be looking at the range of 
influences affecting kidnapping responses. By using tangible 
evidence from my ethnographic research in Cyprus and the 
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interviews I held with counter-kidnapping practitioners, I will 
explain why the counter-kidnapping knowledge transfer is not 
useful and does not work. Finally, in the last section of the thesis I 
will be talking about the interconnectedness of public organisations 
and private businesses which are responsible for dealing with 
ransom kidnapping cases. This thesis aims to fill some gaps in our 
knowledge. There is a lot of conceptual and theoretical work 
towards understanding knowledge transfer, but not many people, to 
my knowledge, have looked at what these practices are and how 
that knowledge is interpreted by practitioners on the ground, in an 
empirical and very localized sense. There is academic discussion 
around globalisation and glocalisation, but my research looks at 
these things from a more practical viewpoint. I will not just look at 
how a high-security set of information is being transferred and what 
that includes, but I will also look at what happens when information 
lands somewhere and is expected to be transferred, understood and 
applied by practitioners. The thesis will conclude by looking at how 
certain barriers have led to the creation of a very strong private risk 
management and counter-kidnap sector, underlining the limits of 
the state and showing the responsibilisation of citizens to stay safe. 
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methods applied while researching the 
topic of this thesis. For this research a qualitative case study 
approach was chosen in order to investigate and analyse a variety 
of issues associated with the high security transfer of counter-
kidnap knowledge. This specific type of crime was chosen in order 
to understand the way police are responding to it, and in order to 
critically analyse the literature and all the global processes that 
occur. I will look at how knowledge production, transfer and 
application are related to the ways of dealing with ransom 
kidnapping cases in Greece, the United Kingdom and Cyprus. 
However, it should be noted that this research is not comparative, 
and I am not planning on comparing the exact same variables in 
these three different nations. More specifically, in this thesis I am 
looking at the local production of the counter-kidnaping knowledge, 
the way it is articulated, the movement of information, and the 
reasons behind this movement, as well as the kidnapping practices 
in these three different locations. This thesis will be expanded with 
a thematic analysis of specific patterns within the collected data, as 
well as documentary analysis, and a small ethnography with police 
negotiators in Cyprus. In this chapter I will provide the justification 
for the chosen methodology, and I will give details of the study 
design, the data collection process and the data analysis, along with 
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problems I faced during the interviews, as well as some ethical 
considerations.  
 
3.2 Justification of Methodology 
This thesis is a qualitative research study, and the data came from 
a thematic analysis of interviews conducted in two nations, from the 
analysis of official documents associated with kidnappings, to a 
small ethnography with 28 participants in a third nation. As it is 
going to be explained in the following paragraph, I decided to 
conduct qualitative research because I had limited knowledge of the 
topic and also because I wanted to use an interpretivist approach 
for the analysis of my data.  
Kidnapping for ransom is used as a case study for the 
interrogation of the existing literature on knowledge transfer and 
the analysis of what is actually happening around the transfer of 
counter-kidnap high security techniques. This case study is a means 
of examining the way knowledge is constructed and articulated by 
those who produce it and use it. There is an uneven application of 
different knowledge, and the local context has a big impact upon 
the shaping of this knowledge and the chosen approach. This 
research is not implying any generalisation of the findings towards 
other types of high security knowledge transfer, but it is specifically 
focusing on the ways of dealing with ransom kidnapping cases in 
the nations I have looked at, from the perspective of those 
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interviewed. A qualitative research method was chosen because it 
provides room for interaction with participants and it is also the 
only way to look at something which has not been investigated 
before, as I will explain further below. There has been a very 
limited research on kidnappings in the past, mainly by psychologists 
studying the effects of trauma to the hostages, which meant that I 
had no prior knowledge before starting my research. My limited 
knowledge created the need for an open-ended approach where 
meanings and answers emerge at the end of the process. With 
partial and imperfect knowledge, researchers do not know how 
things are or how they work until they start talking to people who 
are operating within the field. In addition to that, qualitative 
research can help towards questioning the initial ideas and 
rationales, and even go beyond them. When it comes to the 
transfer of high security knowledge, numbers are not important, 
whereas patterns or even a single informant can unfold key ideas 
and impel the analysis of the researched topic. In addition to that, 
the counter-kidnap field is extremely small, making it impossible to 
conduct any statistical research. Ontology tries to objectively 
answer how we measure the world around us. However, I believe 
that the world around us is not something that we can objectively 
measure. At least when it comes to the social sciences, the world is 
created by its inhabitants and the way they engage with and 
understand the world around them, and the effects this can have on 
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their practices. Social phenomena and their meaning are constantly 
being constructed by social actors, and this is what my research is 
interested in. (Crowther, Fussey, 2014: 42). I am using an 
interpretivist approach which means that knowledge and 
phenomena in general are subjective and there is not one single 
truth, but rather many interpretations which are internally and 
subjectively constructed by each individual. The focus of my 
research is on the subjective reality of the stakeholders, those 
involved in the counter-kidnap businesses and those who have been 
directly affected by the counter-kidnap practices. I am trying to 
understand the world in which these people operate, without any 
attempt to measure anything, simply because there is not an 
objective reality that we all share, and that can be measured. I am 
trying to understand how specific people make sense of their 
environment, how they interpret it, the ways in which they frame 
their interactions, the language they use, their resistance to 
knowledge and their acceptance of other things, as well as their 
culture. This thesis has been written based on how these individuals 
view themselves and the world around them. As Crowther and 
Fussey have perfectly summarised it „interpretivists acknowledge 
the subjective and value-laden character of social action, people‟s 
beliefs, and the researcher‟ (2014: 41). I have tried to look at their 
world through their eyes, however this research is subjective and 
there is no attempt to over-generalise. This inability to generalise 
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might be seen as an issue, but this research focuses on a specific 
group of people who operate in a specific field, and other 
researches in the future can potentially check whether my 
observations apply to other fields apart from the counter-kidnap 
one.      
Inductive thematic analysis is used to identify meaningful 
information that can provide an answer to the research question, 
aiming to construct meaning without being based on any 
preconceptions. Braun and Clarke, while discussing thematic 
analysis in the study of psychology, state that inductive thematic 
analysis is „a process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a 
pre-existing coding frame‟ (2006: 89). I accept that it is difficult for 
researchers to work in a theoretical, epistemological or ideological 
vacuum, and neutrality is not always possible. However, in this 
research and in the responses of those interviewed, everything is 
subjective, and what I am interested in is how these people see the 
world through their own eyes. This research is looking at 
subjectivities, where the interviewees‟ linguistics, values, meanings 
and standpoints become part of the analysis. It is an 
epistemological analysis of how those who are somehow connected 
to dealing with ransom kidnappings interpret and make sense of the 
world around them. The subjective view has a high value because 
human actors affect „the social world in multiple ways, and they 
interpret and construct meaning from their surroundings‟ 
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(Crowther-Dowey, Fussey, 2013: 41). A difficulty with working with 
an inductive thematic analysis is that the process of searching for 
themes and identifying the useful data which can be used in the 
analysis takes longer. First, I had to collect most of the data and 
then I had to look for significant themes to use so as to construct 
my thesis around them. 
In this thesis there is also document analysis of official 
manual-style documents created by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the European Network of Advisory 
Teams (EuNAT). The United Nations Counter Kidnapping manual 
was not publically available, and after many requests to gain access 
to it in order to read it, always by using my status as a researcher, 
the law enforcement advisor from the anti-organised crime and 
illicit drug trafficking implementation and support section emailed 
me explaining that: „when published, these [the manual on 
kidnappings] were made available to national competent authorities 
and later, further developed into a training course for first 
responders. Unfortunately this material is one of the few UN 
publications not freely available, rather it is only provided to 
national competent authorities of Member States.‟  However, I 
managed to get hold of this manual when it unexpectedly appeared 
online for a few hours only, which possibly had been due to a 
system failure. The EuNAT prevention and coping strategies 
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manuals created by EUROPOL and, contrary to the UNODC 
document, is available online.  
The final method used in this research is ethnography. I 
undertook a small ethnography with the Cypriot police negotiators, 
where I got the chance to spend five days with them, from eight 
o‟clock in the morning until seven o‟clock in the evening.  During 
this ethnography, I observed the training and the exercises from 
the point of view of the participants, and I also got the opportunity 
to present an introductory three-hour session on kidnappings. This 
ethnography was a great opportunity to experience personally what 
these negotiators experience during these training-events, as well 
as to observe their practical aspect within the exercises and the 
presentations that take place. My observation and participation in 
the annual negotiators‟ training in Cyprus was a great way to see 
how useful knowledge transfer events are and how the practitioners 
viewed a variety of issues. Participant observation is a technique 
which is widely used in cultural ethnography because it is a great 
way to see how people behave in their natural environment. Police 
are very secretive and this is a characteristic that appears intrinsic 
if not throughout the world, then in most nations, however, my 
ethnography gave me the opportunity to write about an 
occupational culture which is not easily accessible and although 
people have discussed it, not many of them have actually had 
access to observe and participate in it. Not only did I experience the 
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content of their re-training, but I also became immersed in their 
occupational culture by having lunches with them and, in general, 
spending a big part of my days in Cyprus with them. Apart from 
experiencing how high-security knowledge-transfer events work, I 
also noticed things, heard comments and questions that otherwise I 
would not be party to. This gave me a better understanding of their 
specific police sub-culture, how they view themselves compared to 
others, as well as their knowledge and ideas around counter-
kidnap.     
 
3.3 Interviews 
The interviews had a semi-structured format, with a set of 
questions asked of my interviewees during our discussion and, 
later, after I got more used to interviewing people (possibly after 
the fifth interview) I began noting themes which needed to be 
covered. Although the interviews were discussions where the 
interviewees were free to talk about whatever they wanted, at the 
beginning I had a set of a few questions (an interview probe) which 
I wanted to ask during our discussion, but later I refined my way of 
interviewing from questions to themes once my understanding for 
the field developed. Semi-structured interviews were preferred over 
structured interviews, because kidnappings and counter-kidnapping 
issues are under-researched, and the only way to penetrate the 
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field and gain knowledge on a very esoteric and hidden topic was 
through having a flexible conversation. Semi-structured interviews 
offered the opportunity of drifting and departing from the scheduled 
questions, and asking new ones which allowed me to explore more 
diverse areas. The semi-structured interviews enabled me to 
compare different responses, so that I could focus on particular 
themes for the thematic analysis. The interviews were as close to 
an everyday discussion as possible, where I would follow the replies 
of the interviewees and usually ask further questions or offer my 
view on the topic discussed, in the hope of further discussion. After 
making the interviewees feel comfortable for a few minutes, the 
interviews would usually begin with a general question aiming at 
understanding the level of knowledge of the person being 
interviewed. I would start with questions such as „When did you 
initially receive your knowledge on dealing with this type of crime?‟, 
„Were you trained specifically for kidnapping cases?‟, „Who was the 
person who trained you?‟. If the interviewees could answer these, I 
would go onto more specific questions and ask them if they had 
actually participated as negotiators in any case, and if they had, 
then in which one, or, if not, then why they think this might be the 
case. Other discussions were related to the content of the training 
events they have attended, if they found them interesting and 
helpful, why they think Greece is now training other countries, and 
why they have chosen to be kidnap-negotiators. Many people from 
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the Greek police were interviewed more than once, whereas all the 
other practitioners from Cyprus and the United Kingdom were only 
interviewed once. When it comes to the interviews of the kidnapped 
individuals and/or their families, I began the interviews by asking 
them to say a few words about their kidnapping, while at the same 
time we were having a normal conversation. At this point it should 
be mentioned that the only interview which was more structured 
was with the high ranking NCA official. The interview was still semi-
structured but because of the fact that I could only talk to him 
during a fifteen-minute break (at the London counter-kidnapping, 
hijacking and hostage-taking event), I had to be prepared with a 
set of questions. Of course, during these fifteen minutes we also 
discussed other things, but the questions I asked him were these: 
„What is the importance of the UK experience for other countries?‟, 
„Why does the UK train other nations?‟, „What is the importance of 
international standards?‟, „Are other nations such as Greece and 
Cyprus well equipped to deal with such a crime?‟, „Are nations 
facing similar problems (in terms of kidnap)?‟, and, finally, „Are any 
problems with the sharing of practices?‟. By asking these questions 
I took the advantage of meeting with one of the people conducting 
the knowledge transfer and dealing with kidnaps inside the United 
Kingdom, in order to find more information about the view of those 
who create and transfer the counter-kidnap knowledge. Within this 
interview, the official explained to me his reasoning behind the 
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importance of knowledge transfer, what he thinks of those who 
have received that knowledge, and whether these events have 
made a substantial difference to the way things are done. 
 
3.4 Interviewees and Access 
Timeline of events: 
July 2013: Met with 5 police officers in two different cities, as well 
as a prison manager and a social worker who happened to be there 
when I visited the prison manager.  All these people had very 
minimal kidnap-related knowledge. 
September 2013: Interviews with ex-hostages and family 
members [interviewees 2, 3, 4]. One of the interviewees introduced 
me to the most experienced negotiator in Greece [interviewee 6] 
with whom I briefly talked in a couple of other occasions in the 
future.  
October 2013: Police replied to a formal demand I placed in June 
2013 in order to talk to police negotiators involved in kidnappings. 
They emailed with the name of a negotiator. After exchanging a few 
emails I flew to Greece to interview him [interviewee 7]. I also 
talked to two other negotiators [interviewees 8, 20] 
February 2014: The Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection 
replied to an email I send a month ago stating that there are no 
statistics held on kidnappings.  
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November 2014:  Met a high ranking police officer to ask for his 
assistance to help me identify and interview people who are 
involved in kidnaps. He immediately introduced me to a police 
psychologist who after a few of my questions said that he does not 
have any relevant experience. During my interview with the high 
ranking official he referred to two cities in Greece where re-
trainings take place. Two days after I visited both places to talk to 
people. 
November 2014: Interviewed and talked to people I have talked 
to in the past [interviewees 6, 7, 9] and also interviewed the person 
who is organising the trainings and re-trainings [interviewee 21] 
with whom we met a year later as well.  
April 2015: An informant emails me saying that in five days there 
is going to be a re-training of the Greek negotiators by a team of 
three coming from England. Attempted to participate and/or 
observe at this re-training by emailing and calling the Minister of 
Interior Affairs, the minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection, 
ex-hostages, the head of the Greek police and contacts from those 
in the police without any success. The Centre of Security Studies 
which also was the donor of the re-training decided to deny my 
participation and I received a fax announcing that decision.  
May 2015: Attended the 6th conference on Tackling Kidnapping, 
Hijack and Hostage Take in London which lasted for two days. 
There I interviewed many people mainly from the private sector 
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[interviewees 10, 13, 15, 25, 28]. With many of these people we 
met again in similar events in the future. In this event I also briefly 
met a former kidnap hostage [interviewee 29] 
May 2015: Went back to Greece to talk to two police negotiators 
[interviewees 7, 16] who took part to the re-training I was not 
allowed to attend. They both said that the re-training was on 
terrorist incidents and focused on ISIS related exercises. I also met 
with the man organising the re-trainings who mentioned that the 
Cypriot negotiators have been trained in the location where he 
worked and promised to email me with the details of one of them. 
July 2015: I received the email and phone number of a police 
officer in Cyprus and after a brief chat with the Cypriot officer he 
said he could not help me but offered to find someone who could. A 
few days later he emailed me with the details and the email address 
of the main negotiator in Cyprus [interviewee 12] 
August 2015: Finally talked on the phone with the Cypriot 
negotiator [interviewee 12] and he mentioned the upcoming re-
training. When I asked if I can attend to observe or even participate 
he offered to ask a high-ranking counter-terrorism official. He called 
a few days later to inform me about his positive reply and that I will 
have to present something. In September and October we talked 
and exchanged emails a few more times. 
November 2015: Participation and observation of the re-training 
of the police negotiators of Cyprus where I interacted with all those 
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who participated and mainly with the main Cypriot negotiator who 
is organising there re-trainings [interviewees 11, 17, 18, 19, 22]. I 
also got the opportunity to talk to the mother of a former kidnap 
hostage from Cyprus [interviewee 5] 
February 2016: Attended the Expert Analysis: Emerging Trends in 
Kidnap for Ransom in London, organised by KR Magazine, where I 
met and talked to many practitioners from the private sector and 
some others who were working in organisations and NGOs 
[interviewees 20, 26, 27]. 
April 2016: Attended the 7th conference on Tackling Kidnapping, 
Hijack and Hostage Taking in London where I met and interviewed 
and talked to many people [interviewees 1, 10, 13, 23, 24, 25, 30] 
June 2016: I found and contacted through social media a retired 
police negotiator with whom we arranged for a skype interview the 
week after [interviewee 14].  
 
This is a research with high heterogeneity, both in terms of 
the background of the people interviewed (public and private field 
practitioners, insurers, hostages and family members) as well as 
the various national units and agencies involved in countering 
kidnaps in the UK, Greece and Cyprus. United Kingdom is very 
organised, with a specialist unit in place, NCA‟s Anti-Kidnap and 
Extortion Unit. NCA is an agency and a police entity which works 
proactively and is using intelligence to deal with serious crimes. The 
72 
 
fact that the Anti-kidnap and Extortion Unit is a specialist one 
means that those countering the cases are experts on these 
particular crimes and their roles inside the agency are associated 
with these matters only. This is something that is different from the 
other two police units I have looked at, the Greek one and the 
Cypriot one.  
In Greece those dealing with kidnaps belong to the 
Department of Crimes Against Life and Property which is 
responsible for various crimes such as crimes against life, crimes 
against property, extortion, disappearances and missing persons. 
This department is often otherwise called by police officers and the 
media as the “Homicides Department” because the majority of the 
cases investigated are about this particular crime. The people that I 
have interviewed in Greece belong to this department, and very few 
of them, those with adequate training and experience, will be called 
in case there is a kidnap. Those negotiators are the intermediaries 
between the family and the kidnappers, as well as have their eyes 
and ears open to gather any information or intelligence they can 
find and even in some cases interrogate suspects. In both Greece 
and Cyprus there is not a specific unit exclusively dedicated to 
countering kidnaps and those dealing with kidnaps have at least 
one more role inside the police. Cyprus has an Emergency 
Response Unit where a few people are trained negotiators, but only 
three have more specialised knowledge and experience in order to 
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participate to a kidnap. Greece and Cyprus both have a very small 
number of people who can be asked to participate to a kidnap case 
and their role in some cases can also involve intelligence gathering 
and informal interrogation-like conversations with people from the 
family and friends environment who are seen as potential suspects. 
In the United Kingdom, the role of people is more clear-cut and 
defined compared to Greece and Cyprus, of course this is because 
the two later countries have more restricted budgets and personnel 
so there is not willingness to have a team of people only working 
whenever there is a kidnap.   
  The majority of the people interviewed for this thesis were 
connected to kidnappings and they were either interviewed in the 
annual counter kidnapping, hijacking and hostage-taking events in 
London, or they were approached through snowballing. Apart from 
the 30 interviews that I am quoting from within my thesis, there 
are also 11 additional people who have been approached and 
interviewed without however using any quotes inside my thesis 
(from these 11 interviews). Seven (7) Greek police officers agreed 
to be interviewed in various parts of Greece, and one (1) Cypriot 
police officer was interviewed via phone, one (1) prison manager, 
one (1) prison social worker5 both interviewed in a Greek prison, 
one (1) police psychologist. However, the interesting issue is that 
                                                          
5
 I interviewed these two people because in many Greek cases of kidnappings, if not all of them, some 
of the organisers of the kidnaps are prisoners, making arrangements from inside the prisons. I wanted 
to understand what they think about that and why this happens. Both the interviewees explained 
that prisons are overcrowded and extremely understaffed.  
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all of these people have never been to a kidnapping incident, or a 
kidnap training-event, and they did not reveal that before the 
scheduled interview. Although I informed them about the topic of 
my research they agreed to meet me without informing me that 
they could not be of any help. In almost all cases I travelled to 
various Greek cities just for these interviews but without receiving 
the information I was hoping for. In most cases after having a quick 
chat in their offices or in cafes, they would simply tell me that they 
could not help me, or in other cases they would pretend they know 
things about kidnaps, but it would be the things they have read on 
the news, without having any personal experience of kidnaps 
themselves. All these non-helpful interviews demonstrate that these 
people wanted the status attached to being in the counter-kidnap 
team, however, once you scratch the surface through questions, 
there is not a lot of significant knowledge within. There is a value to 
them in terms of their self-esteem and the way they are viewed by 
their colleagues and outsiders. My understanding was that they 
would like to be viewed as part of those involved in the countering 
of a kidnapping, which demonstrates the range of people who claim 
to be kidnap practitioners and experts. There is a symbolic value in 
having the identity of a kidnap negotiator which is also shown by 
the fact that those involved into kidnaps were differentiating 
themselves from other police sub-cultures, showing that they are 
higher-up on the police career ladder.   
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Apart from those unhelpful interviewees, during my time in 
Cyprus I interacted with almost all of the participants of the training 
(28 people) in an ethnographic way. However, only three (3) of 
them have kidnap-related experience, after negotiating a 
kidnapping incident. For this thesis I have interviewed and spoken 
to a variety of practitioners in the counter-kidnap field, and I have 
received information from various stakeholders involved into 
kidnappings for ransom: hostages and their families, police-
negotiators, police trainers, those who are organising the national 
police training-events and exercises, people responsible for creating 
contingency plans, those who are paid to evacuate people from 
dangerous situations, insurers, NGO representatives, and those who 
are responsible for managing risk. In this thesis there are 
interviews and quotes from people who operate in many different 
parts of the world, however it should be noted that there are not 
many practitioners in the counter-kidnap field. In each country 
there are only a few police negotiators who are equipped with 
knowledge around kidnappings, because they would travel to other 
areas of the country if there is such a kidnap case. Not only there 
are very few practitioners, but there is also a very small number of 
people who are trained and experienced enough to negotiate in a 
kidnapping case. In addition to that, there are few private 
companies specialising in counter-kidnap, and they tend to be 
based in one nation but work around the globe. I have tried to 
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provide a wide range of experiences in order to adequately 
interrogate my research questions concerning counter kidnapping 
practices, and the ways in which knowledge becomes transferred 
and imported into domestic contexts.  The small number of kidnap-
related research, shows that it is not that no one has taken interest 
in kidnappings before, but rather that the difficulty to access such a 
secretive world has prevented other researchers from doing so.  
 
3.5 Greece: Access Rejection, Before, During and After 
the Interviews 
Before my interviews in Greece I prepared myself by reading online 
about kidnap cases that have happened in the past. In this thesis, 
all the interviews have been case specific. This means that they 
were designed based on the characteristics of the interviewee. The 
location, the duration of the interview, the introduction of myself 
and my research topic, as well as the tone of the interviews, were 
all tailored to each individual subject. Regarding the timing of the 
interviews, it should be said that there was a variation in the 
duration of the interviews. The shortest interview lasted for around 
one hour, while the longest one lasted for two hours and thirty 
minutes in duration. Interestingly, the higher the interviewee‟s rank 
inside the police, the shorter the interviews were. This was 
obviously because of time restrictions, due to their heavy workload, 
but also it was potentially due to their fear of revealing too much 
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information, which can expose them and jeopardize their position. 
At this point it should be stated that I had to initiate a rapport-
building process (Ceglowski, 2000; Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005; 
Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, Liamputtong, 2007) which involved 
around 30 minutes at the beginning of each interview to talk about 
irrelevant things before I could talk about what I was there to talk 
about. Glense and Peshkin have described rapport as a „distance-
reducing, anxiety quieting, trust building mechanism‟ (1992: 94) . 
Similarly to that, I could not just get up and leave after the end of 
the interview so each interview would end with a more general 
discussion of, usually, irrelevant to my research things. According 
to Daly, a qualitative researcher needs to be a „fair exchange‟ 
(1992: 2) with both researcher and interviewees participating and 
contributing in the sharing process. I have used self-disclosure to 
enhance rapport and even though I could not have a „fair exchange‟ 
with kidnap victims and police officers, I tried to be a 
compassionate and empathic active listener.  
Interviewing police officers is not easy and as Pini (2008) 
believes interviews are not a straightforward extraction of 
information from an informant (36). Some men might use a 
research interview as a dramaturgical task (Schwalbe, Wolkomir, 
2003); they might underline their masculine identity by trying to 
control the interview, by showing expertise and by sexualising the 
researcher. At this point it should be stated that I had to initiate a 
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rapport-building process (Ceglowski, 2000; Liamputtong and Ezzy, 
2005; Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, Liamputtong, 2007) which 
involved around 30 minutes at the beginning of each interview to 
talk about irrelevant things before I could talk about what I was 
there to talk about. Glense and Peshkin have described rapport as a 
„distance-reducing, anxiety quieting, trust building mechanism‟ 
(1992: 94)6. Similarly to that, I could not just get up and leave 
after the end of the interview so each interview would end with a 
more general discussion of, usually, irrelevant to my research 
things. According to Daly, a qualitative researcher needs to be a 
„fair exchange‟ (1992: 2) with both researcher and interviewees 
participating and contributing in the sharing process. I have used 
self-disclosure to enhance rapport and even though I could not 
have a „fair exchange‟ with kidnap victims and police officers, I tried 
to be a compassionate and empathic active listener.  
For this thesis, amongst others, I have interviewed police 
officers, and this specific group of people, characterised by their 
cop-culture, can be the epitome of machismo, shaping the interview 
process. Female researchers (Cmpbell, 2003; Horn, 1997; Oakley, 
1981) have talked about the, not so rare, sexualisation of 
researchers by male research participants and interviewees. 
                                                          
6
 Although I acknowledge it, I will not get into the details of Oakley’s (1981) opposition on the use of 
rapport because of its manipulative nature. However I want to mention that the fact that some of my 
interviewees did not provide the data I was hoping for is a sign that the reason behind building 
rapport was not to manipulate the interviewees and force them to say things they did not plan on 
saying, but to create a relaxing atmosphere and build trust. 
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Sexualising is usually about control and even the physical site of an 
interview is yet another factor affecting power relations (Elwood, 
Martin, 2000). According to Schwalbe and Molstein (in Gubrium, 
Holstein, 2001), the researcher can reduce such a behaviour of 
male interviewees by showing symbolic control. This can be done 
through a business-like attire, by paying close attention yet at the 
same time showing a cool disinterest, by always returning the 
discussion back to the subject and by having the interviews in 
public locations. These are all things I did either consciously or 
subconsciously, apart from the fact that in a few occasions the 
interviews took place in their personal offices. However, two  of my 
interviewees asked me to go out for drinks later that night of the 
interviews „to meet [me] better and show me the city‟ as one of 
them said, which I politely refused in both cases, risking to miss 
interesting data, but making sure that the lines were not crossed.  
Moving on to „repair mechanisms‟ (Silverman, 1993:132), this 
was a technique that I had to use with two police offers who were 
quite senior within the police force. For instance, these two men 
remained silent for a few, uncomfortable, seconds in many 
occasions, not following the unwritten „rules‟ of conversation, 
without responding to a question or a comment. Some repair 
mechanisms that I implemented were to try and fill the silence 
through speaking again and either rephrasing the 
question/comment or simply commenting on the difficulty of the 
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topic discussed. However, even those interviewees who said very 
little either referred me to other people who were more experienced 
in kidnappings, or said something which moved my research a step 
forward (such as saying that the counter-kidnapping training-
events take place in two training centres in Greece, so I arranged 
visits to both of them in order to speak with people who might 
somehow be involved).  
In April 2015, I was informed by one of my interviewees that 
in five days‟ time there was to be a negotiators‟ re-training 
workshop to take place in Athens. All I knew about the topic of this 
training was that it was going to be delivered by people from 
Greater Manchester police, and it was going to be related to 
hostage negotiations of cases where there are terrorist groups 
involved. Even five days before the training, my informant was not 
sure whether there was going to be any discussion about 
negotiating kidnapping cases, so I could not risk not being there. I 
only had a few days to negotiate my participation in the training, 
and to ask for official access to either present to or observe the 
event. In order to achieve that, I sent an official request to various 
people Greek ministries, and after finding, through my connections, 
the personal fax number of the head of the Greek police, I send a 
fax stating who I am, what I am doing and how I can help (for 
instance what I can present). At the same time I contacted a 
negotiator and trainer who I interviewed in 2014, and he is 
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regarded as the most experience negotiator in the country. In 
addition to these attempts, knowing that in most cases kidnap 
victims and their families maintain a good relationship with those 
who negotiated their release, I contacted one of the former kidnap 
victims to ask if he knew of anyone who could help me. All my 
efforts were fruitless and no one was able to offer any help. The 
day before the beginning of the training-event, someone from the 
Centre of Security Studies (ΚΕΜΕΑ in Greek) called me, saying that 
they would not be able to allow any outsiders to attend the event 
and that this was to be an exercise for a very select few. Later I 
learned that the Centre of Security Studies was the sponsor of this 
specific training-event and that the head of the Greek police had 
asked them to make a decision and inform me. The second day of 
the event I also received a fax stating the reason why I was not 
allowed to attend.  [check photo in section 6.5 for the fax received 
by the Greek police rejecting my application to observe and/or 
participate at the training]  
A month after the training-event, I interviewed two 
negotiators who were there, and we briefly talked about the content 
and the exercises they did. They did not share much information, 
but they told me that it was mainly about general hostage-
situations and the main focus was on ISIS, while the exercise was 
about a plane hijacking with hostages taken by the ISIS terrorists. 
When I asked them to tell me some titles of sessions, or enclose 
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more information, they both said that they could not remember 
details, but they really liked the trainers from the United Kingdom‟s 
Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Unit.     
 
3.6 Cyprus: Access Acceptance, Before, During and After 
the Interviews 
At the end of an interview with the person who was organising the 
police training and re-training-events in Athens, I asked him if there 
was any chance to interview anyone from Cyprus, because during 
our interview he referred a couple of times to the fact that the 
Cypriot kidnapping negotiators were trained in Athens. He could not 
help me at that point, but a week later he emailed me the contact 
details of someone who was on the team of trainees who had 
visited Athens a few years ago to receive kidnap-related 
information. He gave me the email address, as well as two phone 
numbers which belonged to a police officer, and immediately I tried 
to send an email to him, asking to arrange a skype interview. 
However, I soon found out that both the email and one of the 
phone numbers were wrong, while the second number was the 
landline of his house. When he answered the phone, he was very 
polite and he told me that he is not the right person for an 
interview, because he has never been to any counter-kidnap 
training-event, and he is not even a negotiator. However, he 
seemed to be very interested in my research and the fact that he 
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did his degree in an English university created a very positive 
atmosphere, so he promised to try and find information about 
someone who might be relevant to kidnappings. He kept his 
promise, and a few days later he sent an email with the name of a 
negotiator and his email address. This negotiator has taken part in 
a kidnapping, he is transferring his knowledge to other negotiators, 
and he is also organising the annual negotiation training-events. 
Our interview went really well, and although he refused to state 
that he was trained by the Greek police (something which confused 
me), he start talking about the annual re-training-events they hold. 
Sensing the opportunity, I asked if I could join in the next one (in 
2015), and his reply was that he needed time to think about it. Two 
weeks later he called to tell me that I could join the re-training-
event of the police negotiators, but I would have to present 
something as an exchange, which of course I agreed to do. On the 
last day of the five-day long event in Cyprus, he told me that it took 
him two weeks to inform me of his decision because, as he said, 
„we checked your background. Not personal stuff, but we wanted to 
see if you are who you claim to be. It was necessary‟ [interviewee 
12]. This negotiator informed me about conducting a quick 
background check and although no other interviewee referred to 
such a thing, I do believe that most of them, if not all, did the same 
before meeting me. This is potentially a sign that my research 
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concerns sensitive topics, but this will be discussed later on in this 
chapter (ethical considerations section). 
 A month before the annual re-training-event, he called me to 
talk about the details of my presentation, as well as its topic. He 
informed me that I would have to fill a three-hour slot with my 
presentation, and when I offered to give a more academic 
presentation, he said „they will be bored‟ [interviewee 12], meaning 
that the other negotiators would not like what I was going to say. I 
replied that I could talk about the United Nations manual and 
criticise it and I could talk about knowledge transfer and 
kidnappings. However, he said that my presentation should not 
include anything academic or any criticisms, that I also should not 
talk about what is happening in other countries in terms of 
kidnappings, and I also should not talk about any kind of 
definitions, because the participants „don‟t care‟. Instead, what the 
other negotiators would love to hear is information about Greek 
kidnapping cases, but, as he suggested „[I] should be very careful 
as [I am] not allowed to say anything about the way police dealt 
with these cases because [I] might confuse them 
[negotiator/participants]‟ [interviewee 12]. In addition to that, he 
said that I could present on the kidnapping hostages and their 
families that I have interviewed, and „have their picture as well‟, 
and he also said that „if there is any violent kidnapping case where 
the hostage got killed, they would love to hear about it‟ 
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[interviewee 12]. In a way, he gave me a list of things that I should 
and should not say, but I tried to explain that there are ethical 
restrictions to my information, because when I interviewed the 
former kidnap-hostages and their families, I did not inform them 
that at some point in the future I might use their details and their 
photos for a police training-session. All this poses ethical questions 
and speaks volumes about the nature and the quality of the 
training-events, where the main goal is to attract the participant‟s 
attention with violence and blood-filled cases, rather than to see 
how they might improve their practices and further their knowledge 
of ransom-kidnappings.  
I did not negotiate the content of my presentation, but I 
decided to do a presentation which was going to be slightly 
academic with a perfect balance of information that the participants 
might like (and also things that he told me not to talk about). The 
levels of speech scrutiny seemed to be high anyway, but it was 
quite obvious when he asked to see a draft of my power point 
presentation, only a week before the training. Excuses like, „I have 
been really busy lately‟, and „I haven‟t started the preparation of it 
yet‟ were used to prevent any changes to my presentation from 
happening. From my previous attempt to take part in the Greek 
training, I knew how difficult it was to be granted the access to 
participate, train and observe a group of police negotiators, and I 
felt that the crucial point was to get access. I believed that once I 
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was there, and after spending a few hours or a couple of days with 
them, it would be a lot more difficult and awkward to ask me to 
leave, in case me or my presentation was not in alignment with 
their needs and priorities. This meant that I had to do my best in 
order to maintain the granted permission, which in that case was 
because I agreed to do a presentation, with very specific content. 
After asking a few of the participants what they knew, and 
witnessing myself, on the first day of the training, how little the 
police negotiators knew about negotiating and kidnappings, I added 
a few more things in my presentation to give some background 
information on kidnaps.  
In my three-hour session, some of the things I talked about 
were the different types of kidnappings and in which geographical 
locations we usually see each type, followed by examples from real 
cases found on the media or from anecdotal information gathered 
from people who were somehow related to the incidents (through 
friends from around the world). I also said a few things about the 
counter-kidnapping manual, and provided a small criticism on it. I 
commented on the fact that, although the UN said that the counter-
kidnap manual is already in the hands of those who should read it 
in each police department, from what it seems from the people I 
have talked to who are working in various countries, only the two 
people who were in the team writing it had read it. Also, I 
commented on the fact that the manual is dated and does not 
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include a type of kidnapping, which, although not new, is currently 
being used extensively by kidnappers across the world. In addition 
to these, I tried to underline the fact that all kidnappings are 
different, and although they might be in the same geographical 
location or country, they can be very dissimilar, which is something 
that I also refer to and analyse later on in my thesis. This was done 
by closely analysing the characteristics of kidnappings which took 
place in Greece. Finally, we all closely analysed the letters sent to a 
hostage‟s family by his kidnappers. These letters were given to me 
by the former kidnapping hostage and his family, and the aim of 
the close analysis was to try and understand what information we 
get from those letters as well as assess whether the kidnappers 
were professionals or armatures. This is the first thing they will be 
asked to do in a case of kidnapping, where the kidnappers are 
contacting the family of the hostage through letters SMS messages, 
or phone calls and recorded messages. This exercise lasted a bit 
longer than it was planned because the negotiators were unable to 
identify the important parts of the letters. For example in the first 
letter of the kidnappers, it was quite obvious that they knew exactly 
what they were doing, which shows that they have possibly done it 
before, however the negotiators were unable to gather this clue. 
The presentation went really well, and although I presented 
everything I was told not to, the negotiators, including the person 
who organised the training, liked it very much. While I was 
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presenting, I even noticed that they were all keeping notes, which 
is something that did not happen in any other session prior or 
following mine. To my surprise, at the end of my presentation they 
all stood up and applauded, while afterwards the organiser of the 
training congratulated me. Interestingly, after my presentation, I 
noticed on the desktop of the police laptop which was being used, 
an icon with my presentation title on it. The organiser of these 
annual events had sneakily saved my presentation on the computer 
without asking me, possibly to be used in their future training and 
re-training-events.  
The presentation was successful and those who were there 
felt that they have gained something useful, so I was in a better 
position to ask for “favours” or “benefits”. After my presentation I 
capitalised on that, and I gained the advantage of interviewing the 
mother of a kidnapping hostage. During the break after my session, 
the group of the three negotiators (one of them was the organiser 
of the training) who worked with the mother of a Cypriot young 
man who was kidnapped in Athens, came to talk to me. We chatted 
for around thirty minutes, and after this chat I asked if it is possible 
to meet the former hostage or his mother. The organiser smiled, 
stood up, and walked a couple of steps away from where we were 
all sitting, and I could hear him talking on the phone to the mother 
of the former hostage. After greeting her, he said „we are all here 
for our re-training, and there is someone here who wants to talk to 
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you. Her name is Eleana and she is a researcher on kidnappings for 
ransom. Can you come? ‟ [interviewee 12]. She was there in 
around thirty minutes, and from what I understood she lived in a 
nearby town. At the beginning of the interview she told me that she 
came because these people helped her at a very difficult time in her 
life, so she owns them a lot, and that she would love to talk to me 
about something that stigmatised her for the rest of her life. Apart 
from getting access to interview the mother of the former hostage, 
I used my presentation to gain more data, and it was a gateway to 
a better ethnography. After my presentation someone informed the 
head of the Cypriot counter-terrorism team about the 
presentation‟s quality and content. This man is every year 
responsible for setting the big, formal exercise, which takes place 
throughout a whole day during the re-training event. The day 
before this exercise, he came to congratulate me for my 
presentation and asked me if I want to observe the exercise. Of 
course I said yes, and he arranged for a car to pick us up (himself, 
a driver, a negotiator to explain what is happening to me, and 
myself), and drive us to all the three different exercises which were 
taking place simultaneously in different parts of Cyprus. He also 
arranged for a negotiator to be with us in order to explain to me 
what was going on, and he gave permission for me to be on both 
the side of the negotiators and the side of the terrorists.  I do not 
think I would have received such a warm reaction if I had presented 
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something that they would not have liked, or not have presented at 
all.  
Just like in the case of the interviews with the Greek police 
officers and negotiators, in Cyprus I was definitely perceived as an 
outsider but I did not feel that my presence was not welcomed. I 
was there at my own expenses, aiming to offer a wider 
understanding of what happens in relation to kidnaps around the 
world which was something highly appraised. Attending the 
Tackling Kidnapping, Hijack and Hostage Take event in London and 
interviewing or talking to people whose life has been affected by 
kidnaps, equipped me with interesting things to discuss with the 
participants while I was there. Although I spend a lot of time with 
the Cypriot negotiators, I did not ask to get any phone numbers or 
email addresses for further questions.    
 
3.7 United Kingdom: Before, During and After the 
Interviews  
For the Greek and the Cypriot police I was perceived as an 
„outsider‟ for a variety of reasons. I was a female in a mainly male 
environment, coming from academia, which is usually, from my 
understanding, quite alien to them, I was asking questions about a 
high security issue and there was no shared training, experiences, 
background or mentality. In any case, my presence was welcomed, 
but some of the interviewees were reluctant to share information 
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with me because as one of them said „you are not one of us‟ 
[interviewee 9]. I researched on a group to which I was not a 
member of and I did not identify with any of the people 
interviewed. Horn (1997) who is a female researcher conducting 
research on police said that not being „one of the boys‟ was 
beneficial since she was not seen as suspicious and threatening as 
her male scholars. The benefit of being an insider is direct 
acceptance to the group of people, but as Watson (1999) believes, 
it is more difficult to have a neutral stance. An external to a group 
of people or to an experience can have a wider perspective (Fay, 
1996), and the absence of sympathy can add credibility to the 
findings. I do not imply that those who are „insiders‟ are unable to, 
fairly, carry out their research or that it is going to be of a lower 
quality, but rather that the findings would be different from those of 
an outsider conducting research on the same group. Different 
people can get different data because of the interviewing relations, 
status and dynamics developed between the specific interviewer 
and interviewee. As Campbel cleverly pointed out: „I can only 
speculate that had I been older (or younger maybe), male, a more 
experienced researcher, a police colleague, white, middle class, a 
Freemason, or any other combination of social identities, an entirely 
different set of interviewing relations would have prevailed‟ (2003: 
297).  
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The counter-kidnap field is a predominantly male field, a good 
example is that in all the three counter-kidnap events in London 
that I attended, out of 30-40 people only around five of them were 
women including myself. This is another way that one might feel 
like being an „outsider‟ and definitely comments on the clothing 
decisions of the other women in the room did not help me feel as 
comfortable as an „insider‟ would feel. I found quite interesting the 
fact that people around me could understand someone‟s 
background and identity through small hints such as a particular tie 
which shows that one is a member of the US military aviation, or 
cufflinks, and a short haircut. Even though I did not share the same 
sub-culture with these people, those that I interviewed during the 
three different London conferences were more than happy to help 
me with my research. In Greece and Cyprus interviewees were also 
happy to help me, but I felt that my interviewees in Greece were 
slightly alarmed and in many occasions they said that what they will 
tell me is “off the record”. The relaxed approach of those coming 
from the private field is possibly because from what I understood, 
all of the participants were more used to the presence of someone 
who is asking questions and keeping notes either through having 
worked with researchers or through studying and conducting their 
own research when they were studying. In many occasions I 
understood that my interviewees would talk slower in order for me 
to keep notes, or they would give me their business cards to call 
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them or email them in case of more questions coming us, which are 
signs showing their understanding of how qualitative research 
works.  
 
3.8 Snowballing and its Issues  
In order to find interviewees for my research, I mainly used 
snowballing sampling. Negotiators, and especially those working in 
kidnapping cases, have to keep a low profile, hence the only way to 
find them was by snowballing my way through the police-network. 
The initial interview subject was found through an interviewed 
kidnap-hostage who has a good relationship with the police officer 
who negotiated her release. This negotiator is the most experienced 
in the field of kidnapping negotiations, and as he said, he is also 
teaching other negotiators from other countries. In addition, 
another negotiator was found through a formal request to the 
Greek police headquarters in 2013 for a previous research (MSc 
dissertation). Even though the request was made on May 2013, the 
reply to this request came six months after (November 2013), 
when a negotiator called me to give me his name and phone 
number, in order to arrange an interview. This negotiator was 
interviewed three times, and he introduced me to another kidnap-
negotiator and a psychologist with whom they usually work 
together in kidnap for ransom cases.  
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Snowball sampling was chosen because the researched topic 
is about a high security issue and it involved information which 
should not be available to people outside the secure circle of 
specific police officers. Snowball sampling can only flourish when 
there are relationships of trust and reliability and through each of 
my interviews I tried to put an emphasis on these characteristics. 
This was succeeded by various ways, which were related to the 
rank and the position of the interviewee. With those who were 
higher in the police ranking system (deputy commissioner and 
assistant commissioner), I was referring, at some point in the 
interview, to my father‟s previous experiences with the Greek 
military, which is always highly valued in police. With the other 
interviewees, the bond of trust was formed through talking about 
the other people I have interviewed (including some kidnap 
victims), and my position in the university as a graduate teaching 
assistant. In all cases, the interviews were starting with an 
introduction of myself, the significance of my research topic, and 
the importance of finding ways to bridge the gap between academia 
and the police work. Overall, although the mouth-to-mouth positive 
propaganda proved to be very helpful, getting access to a secretive 
field remained difficult. In a couple of occasions they encouraged 
me not to follow the official –and very bureaucratic– procedures, 
and either speak with them directly, or speak with specific people 
and emphasise particular aspects of my life (for instance that I was 
95 
 
raised in the Northern part of the country because the person with 
whom I had to get in contact with was from the North as well, and 
that I am teaching in a university abroad). Those who signalled 
interest in my research were happy to support me by introducing 
me to others in the field of kidnappings and negotiations, however 
this means that most of those interviewed in Cyprus and mainly in 
Greece had similar beliefs and ideas. The main issue with the 
snowballing method was that these networks of people have been 
potentially in the same police academy, they have received possibly 
the same training, and they also work together, which leads to 
people with similar responses on the topic of kidnaps. The only two 
interviewees who presented a different view was the man who is 
responsible for organising all the trainings [interviewee 21] inside 
the Greek police, and the retired police negotiator [interviewee 14]. 
In my analysis I am treating the other police negotiators as a group 
of people who are all members of the same police sub-culture, and 
their sharing of similar ideas is the characteristics of this particular 
occupational sub-culture. Although in other types of research 
snowballing can be problematic, in my research not only it was the 
only way to get access to a very small number of practitioners, but 
also it revealed an interesting pattern of views which is possibly 
taught or spread by word of mouth. 
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3.9 Technical Considerations 
In my interviews, I avoided using a recorder. During the first few 
interviews I had the questions that I wanted to ask in front of me, 
but later I became more confident and did not need to do so. That 
was deliberately avoided, because I wanted to create the 
impression that we were having an informal discussion in their 
office or in the location of their choice. From previous experience of 
interviewing police officers, I realised that once the recorder started 
recording, they would start responding very tersely, will not speak 
openly, and only give vague comments. I tried to avoid any over-
formalisation of the procedure and the environment, because I was 
aware of how delicate the dynamics were, and how off-putting 
formalities can be. Without this interviewing „tool‟, my interviewees 
were feeling more heartened and comfortable to engage is a high-
security issue. In relation to recording the interview, Bryman 
(2001) agrees that it „may disconcert respondents, who become 
self-conscious or alarmed at the prospect of their words being 
preserved‟ (332). Again, from previous interviewing experience, 
those who refused to be recorded are those who provided useful 
information that other people tend not to disclose.  
However, when it comes to the interviews of ex-kidnapping 
hostages and their families, there was a completely different 
approach. In most cases former kidnapping-hostages were the ones 
asking me to record them because there were many details in their 
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story, or because they wanted to be sure that I was able to 
remember every detail of what they were going to tell me. In all 
three cases they wanted me to test early on in the interview if the 
microphone and the recorder were working. They also wanted to 
have the microphone as close to them as possible. One of them 
started the interview by saying that she is aware of the fact that 
there is no academic research around kidnappings for ransom, 
which sounded like an attempt to justify her choice to meet me. In 
another case someone else tried to underling the importance of my 
research, because as she said „this [the kidnapping] has destroyed 
us [the family]‟ [interviewee 5], because after paying the ransom 
the bank took their house and now they do not have where to live. 
 
3.10 Issues of Recall 
Qualitative researchers almost always record their interviews, 
because without recording them, it is very easy to lose the exact 
phrases and language used by the interviewees. Of course the 
human memory has some natural limitations and it is impossible to 
remember the exact words used by someone. I was aware that 
recording changes the dynamics of the interviews, and after a few 
rejections to record the counter-kidnap related interviewees, I 
decided to use my memory and my writing. During the interviews 
with the Greek-speaking interviewees I had a piece of paper near 
me where I could write phrases which would later help me 
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remember exactly what the interviewee had said. After doing a few 
interviews I could understand when the interviewees were about to 
say something that could be useful for my thesis, and I would write 
it down. When it comes to the interviews with the English-speaking 
interviewees, I was taking full-notes during the interviews. Contrary 
to the interviews in Greek, the English interviews where done in a 
more formal context with only a few minutes available for the 
interview. These interviews where shorter, but I was taking notes 
during the interviews, acknowledging the limits of my memory 
when it comes to remembering quotes in a language other than my 
native tongue. However, there is always an element of intuitive 
glosses in all interviews which are not being recorded (Bryman, 
2001). This implies that as a researcher I might have, 
unintentionally, applied glosses to what people have said during the 
interviews, and remember information in a particular way, yet this 
thesis is the closest anyone has been to counter-kidnap 
practitioners, and the only way to do it was through using my 
memory, a pen and a paper instead of a recorder.       
 
3.11 Interview Questions 
The interview questions covered various aspects of kidnappings. 
Some of these aspects are: the training of negotiators and the 
training of negotiators coming from other countries, the conditions 
of training, international links and transnational policing, the 
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usefulness (or not) of having neighbouring countries following the 
same actions with Greece in the case of a kidnapping, and finally, 
why Greece is perceived as a knowledge broker and is now training 
others from abroad. Since I conducted this research through 
interviewing various stakeholders, there were different questions 
for each category, while at the same time in many cases I had to 
quickly think of new sets of questions because the person who was 
being interviewed had limited knowledge, or, alternatively, hid the 
lack of knowledge before the interview. The interviews were 
characterised by fluidity both in terms of approaching the different 
practitioners and in the questions asked.       
 
3.12 Ethical Considerations 
According to Lee, a research with a sensitive topic is any „research 
which potentially poses a substantial threat to those who are or 
have been involved in it‟ (1993: 4) and it can pose threats in three 
areas: be an „intrusive threat‟, a „threat of sanctions‟ or be a 
„political threat‟ (ibid). By revealing to me high-security information 
about operational techniques, hypothetically speaking, my 
interviewees could be threatened in all three areas that Lee has 
referred to. It should be also reminded that kidnap negotiators want 
to keep their identities hidden. Even during a kidnapping they are 
invisible players, intermediating the discussions and directing the 
person who is in contact with the kidnappers in order to make 
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arrangements for the final agreement. In my thesis, informants 
have been protected by anonymising data, so as their identities are 
protected in the best way possible. This has been done by direct 
and indirect anonymity. In addition to that, in my thesis I do not 
refer to the rankings, their position inside their organisation, or the 
name of the company in which they work for or have created. I 
should not avoid saying that apart from a few planned interviews in 
Greece, the rest of this research was not planned, and my fieldwork 
was not expected. In the two counter-kidnap events or the week-
long training I attended, I never expected to interview people. A 
good example is that I was in a Greek city for a planned interview, 
and on the same day, after receiving a phone call, I would travel to 
another city to talk to someone else who had suddenly agreed to 
talk to me. Regardless of the unexpected nature of my interviews I 
made sure that I complied with all the ethical aspects. 
 As has been mentioned before in this chapter, the counter-
kidnapping field is extremely small at both the national and global 
level, and for this thesis I have interviewed people in five different 
cities around the world. However, I have tried to keep them 
anonymous by providing a number for each one of them as an 
attempt to conceal their identity. Apart from anonymity, 
confidentiality was accomplished by keeping some information 
secret. Whenever the interviewee provided information and stated 
that it was „off the record‟, then this information remained secret 
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and I have not used it within this thesis (and will never use it in the 
future). Confidentiality aims at protecting individuals from harm 
and stigmatization, as well as protecting their privacy. If there is no 
confidentiality, this might have damaging consequences to the 
research participants. Bok (1982) noted that confidentiality and 
secrecy are interrelated since the first one indicates the methods 
that have been used to conceal (6). Secrecy exists to protect one‟s 
identity, plans, actions, and property, whether that is material or 
abstract, such as ideas (20). Baez (2002) is quite critical of the idea 
of confidentiality. For him, „qualitative research should be 
transformative‟ (Baez, 2002: 36), and to do so researchers „must 
subject to question the idea of confidentiality‟ (ibid). Of course this 
does not mean to discard confidentiality completely, but „at every 
research opportunity confidentiality should be theorized for what it 
permits and forecloses‟ (ibid). Baez goes on to call it a hypocrisy 
when the researcher wants to know „the respondent‟s secrets but 
promises to protect the respondent‟s identity‟ (2002: 46). Bok 
(1982: 27) and Kelman (1977: 169) have a more relaxed stance 
and argue that it is important to give the control to the respondents 
and let them decide the level of confidentiality and secrecy they 
want. Although this would be ideal, in the context of my research, 
this means that I would have to explain the methodological aspects 
of my research to people who might not fully understand what I am 
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saying. Simply stating beforehand that they will remain anonymous 
saves time and thwarts unnecessary complexion.   
As qualitative researchers we are often concerned with people 
who in many occasions might be distressed or at a time of crisis 
and stress and we ask them, and expect them, to talk about an 
unpleasant experience in detail (Cannon, 1992; Dickson-Swift, 
James, Kippens, Liamputtong, 2007; Draucker, 1999). What I tried 
to do with my interviews was to be discrete, respectful and 
appreciate their willingness to talk to me. When it comes to the 
victims of kidnappings and/or their families, apart from making sure 
that their anonymity is secured, again by providing a number 
instead of their original names and changing minor details around 
their kidnaps, I made sure I protected them as well. I was aware 
that I was talking to vulnerable people under distress, so from the 
beginning they were informed about their right to choose the place 
of the interview and their right to cancel or end the interview 
whenever they wanted before or during our meeting. One of the 
interviewees, two hours before our interview, changed the location 
of our meeting three times in order to make sure that she was 
going to be safe. In all cases I got their oral consent first (via 
phone), and the atmosphere during the interviews was comfortable 
and relaxed. During the interviews with the former hostages and/or 
their family members, I was aware of their vulnerability so I 
allowed them to talk without any pressure or any questions. All the 
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interviews began by me saying that I would like to hear their story, 
and then at the end I would ask them if they were happy with the 
way that the police had responded to their case and if they think 
anything could have been done in a different way. Kvale (1996), 
has stated that the „interviewer should also be aware that the 
openness and intimacy of the interview may be seductive and lead 
to disclose information that they may later regret‟ (116). Having 
Kvale‟s words in mind, I encouraged all my interviewees to contact 
me any time after the interview in case they have second thoughts 
or if they do not want me to talk about some of the things we 
discussed during the interview. 
All interviews were very positive, but there was one small 
exception where at some point the mother of a former kidnapped 
man started tearing up whilst talking about the effects of the kidnap 
on their lives. At that point the interview stopped and I asked her if 
she was willing to continue but she replied that crying would make 
her feel better, and after talking about something else for a few 
minutes, we continued discussing her son‟s kidnapping. I 
understand that talking about such a sensitive and emotionally 
charged issue can potentially be upsetting for the informant, so I 
was always very gentle, giving space to people so that they could 
talk freely and stop whenever they wanted. Even before the 
interviews I knew that what my interviewees were going to tell me 
(at least those who had a personal involvement to a kidnap) where 
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more than just words, it was more than just a few sentences inside 
my thesis, it was a horrifying experience that they had to go 
through, both as individuals and as a family. In the case when the 
lady started tearing up, we immediately paused the interview, and 
after making sure that she was fine I asked her whether she would 
like to continue the interview or stop it completely. Although 
interviewing people who have been directly affected by a kidnap 
can be very distressing, in all cases those people wanted to be 
interviewed and talking about their stories seemed to be a form of 
catharsis or therapy for their trauma. It is important mentioning 
that with my interviews with kidnap victims and/or their families, I 
was not asking questions. I would only say „Can you please tell me 
your story?‟ or something along these lines. In all cases I had my 
student identification with me to prove my identity as a researcher, 
as well as the ethical form, but no one seemed to care about these. 
Closing the section on ethical consideration I would like to underline 
the importance of conducting research on sensitive topics as this is 
the only way to get a better understanding of all those issues 
affecting the people inside a society and shaping the society itself. 
As a researcher I believe that shying away from sensitive and 
controversial topics, is an avoidance of our responsibility to the 
discipline and the society.  
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3.13 Data Analysis 
This thesis is based on a qualitative research study, aiming to shed 
some light on the knowledge associated with the practices of 
countering kidnappings for ransom. I was free from any constraint 
which might have occurred had I used fixed questions and 
responses. I have used inductive analysis because having decided 
to look into a field which has not been looked at before, I 
approached it in a tabula rasa state of mind. I did not have any pre-
conceived notions or ideas about how things will turn out, what my 
interviewees were going to say or what my findings were going to 
be. I looked at the data and tried to see what comes out of it, what 
is it emerging out of the interviews, without assuming anything. 
This thesis has been developed after thematically coding the data, 
which has allowed me to provide my interpretation of themes. The 
thematic analysis of data received from my ethnography and from 
interviews in three nations has assisted me in identifying patterns 
and themes which could be used to describe the journey of 
knowledge and other issues related to its application. As it has been 
previously mentioned in this chapter, I did not transcribe the 
interviews because at the beginning all the interviewees opposed 
the idea of being recorded so after some point I stopped asking and 
only use a pen and a paper to keep notes. I was taking notes 
(during the interviews and afterwards), which were later read and 
coded into themes. The next step was to decide which of these 
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themes will actually make a contribution towards a better 
understanding of the chosen research topic. I looked at the 
repeated topics of the interview scripts and then ideas begun to 
emerge. The structure of this thesis has developed from these 
themes and the titles of the chapters are based on these thematic 
codes. As an outsider I had an imperfect knowledge of the 
environment I was researching which can even make the 
identification of the right people to be interviewed difficult.  
In addition to using thematic coding for the analysis of the 
interviews, for this research I also conducted a qualitative 
document analysis. In theory documents have an important role as 
vehicles of moving information around. After searching and finding 
documents which are related to countering kidnaps, I looked 
through them and picked up the relevant themes which matched 
my research aims. This yet another form of inductive analysis 
where I am trying to generate new theory and information from the 
data I collected from the documents, the interviews and the 
ethnography in Cyprus. 
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3.14 Photos from Ethnography in Cyprus 
 
F
irs
t 
h
o
s
ta
g
e
 
in
c
id
e
n
t 
w
h
e
re
 
a
 
la
d
y
 
is
 
h
e
ld
 
h
o
s
ta
g
e
 
in
s
id
e
 
a
 
h
o
u
s
e
 
b
y
 
s
o
m
e
o
n
e
 
w
h
o
 
is
 
a
n
 
IS
IS
 
m
e
m
b
e
r. 
T
h
e
 
la
d
y
 
s
ta
rte
d
 
s
c
re
a
m
in
g
 a
n
d
 a
s
k
in
g
 fo
r h
e
lp
. T
h
e
n
 th
e
 tw
o
 n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 a
n
d
 th
e
 tw
o
 m
e
m
b
e
rs
 o
f th
e
 c
o
u
n
te
r-te
rro
ris
m
 te
a
m
 d
e
c
id
e
d
 to
 le
a
v
e
 
a
n
d
 g
o
 g
e
t th
e
 w
h
ite
 b
o
a
rd
 fro
m
 th
e
 c
a
r w
ith
o
u
t a
tte
m
p
tin
g
 to
 c
a
lm
 th
e
 s
itu
a
tio
n
 d
o
w
n
. 
 
108 
 
 
 
 
A
t 
so
m
e 
p
o
in
t 
th
ey
 r
ea
lis
ed
 t
h
at
 t
h
ey
 n
ee
d
ed
 a
 w
h
it
e 
b
o
ar
d
 a
n
d
 s
o
m
e 
p
en
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
ei
r 
ca
r 
to
 k
ee
p
 n
o
te
s 
an
d
 p
la
n
 t
h
ei
r 
n
ex
t 
m
o
ve
s.
 T
h
e
y
 w
a
lk
e
d
 
b
a
c
k
w
a
rd
s
 t
o
w
a
rd
s
 t
h
e
ir
 c
a
r 
w
h
ic
h
 s
e
e
m
e
d
 t
o
 b
e
 m
o
re
 c
o
m
p
li
c
a
te
d
 t
h
a
n
 t
h
e
y
 i
n
it
ia
ll
y
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t 
109 
 
 
W
h
ils
t ta
k
in
g
 th
e
 w
h
ite
 b
o
a
rd
 to
 th
e
 p
la
c
e
 w
h
e
re
 th
e
y
 w
e
re
 
g
o
in
g
 to
 p
la
n
 th
e
ir n
e
g
o
tia
tio
n
s
 a
n
d
 k
e
e
p
 n
o
te
s
 a
b
o
u
t a
n
y
 h
in
ts
 g
iv
e
n
 b
y
 th
e
 
h
o
s
ta
g
e
-ta
k
e
r th
e
y
 to
o
k
 tw
o
 m
o
re
 n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 w
ith
 th
e
m
. T
h
e
s
e
 n
e
w
 n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 w
e
re
 g
o
in
g
 to
 ta
k
e
 o
v
e
r th
e
 n
e
g
o
tia
tio
n
s
 (n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 w
o
rk
 
in
 p
a
irs
 in
 E
n
g
la
n
d
, G
re
e
c
e
 a
n
d
 C
y
p
ru
s
). H
e
re
 w
e
 c
a
n
 s
e
e
 s
ix
 p
e
o
p
le
 b
e
in
g
 “p
ro
te
c
te
d
” b
e
h
in
d
 o
n
e
 s
h
ie
ld
. 
 
110 
 
 
 
F
o
r 
s
o
m
e
 r
e
a
s
o
n
 f
iv
e
 n
e
g
o
ti
a
to
rs
 e
n
d
e
d
 u
p
 a
ll
 n
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
n
g
 a
t 
th
e
 s
a
m
e
 t
im
e
. 
O
n
 t
h
e
 r
ig
h
t 
o
f 
th
e
 p
h
o
to
 w
e
 c
a
n
 s
e
e
 t
h
e
 c
a
r 
o
f 
th
e
 h
o
s
ta
g
e
 a
b
o
u
t 
w
h
ic
h
 
th
e
re
 
w
a
s
 
n
o
t 
m
a
d
e
 
a
n
y
 
d
is
c
u
s
s
io
n
 
a
n
d
 
th
e
y
 
n
e
v
e
r 
a
s
k
e
d
 
fo
r 
th
e
 
b
o
m
b
-d
e
fu
s
e
 
te
a
m
‟s
 h
e
lp
 e
v
e
n
 t
h
o
u
g
h
 t
h
e
 i
d
e
a
 w
a
s
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 c
a
r 
w
a
s 
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
 t
o
 h
a
v
e
 e
x
p
lo
s
iv
e
s
 i
n
s
id
e
. 
 
111 
 
 
 
 
T
h
o
s
e
 w
h
o
 w
e
re
 n
o
t n
e
g
o
tia
tin
g
 w
e
re
 e
ith
e
r s
ta
y
in
g
 in
s
id
e
 th
e
 b
u
s
 o
n
 th
e
 rig
h
t o
f th
e
 p
h
o
to
 o
r o
u
ts
id
e
. A
ls
o
 o
n
 th
e
 rig
h
t w
e
 c
a
n
 s
e
e
 th
e
 p
e
rs
o
n
 
w
h
o
 is
 o
rg
a
n
is
in
g
 th
e
 tra
in
in
g
s
 (h
e
 is
 th
e
 o
n
e
 w
h
o
 in
v
ite
d
 m
e
 to
 p
a
rtic
ip
a
te
 in
 th
e
ir tra
in
in
g
) a
n
d
 a
t th
a
t p
o
in
t h
e
 is
 a
s
k
in
g
 fo
r th
e
 n
e
x
t tw
o
 
n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 to
 re
p
la
c
e
 tw
o
 o
f th
o
s
e
 w
h
o
 h
a
v
e
 a
lre
a
d
y
 p
ra
c
tic
e
d
 th
e
ir n
e
g
o
tia
tio
n
 s
k
ills
. T
h
e
 b
u
s
 w
h
ic
h
 h
a
s
 m
o
v
e
d
 th
e
 n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 fro
m
 o
n
e
 p
la
c
e
 
to
 o
th
e
rs
 a
ro
u
n
d
 C
y
p
ru
s
 a
n
d
 th
e
 c
e
ll o
f n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 (w
h
ic
h
 is
 b
e
h
in
d
 th
e
 b
u
s
) a
re
 p
a
rk
e
d
 rig
h
t o
u
ts
id
e
 th
e
 p
la
c
e
 w
h
e
re
 b
o
th
 th
e
 h
o
s
ta
g
e
 a
n
d
 th
e
 
te
rro
ris
t a
re
 lo
c
a
te
d
. 
 
112 
 
 O
n
 t
h
e
 l
e
ft
 o
f 
th
e
 p
h
o
to
 w
e
 c
a
n
 s
e
e
 t
h
e
 n
o
te
s
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 p
la
n
 o
f 
n
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
o
n
s
 b
e
in
g
 t
a
k
e
n
 a
w
a
y
 b
y
 t
h
e
 w
in
d
 (
u
n
d
e
r 
th
e
 w
h
it
e
 g
a
te
).
 A
ls
o
 a
 
n
o
s
y
 n
e
ig
h
b
o
r 
c
a
m
e
 t
o
 o
b
s
e
rv
e
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
a
n
y
o
n
e
 t
e
ll
in
g
 h
im
 t
h
a
t 
h
e
 s
h
o
u
ld
 n
o
t 
b
e
 h
e
re
. 
 
 
113 
 
 
S
e
c
o
n
d
 e
x
e
rc
is
e
, w
h
e
re
 a
n
o
th
e
r te
rro
ris
t is
 o
n
 a
 b
o
a
t w
ith
 e
x
p
lo
s
iv
e
s
 in
s
id
e
. S
e
v
e
n
 p
e
o
p
le
 “p
ro
te
cte
d
” b
e
h
in
d
 a
 s
h
ie
ld
 a
re
 s
e
e
n
 to
 b
e
 a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
in
g
 
th
e
 b
o
a
t w
ith
o
u
t firs
t n
e
g
o
tia
tin
g
 a
n
y
th
in
g
. T
h
e
 n
e
x
t d
a
y
 th
e
 p
e
rs
o
n
 o
rg
a
n
iz
in
g
 th
e
s
e
 tra
in
in
g
s
 c
a
lle
d
 th
is
 a
 s
u
ic
id
e
. 
 
114 
 
 
A
 te
a
m
 o
f n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 h
a
v
e
 ju
s
t a
rriv
e
d
 w
ith
 a
 h
e
lic
o
p
te
r. T
h
e
 te
rro
ris
t fro
m
 th
e
 firs
t e
x
e
rc
is
e
 a
s
k
e
d
 fo
r a
 h
e
lic
o
p
te
r fo
r h
is
 tra
n
s
fe
r a
n
d
 th
e
y
 fa
ile
d
 
to
 n
e
g
o
tia
te
 th
a
t. In
 th
e
 p
h
o
to
 th
e
 n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 s
to
p
 fo
r s
e
lfie
s
 a
n
d
 v
id
e
o
s
 w
ith
 th
e
 h
e
lic
o
p
te
r o
n
 th
e
 b
a
c
k
g
ro
u
n
d
. 
 
115 
 
 T
h
e
 t
h
ir
d
 e
x
e
rc
is
e
 t
o
o
k
 p
la
c
e
 o
n
 a
 p
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r 
p
la
n
e
. 
In
 t
h
e
 p
h
o
to
 w
e
 c
a
n
 s
e
e
 a
ll
 t
h
e
 p
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
rs
 a
s
 w
e
ll
 a
s
 t
h
e
 t
h
re
e
 t
e
rr
o
ri
s
ts
 s
ta
y
in
g
 s
ti
ll
 o
n
 t
h
e
 
fl
o
o
r.
 T
h
e
 c
o
u
n
te
r-
te
rr
o
ri
s
m
 t
e
a
m
 a
rr
e
s
te
d
 o
n
ly
 o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 t
e
rr
o
ri
s
ts
. 
O
n
 t
h
e
 r
ig
h
t-
h
a
n
d
 s
id
e
 w
e
 c
a
n
 s
e
e
 o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 n
e
g
o
ti
a
to
rs
 t
a
k
in
g
 a
 s
e
lf
ie
. 
 
116 
 
 
 
A
t th
e
 e
n
d
 o
f th
e
 e
x
e
rc
is
e
s
 th
e
 o
rg
a
n
iz
e
r o
f th
e
 tra
in
in
g
 s
u
g
g
e
s
te
d
 m
e
 to
 ta
k
e
 o
f p
h
o
to
 w
ith
 th
e
 fo
u
r m
e
m
b
e
rs
 o
f th
e
 c
o
u
n
te
r-te
rro
ris
m
 te
a
m
 a
n
d
 
tw
o
 o
f th
e
 n
e
g
o
tia
to
rs
 (I trie
d
 to
 h
id
e
 th
e
ir fa
c
e
s
) w
h
o
 to
o
k
 p
a
rt in
 th
e
 e
x
e
rc
is
e
s
.  
 
117 
 
Chapter 4:  The Dissemination, 
Reception and Application of the 
Counter-kidnap Knowledge 
 4.1 Introduction 
After reviewing relevant literature and discussing my chosen 
methodology, this chapter will be divided in two sections. First, I 
will analyse the different ways in which counter kidnapping 
knowledge is transferred within a nation or abroad, to other 
nations. To do so, I will look at two documents, one from UNODC 
and one from EuNAT. These are the only7 documents on 
kidnappings which have been created by formal organisations, and 
play an important role towards the transfer of counter kidnap 
knowledge. However, their importance is not limited to their 
formality and in fact they are produced and disseminated by well-
known organisations in the field of crime and crime control. These 
documents, and especially the UNODC counter-kidnap manual, are 
vehicles for knowledge transfer. The UNODC manual has been 
produced by some of my interviewees [Interviewee 1, Interviewee 
15], and during the interviews they referred to its importance and 
usefulness. This manual stands as the „golden standard‟ of how a 
nation is advised to deal with a kidnap and it is an attempt by the 
UN to engage with its member-states.  
                                                          
7
 Private companies working in the counter-kidnap and risk management field might possibly have 
produced their own booklets which are provided to their clients, along with the training and the 
safety checks they offer, but the UN manual and the EuNAT brochure are the only official documents 
on kidnappings. 
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The EuNAT brochure contains some very basic information 
around hostage-taking, extortion, and kidnapping prevention, but 
this information is often forgotten and overlooked in day to day life. 
Due to various circumstances, someone‟s life might be at risk and 
this brochure contains concrete advice for preventing or minimising 
the foreseeable risks. Moreover, the EuNAT brochure contains 
schematic information around kidnapping, extortion or hostage-
related incident prevention, as well as recommendations for 
reacting to life-threatening situations once someone is kept as a 
hostage.  
In addition, according to the foreword, everything that is 
included in the document is based on a series of „good practices 
identified by experienced practitioners from many countries‟ 
(UNODC, 2006: iii). By stating that, one can assume that this 
manual includes the most effective tactics available on a global 
level, although, as will be explained later on, this is not entirely 
true. Not many people are aware of the fact that the manual has 
been created and based on one single nation and its own kidnap-
related practices. This does not mean that the manual is not based 
on “best practices”, but rather it means that it was created having 
in mind only what has worked in one specific context, in only one 
nation, the United Kingdom. This exclusivity of having a best 
practices manual created by the techniques of one nation does not 
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imply that the manual is useless to other practitioners, but it can be 
a good insight into what another counter-kidnap team is doing.  
It does not matter if these guidelines are going to be used by 
others, but practitioners can get information on other ways of 
dealing with kidnappings and perhaps apply all or some of these 
techniques in the national counter-kidnap practices. The UNODC 
manual can be used as a practical instrument for policy makers, law 
enforcement officers and criminal justice practitioners and assist 
cooperation between different nations. As it is stated in the 
foreword to the manual, this document „illustrates the importance 
of having in place suitable systems and procedures to improve 
international coordination and cooperation‟ (UNODC, 2006: iii) and 
this specific issue will be discussed in the next chapter of my 
analysis.   
 
In the second section of this chapter I will be discussing 
Knowledge and information, which are two terms that are often 
used interchangeably, but knowledge is distinct from information. 
However, as I will explain, in this thesis I will be using the word 
„knowledge‟, even though I believe that what is actually being 
transferred is „information‟.  I will be explaining why the transfer of 
knowledge does not work, and in order to support that claim, I will 
be highlighting a variety of barriers preventing the transfer or 
making it more difficult. Some of the barriers which are going to be 
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discussed are the people‟s inability to absorb and apply what has 
been transferred, the fact that the language can sometimes block 
people‟s understanding, the low quality of work provided by the 
United Nations, the global role of the United Kingdom‟s National 
Crime Agency, and the difficulty to assess that which has been 
received by the trainees. 
 
4.2 Mechanisms of knowledge transfer 
When referring to knowledge transfer, it is implied that one has 
produced or acquired tacit or explicit knowledge, and that this 
knowledge is organised in order to make it transferable to someone 
else, whether it be an individual or institutions and organisations. 
The words „move‟, or „transfer‟ might suggest that the knowledge is 
removed from its original donor and given exclusively, to the 
recipient. In reality, it is actually copied from one place to the 
other, aiming to create a network of practitioners operating in a 
similar or potentially almost identical manner. The counter-
kidnapping knowledge is transferred through a variety of ways from 
different donors who are considered to be the knowledge brokers, 
either in the global level or in a more localised context. Throughout 
my research I have noticed the move of knowledge cross-national, 
international and international through the use of manuals, and 
training.  
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4.2.1 Brochures and manuals as mechanisms of knowledge 
transfer 
In theory, one of the ways that information can be 
transferred is through the intended vehicles of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) counter-kidnapping manual 
and the European Network of Advisory Teams 8(EuNAT of 
EUROPOL) brochure. The EuNAT brochure is available online, and 
the information contained is a translation of the original brochure 
created in German by the Federal Criminal Police of Germany 
(Bundeskriminalamt, BKA). This brochure „aims to help you 
minimise potential and foreseeable risks and suggests how you can 
do this in order to be as safe as possible‟ (EuNAT, 2012: 4), while 
at the same time it „contains recommendations for reacting to 
critical situations like a kidnapping‟ (ibid), and all that because, as 
they state at the beginning of the EuNAT manual, „sharing 
knowledge saves lives‟. Although not exclusively, the aim of this 
brochure is to prevent kidnappings, extortions and hostage takings, 
mainly of those travelling in hot-spot areas. It consists of 
approximately forty pages of very basic information, such as 
keeping a low profile, changing routes if needed, using licenced 
taxis, remembering the police phone number, not talking to 
strangers, and, in the case of kidnapping, regular eating, drinking 
and sleeping is suggested to those who are kidnapped. In more 
                                                          
8
 EuNAT is a European platform which brings together various police departments in order to share 
best practices: ‘a network of experienced law enforcement advisory teams from across Europe, who 
provide a mechanism for immediate international cooperation when responding to the threat of 
kidnapping, hostage taking and extortion, where life is at risk’ (EuNAT, 2012: 2). 
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detail, this brochure consists of four chapters. These chapters are 
on prevention, kidnapping and hostage taking, extortion, and, 
finally, on checklists.    
The first chapter begins with the phrase „it‟s in your hands-
don‟t be a victim‟ (EuNAT, 2012: 9), which is a phrase perfectly 
illustrating Garland‟s (1996) view of the state as having a tendency 
towards putting the responsibility of security and safety to the 
individuals, what he called „responsibilization‟ of the people. This is 
an approach that not only puts the responsibility of staying secure 
and safe to the individual, but can also potentially lead to victim-
blaming in case something goes wrong and someone ends up 
getting kidnapped. Individuals are advised not to be „attractive‟ 
victims, and to avoid providing opportunities for offenders, and as it 
is stated inside the manual that having experience „of a country 
does not guarantee your safety‟ (ibid).  
The EuNAT brochure constructs panics and creates a sense of 
urgent duty for individual preventative action. This document 
shares a similar rhetoric with many people from the private field. 
One of them said in his presentation9 that it is not a matter of if a 
kidnap is going to take place (in a business or organisation), but a 
matter of when this is going to happen, and in my observations 
during this presentation I noticed many heads nodding in 
agreement. The private industry is feeding on this panic-
                                                          
9
 In the annual London kidnapping, hijacking and hostage-taking event  (2014) 
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construction and the constant fear of individuals. It seems that 
these private risk-management and counter-kidnap businesses 
have replaced the national security and safety provided to citizens.  
  The idea is that all the kidnap-related police departments of 
the UN member states possess the UNODC manual, and have read 
it10. When I asked for permission to read the manual, the United 
Nations law enforcement advisor of the anti-organised crime and 
illicit drug trafficking department wrote in an email he sent to me:  
UNODC coordinated with experts from Member States to 
draft a set of response guidelines for authorities dealing 
with the incidence of kidnap. When published, these were 
made available to national competent authorities and 
later, further developed into a training course for first 
responders.  
By “experts from Member States” he means a very small group of 
counter-kidnap practitioners from the United Kingdom, whereas one 
of my interviewees who was in that group, said, „we basically took 
our [the UK] manual, which is enormous, used as a door stopper, 
and we created a smaller version of it‟ [interviewee 15]. In my 
interview with a member of the counter-kidnap and extortion team 
of the NCA, he underlined the importance of this UNODC manual for 
his team in NCA. He said: 
Every day is a learning day. We are doing a lot of work 
with the UN, my department and my team have written 
the global counter-kidnap manual that has been send to 
every country in the world and it is always useful because 
we talk a lot of colours in the manual and at 3 o'clock in 
the morning if there is a case in Ecuador and we mention 
                                                          
10
 More effort has been put on the creation of the UNODC counter-kidnap manual, which is not 
accessible online, or to researchers, for fear of revealing too much information to those who should 
not possess it. 
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the word 'red', they know exactly what the concept is all 
about so this makes our focal point of 
concern.[interviewee 1] 
Even though on the UNODC website it is specified that the 
manual is available upon request, I requested to UNODC, via email, 
to read the counter-kidnap manual four times (22.09.2013, 
04.11.2013, 14.08.2014, 08.07.2015), in order to have the manual 
sent to me for research purposes. I received a reply to only the first 
email I sent (despite using different email accounts), where it was 
made clear that this manual is designed purely for specific people. 
In one of the emails I exchanged with the United Nations law 
enforcement advisor, he wrote, regarding the manual, that „this 
material is one of the few UN publications not freely available, 
rather it is only provided to national competent authorities of 
Member States‟. On the UNODC website it is stated: 
The manual presents a constructive tool for policy makers, 
law enforcement officers and criminal justice practitioners 
and is aimed at providing national authorities with 
guidelines on how to deal with a kidnapping case in a 
practical and effective manner. Legislative and national 
policies to target kidnapping are addressed, but focus is 
primarily on the key responses needed for success in 
prevention and investigation. The manual is available upon 
request.11 [interviewee 1] 
Such an access restriction is very interesting because it shows that 
transnational policing knowledge can be filtered and disseminated 
very selectively. Only the UN member states have received, and 
have access to, the manual. However, up to the moment I 
                                                          
11
 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/tools-and-publications.html (accessed 
28.05.2016) 
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interviewed police practitioners in Greece and Cyprus, no one had 
read it.  
The UNODC manual was written in 2006, is thirty-eight pages 
long and consists of four chapters: introduction, policy issues, 
prevention and preparedness and the final chapter is on the key 
elements of responding to a kidnapping. The basic kidnap-related 
knowledge is set in the introductory chapter, beginning with the 
objectives of the manual. The first objective is to preserve human 
life, which is something that has been underlined by all the 
negotiators interviewed, the NCA member and all those from the 
public sector:  
Our main concern is the safe release and return of the 
hostage, the rest is secondary, of course we want to get 
the needed intelligence to catch the kidnappers 
afterwards, but if someone‟s life is in danger, its 
preservation is what we are going for. Human life is also 
protected by the Greek constitution [interviewee 7], 
explained a Greek negotiator. Someone working in the private 
sector said „we are paid for the return of the hostage, safe and 
sound, now how we are going to achieve that is another story, and 
the families [of the hostages] don‟t really care about that‟ 
[interviewee 10].  
Kidnappings can be used by organised criminal groups or 
terrorists, and are increasingly becoming international problems, 
„with victims, [hostages], and criminals (as well as their demands) 
frequently crossing international borders‟. (UNODC, 2006: 2) Also, 
Kidnapping is „the fastest growing criminal business globally‟ 
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(UNODC, 2006: 6), and is a violation of the right to individual 
freedom, which can decrease the public‟s confidence. In various 
sections inside the manual there is an attempt to underline the 
importance of creating partnerships and cooperation between 
different nations and between the private and the public sector. In 
order to do all these things, there needs to be the right resourcing 
of knowledgeable people, of trainings and of the right equipment. 
„[J]udicial cooperation should be promoted to enhance information 
exchange and facilitate procedures and operations abroad‟ (UNODC, 
2006: 7), specifically between neighbouring countries, also, there 
needs to be the creation of „effective partnerships involving the 
public sector, the private sector, the community and the general 
public‟ (UNODC, 2006: 6).  
In addition to that, the manual states that nations need to 
ensure that law enforcement authorities have received training and 
scenario based exercises, as well as create mechanisms and 
databases for knowledge and information exchange. An interesting 
point made as part of the key elements for the strategy 
development of nation states is the consistent provision of training 
to all the agencies involved or related to kidnappings. According to 
the manual „there are indications that they [kidnappings] are 
increasing in frequency and complexity and will continue to do so‟ 
(UNODC, 2006: 12), thus „embassies and consulates of other 
States‟ (UNODC, 2006: 14) inside or outside national borders 
127 
 
should establish communication systems and work together. Inside 
the manual there is an emphasis on the importance of constant 
training to those involved in the counter-kidnap field with „joint 
training of law enforcement agencies at the national and 
international levels [because it] is useful in understanding the 
capabilities and constraints on organisations‟ (UNODC, 2006: 20). 
In addition to that, the trainings should have real–life simulation 
exercises and agencies need to be sure that through training, their 
staff can make informed and balanced assessments of the 
information. 
 
4.2.2  Brochure and manual weaknesses and disparities  
After reproducing and analysing the two official documents on 
kidnappings, it is crucial to provide their criticism and indicate some 
of their asthenic aspects. When it comes to the EuNAT brochure, it 
seems that there was not a lot of time and research invested into 
its creation; it is a small brochure with inaccuracies and, as was 
mentioned in the previous section, it contains very basic 
information, and the main point of its creation seems to be the 
placement of responsibility to each individual. At first I am going to 
analyse four inaccuracies that I noticed within the EuNAT brochure, 
and then I will discuss some knotty and questionable points from 
the UNODC manual.  
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In one of the first pages of the EuNAT brochure it is mentioned 
that one of the kidnap prevention goals is to „react appropriately‟ 
(EuNAT, 2012: 9). This is a vain suggestion without any explanation 
following it. Appropriateness is different from person to person and 
by making such a statement without further explaining what is 
meant by that, it makes it pointless because it does not provide any 
valuable content. In addition, in the section regarding ways to deal 
with the offenders (in the case of someone being kidnapped), the 
recommendation is to establish a personal relationship with the 
kidnappers, and a way to accomplish that, according to the 
brochure, is through suitable topics, and one of them can be by 
reference to „family (e.g. by showing photographs)‟ (EuNAT, 2012: 
28). At this point, the brochure fails to provide the opposite view, 
which is that by giving family-related information, either through 
pictures or through other means, it can put these family members 
at risk. Revealing family information might be used against the 
hostage and from the various former kidnap-hostages interviewed 
for this research, most of them were trying to provide as little 
information about their family as possible, in order to avoid getting 
them involved. A good example showing that revealing information 
about family members can be used against a hostage is when a 
former kidnapped university student, accidentally revealed 
information about her sister. During our interview, the student, who 
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was kidnapped in 2011, said that at some point during her captivity 
she mentioned that she could not wait to see her sister:  
it was my fault because through what I said it was clear 
that we [the hostage and her sister] have a very close 
relationship and at points when they wanted me to 
cooperate and say specific things [to her father while they 
were negotiating the ransom through the phone], they 
would tell me that if I don‟t do what they say they would 
also kidnap her. I remember one of them [kidnappers] 
saying “we will bring her here to keep you company, we 
can have both of you”, and then laughing. It was terrible; 
maybe they knew I had a sister before kidnapping me, 
they possibly did, but I showed that I care about her and I 
knew they could find her. [interviewee 2] 
A businessman and an IT expert who were both kidnapped were 
very cautious about not revealing any family-related information. 
The businessman who was got kidnapped in Greece (in 2008), said 
than when he was asked for his wife‟s phone number in order to 
notify her about the kidnap and make her aware about the ransom 
demand, the businessman insisted he give his lawyer‟s number.  
They [kidnappers] kept insisting to talk to her [his wife], 
but I was telling them that she has heart problems and 
they would kill her, which was not true and it didn‟t 
persuade them. Then I told them that she has no clue 
about our [his family‟s and his business‟] finances, so they 
agreed to negotiate with the lawyer. But from the other 
side [his wife with the police negotiators] they decided 
that the best person to communicate with the kidnappers 
was my wife, so she got involved anyways. [interviewee 
3] 
That was the businessman‟s attempt to keep his family safe.  
Another former hostage [interviewee 30] who was interviewed said 
something similar. The man was kidnapped in Iraq (in 2007), and in 
our interview he explained that he had to invent a wife without 
giving any information about real family members and friends. He 
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made up a wife who was far from Iraq or the UK, where he was 
originally from, and throughout his kidnapping he kept saying to his 
kidnappers that she could not be reached by phone. The former 
hostage said that it was an instinctive reaction, and by doing that 
not only did this appeal to his kidnapper‟s respect for family, but he 
also tried to keep his actual family uninvolved. These three 
examples show that informing the readers of the EuNAT brochure 
that establishing a personal relationship through various topics, 
without mentioning any information about the dangers of 
developing the Stockholm syndrome (which is luckily mentioned in 
the UNODC manual), or the dangers of putting the life of family 
members at risk, is naive.   
 The third inaccuracy inside the EuNAT brochure is the part 
where it is suggested that, in the case where someone is kept 
hostage, they should stay mentally fit by keeping a diary. 
Maintaining good mental health during the time one is kept hostage 
is very important, however, within the brochure, hostages are 
advised to „[keep] a diary, memorise the place where you are being 
kept, [observe] how the kidnappers are organised, or any other 
details about your captivity. Ask for a pen and paper…‟ (EuNAT, 
2012: 30). Keeping mental notes and memorising some things 
connected to the conditions of captivity is different from physically 
writing down in a hard copy format this information. Finding or 
asking for a pen and a paper from your captors in order to keep 
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notes about them, their organisation, the location and the 
surroundings can be quite risky. The idea of keeping notes about 
the kidnappers and the incident contradicts that which is stated 
only two pages, which is that „the offenders are afraid of being 
detected and pursued. Do nothing to reveal that you are aware of 
the offenders‟ identity or hiding place‟ (EuNAT, 2012: 32). 
 The fourth and final questionable point inside the EuNAT 
brochure is where it states that hostages should „only try to escape 
if [they] are sure of [their] success‟. At this point it would be good if 
the brochure provided the definition of “success‟, because escaping 
the place where someone is being held does not mean that they are 
free and safe to return back home. In an interview with an 
experienced Greek negotiator who has been involved in many 
recent kidnapping cases, he stressed the importance of staying 
calm and not trying to escape. He explained that: 
This [escaping] is stupid. It will only make things worse 
for the hostage and a lot more difficult for us [the team 
working in a kidnap]. We try to communicate that to the 
hostage from the first contact they have with their family. 
We ask for the proof of life, so they [kidnappers] usually 
give the hostage on the phone, and the communicator 
[usually the family member receiving the demand] is 
already informed to say „stay calm, don‟t try to escape, we 
are doing our best‟. Escaping usually doesn‟t work out 
well; most people who die or get killed during a 
kidnapping are those who tried to escape at some point. 
Kidnappers might have crossed the borders without them 
[hostages] knowing. So you escape and you go where? 
And if you try to escape but they found out, usually the 
conditions of captivity will get worse; we have seen that in 
a few cases. [interviewee 6] 
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This worsening of the conditions of captivity was also something 
which was mentioned by the young woman who, as stated 
previously, was threatened with having her sister kidnapped as 
well. During her recounting of her kidnapping, she referred to an 
incident where she had to choose between trying to escape and 
staying in her position without taking advantage of the lack of 
observation: 
I told you I was sleeping a lot, twenty hours a day, but 
one afternoon I woke up and I realised the guard [one of 
the kidnappers who was supposed to be observing her] 
was asleep. I didn‟t move from the bed [where she was 
for most of her kidnap] to see him, but I could hear him 
snoring from the next room. I knew the door [of the 
house] was very close to my room, but I had to pass in 
front of the room nextdoor [where the man was sleeping 
in] first. From the sound of it I knew the door was a heavy 
old metallic one, but every time they were opening and 
closing the door I could hear some keys moving. I think 
they [kidnappers] were leaving the keys on the door. Also, 
in the mornings I could hear animals, possibly sheep, 
which meant I was far from the city [from which she was 
kidnapped], maybe even out of the country. I could have 
run towards the door, but he would have possibly heard 
me. I decided to try to fall asleep again and forget about 
it. There was rope inside my room so if I tried to escape, 
at best they would have tied me. […] When we went for 
the autopsy of the house everything was the way I 
thought it was. […] The principal negotiator [of her case] 
said my choice [of not trying to escape] was wise. I am 
alive and unharmed […] I didn‟t want to risk the trust we 
[between the kidnappers and herself] had built so far. 
[interviewee 2] 
Of course, each case is different, but escape is more than leaving 
the space where someone is held as a hostage. Thus, the inclusion 
within the EuNAT brochure that one can try to escape if he/she is 
sure of their success is misleading and can be dangerous. Maybe it 
could have been more helpful if there were a few more details 
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within the brochure concerning things to consider before deciding to 
escape. 
 After explaining why there are four points inside the EuNAT 
brochure which are either questionable or which need further 
clarification, I will do the same for the UNODC manual. The manual 
has a couple of interesting viewpoints and suggestions which 
contradict each other. At the beginning, the manual is in favour of 
partnerships and their development between the public and the 
private sectors, and which involve the public as well. As is stated 
inside the manual, where nations want to develop an effective way 
to tackle kidnappings, they should consider „effective partnerships 
involving the public sector, the private sector, the community, and 
the general public‟ (UNODC, 2006: 6).  At some other part of the 
manual it is also stated that a more effective response can be 
enabled by „allowing the building and development of strategic 
alliances between interested parties, including these in the public 
and private sectors …‟ (UNODC, 2OO6: 10). Although it is not 
explained, when they refer to the private sector, they possibly 
mean the involvement of people from the risk management 
industry, private negotiators and investigators, kidnapping experts, 
as well as insurance companies. However, at some other point it 
creates confusion by stating that maybe nations should consider the 
need to regulate the „private commercial enterprises that offer 
investigation and negotiation services for cases of kidnapping‟ 
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(UNODC, 2006: 7). This statement needs further clarification as it is 
not clear if regulation refers to the control and monitoring of the 
private negotiators and investigators in order to make sure that the 
same standards and quality is kept, or whether it indirectly means 
to slowly reduce their activity in the kidnapping-management field. 
It would appear that the latter might be a more valid reason, 
because UNODC, and the people who wrote the manual, believe 
that there needs to be a control of the business aspect and the 
opportunities to, legally, profit from kidnappings and its risk. My 
understanding is that through suggesting a regulation of a variety 
of kidnap-related businesses, they are ultimately trying to prevent 
kidnappings from happening, and this can also be supported by the 
fact that the manual is questioning the appropriateness of paying 
ransom and having a kidnapping insurance.  
It is stated within the manual that where nations want to 
develop policies, they should consider to „not legitimize the 
payment of ransom to secure the release of a kidnapping victim‟ 
(UNODC, 2006: 7), as well as highlighting the „the need to assess 
the appropriateness of the provision of “kidnapping insurance”, 
which experience shows may act as an encouragement to commit 
such crimes‟ (ibid). Both statements are in a bullet-point form 
without further explanation, so it is unclear whether there is 
approval for families and insurance companies to pay ransom for a 
kidnapped hostage.  
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A kidnapping insurance is not just a guarantee that part or all 
the requested ransom will be paid, but it is also accompanied by 
training in order to prevent a kidnapping, what can happen during a 
hostage incident, what one should expect and what the suggested 
reactions are. This means that if companies and individuals are not 
allowed to have access to such an insurance, it might be more 
difficult to have access to the information around kidnap-prevention 
and also managing being a hostage. Summarising the above points, 
although within the manual it is suggested that there should be a 
regulation of private negotiators, private investigators and the 
prevention of authorisation of ransom payment either from families 
or from insurance companies, at another point they are calling for 
the creation of partnerships. The UNODC manual has actually been 
created by the counter-kidnap team of the National Crime Agency 
in the United Kingdom, and even though they seem to be critical, at 
least within the manual, of private businesses, they are actually 
collaborating with private companies and the NCA has a commercial 
aspect. This will be looked at in more detail later in chapter 6 where 
I will have examples of these collaborations from interviews with 
individuals from the private industry. 
 After referring to the disparities within the UNODC manual 
above, it is important to point out some interesting insufficiencies. 
A manual is a guide which includes instructions and provides 
information on a specific issue. It is written by people who are 
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considered to be knowledgeable experts in their field, and aims to 
clarify who is doing what and when, provide definitions, updates 
and mainly educate practitioners. The manual is dated, because it 
does not include a type of kidnap which is steadily increasing in 
more and more countries, the “tiger” kidnap. This is interesting as 
the manual itself is calling nations to have a continuation of the 
learning around the issue of kidnaps and „the training provided to 
all agencies is constant‟ (UNODC, 2006: 11). However, apart from 
the manual‟s dated content, it is also holding back information. In 
relation to the key investigative issues, the manual states that 
„there are a number of issues that are particularly relevant to the 
investigation of the alleged kidnapping that the case officer [if there 
is a case officer, then this person is taking the main operational 
decisions towards responding to a kidnap]. Due to their sensitive 
nature, they are not described in detail in this manual‟ (UNODC, 
2006: 27-28). After that, there are a few lines written about four of 
these “issues”, which are related to communication, finance 
matters, technical support and media. At this point it should be 
remembered that this manual is one of the very few UN documents, 
and possibly the only one, which is not publically accessible, and it 
is designed only to be read by practitioners. However, by invoking 
the high security and sensitive nature of kidnapping investigations, 
the manual is giving insufficient information, leaving the people to 
whom it is designed to educate without the requisite information.    
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4.2.3  Transnational trainings as  knowledge transfer 
mechanisms 
International organisations such as Europol not only produce 
brochures on ways to avoid being kidnapped and what to do during 
a kidnap situation, but also organise training exercises. A second 
way of transferring knowledge is through this European and 
transnational training. Knowledge is transferred to other teams or 
countries who wish to receive specific knowledge, and to an extent, 
EuNAT, from Europol, is one such mechanism for transferring 
content-related knowledge. With EuNAT, member-states send a 
couple of representatives every year to meetings which are held in 
different European locations. In a follow up interview with one of 
the Greek members of the negotiators team, I was told that in 
December, 2015, he would have to present a kidnap for ransom 
case at a EuNAT training session in Romania. At the beginning of 
our meeting he presented me with two variants of a business card, 
which were in English, and he asked me to choose the one I 
preferred, as well as check the orthography. „I don‟t want them to 
laugh with my English, or think that we are cheap, […] I am going 
to have them [the cards] glossed from both sides‟ [interviewee 7]. 
He also commented on the fact that on the business card he will 
have “counter-kidnapping department”, even though in Greece 
there is no such thing, but those looking at kidnappings are 
members of the homicide department (or formally called the 
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department of crimes against life and property). The negotiator 
provided more details about these trainings, and he explained: 
We [participants] are all together and we all present 
something. […] In the European level, there is 
collaboration only on trafficking and drugs, but Europol is 
organising these re-trainings and they ask for guys like 
me, from many countries, to participate. These re-
trainings take place every year, and now it‟s my turn to go 
with a colleague of mine from the office upstairs. It will be 
good. We are going to present a case we had, in English. 
We will analyse everything about it, from beginning to 
end; what happened, how it happened, negotiations, 
problems, and research. […] Everyone will be very 
interested into what we‟ve got to say because there aren‟t 
many kidnaps in Europe, and we‟ve got a very good case 
to present. [interviewee 7] 
The interviewed NCA member was one of the founders of 
EuNAT, and when I asked him if there are any issues related to the 
transfer of practices, he began narrating the story behind the 
creation of EuNAT, after, of course, saying that there is absolutely 
not one single issue. 
About twelve years ago I was in Berlin and I was in a 
conversation with colleagues from Germany, Switzerland, 
and Holland about kidnapping in general. In two o'clock in 
the morning in a bar somewhere in Berlin, we decided that 
we will create a European group called EuNAT. We got a 
paper napkin and we wrote the terms and conditions and 
the structure of EuNAT, there and then, at 2 o'clock in the 
morning, and we have evolved now to where we are now. 
Our motto is 'sharing information saves lives', and that's 
very important. When we have an incident, by bringing 
someone, anyone, even the tea lady, into that table, that 
environment, i do not have any problem with that, 
because if someone can contribute, it doesn't matter what 
the background is. The main point is sharing information is 
very important. The bottom line for me is that it doesn't 
matter where you are from, if there is a life at risk, then 
we should all contribute and do what we can to secure the 
safe release of the hostage. [interviewee 1] 
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The United Kingdom still plays a very important role at these 
meetings where police counter-kidnap officers share their 
experiences and knowledge. Twelve years after the initial idea was 
conceived, a very small team of UK representatives are the chairs 
of these meetings, but although the initial aim is the European 
communication and response, it seems that this communication has 
expanded to a broader and global collaboration between counter-
kidnap agencies. 
Europe and EuNAT is a very important national advisory 
team that involves twenty-seven member states, we are 
the chair of that particular group, and it is very, very, 
effective. In the UK the NCA has a counter-kidnap and 
extortion unit and it makes sure European standards are 
equivalent. The beauty of that is that a kidnap happens in 
London and i can phone X in Madrid and all of a sudden 
we have surveillance and other assets put in place, so we 
deal with kidnapping response, cross-border surveillance, 
and negotiations not only in Europe but worldwide, so an 
inter-agency response to  each and every incident is very 
important. [interviewee 1] 
The United Kingdom and, more specifically, the National Crime 
Agency and its counter-kidnap and extortion unit are considered to 
be knowledge brokers, both in the European and the global context. 
Not only do they chair the EuNAT meetings, but they are also asked 
to train other police counter-kidnap teams in a variety of locations. 
When I asked the NCA member what they do in relation to 
kidnappings, he underlined the fact that his job is related to 
transferring his counter-kidnap knowledge to other countries. 
I travel a lot; I am in the country very few days a month. 
Since you asked me what we [the NCA] do I will say that 
we speak. It is very important to have a dialogue with 
partners nationally and internationally, in order that we 
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can work together, we can get the hostage back safe and 
well. And also, we provide high quality support to our 
operational partners as well. […]There is a ton of training 
that we have delivered in the last 4 months, in Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Caribbean, Greece, Cyprus, 
Ecuador, where (in Ecuador)they now have their own 
counter-kidnap unit, so you should have that at the back 
of your mind. [interviewee 1] 
Although in my interview with the NCA member there was no 
reference as to whether the training has a cost and what the price 
of delivering such a training would be, as I will explain later in this 
thesis (later in this chapter and in chapter 7), these trainings are 
actually quite pricy. Supposedly, after training the recipient team of 
negotiators in a country, and after this team has read the UNODC 
counter-kidnap manual, there is a deal done between the two 
nation states and counter-kidnapping teams that there will be 
collaboration in the case of an emergency. Each team should be 
capable of dealing with a kidnap incident, but the NCA has 
developed a service aiming to provide advice anytime, anywhere in 
the world. The NCA member interviewed explained how everything 
works in the UK: 
In the UK, there are forty-four police forces and each 
police force has got responsibility to investigate kidnap. 
Within my team, we can deal with a kidnap in its entirety, 
but the nature and scale of kidnappings in the UK stops us 
from doing that on a regular basis. But we offer to the UK 
law enforcement system a 24/7 service that can provide 
tactical advice and considerations as well. So we don't tell 
investigation officers or the senior detectives how to 
investigate, but we point them to the right directions. If 
the job becomes complicated, we have set a system in the 
UK where each police force is responsible to deal with 
ransom kidnap, if it becomes difficult, then they will go to 
their regional resource and request further assistance 
from negotiators, surveillance, and so on and so forth. if 
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the job becomes very complicated they will call the 
National Crime Agency with an army of support and that's 
surveillance, firearms, officers, technicians, negotiators 
and so on and so forth, and it is very important to speak 
to each other, so the multi-agency response is absolutely 
critical in the way that we deal with a kidnapping in this 
country and overseas. [interviewee 1] 
Amongst these teams which have been trained by the NCA is a 
small group of negotiators in Greece, and this team is considered to 
be the knowledge broker in the Balkan area. In the world of 
tackling kidnaping, the counter-kidnapping team of the United 
Kingdom was, and still is, considered to be a knowledge broker, 
transferring the team‟s pricy knowledge to other countries and 
fellow counter-kidnap police teams. Back in the early 2000s, a 
group of three people from the UK counter-kidnap team trained the 
first group of Greek negotiators. All the Greek negotiators from this 
initial group, after following a very successful career in the police, 
are now retired, with most of them currently working in the private 
security business. One of these negotiators is transferring his 
knowledge and techniques to students of business schools, in 
companies offering private seminars on negotiation skills, as well as 
to police officers. Yet, all of them, before retiring, had to train the 
next generation of police negotiators and the counter-kidnap team. 
Currently, according to what the interviewees have said, this 
second generation of police counter-kidnap negotiators is 
transferring its knowledge to the Balkan countries, Poland and 
Cyprus.  
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For this research, a significant number of Greek police officers 
were interviewed, and even though most of them were falsely 
claiming to be in the counter-kidnapping team, they all shared one 
common perception of the team. That perception was the team‟s 
excellent work. Every single negotiator interviewed mentioned the 
fact that the team is one of the best in the world, and the best one 
in Europe. Usually from the first minutes of the interview, 
negotiators and generally people working within the police would 
comment on the police‟s excellence by saying that „when it comes 
to kidnappings we are the best and everyone here [Greece] and 
outside [other countries] knows that‟ [interviewee 7], and this 
negotiator continued by saying „they have a few kidnap cases 
abroad, and because they [the counter-kidnap teams abroad] 
listen, they have learned that here in Greece, we have become 
experts‟ [interviewee 7]. As another police officer, interestingly, 
stated, „we have a hundred present success on solving kidnap for 
ransom cases‟ [interviewee 8], „they [other Balkan countries] ask 
us to train them, they are asking for OUR help‟ [interviewee 8].  A 
relatively young negotiator stated: „we are the best, and in Europe 
there are no other cases of kidnaps, apart from those here [in 
Greece]. Greece is unique and that‟s why there is interest from 
outside; what we do, how we do it‟ [interviewee 9]12.   
 
                                                          
12
 This will be looked in detail in section 5.3  
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4.2.4 Intranational trainings as a knowledge transfer 
mechanism  
A final way of transferring knowledge is through intranational 
trainings, which are taking place within particular countries. High 
Security knowledge transfer is moving both internationally and 
intranationally, within a country or across its borders, and this is 
usually manifested through state organisations like the police. This 
can either be in a form of training, or in a form of re-training in 
order to keep up to date the information and the knowledge that 
the negotiators and the counter-kidnap team already have. These 
knowledge-events are mostly done by people who have received 
their initial training by the knowledge brokers, which is usually 
those in the UK, and they are expected to disseminate to others 
what they have learned. In most cases, once there is demand for a 
knowledge transfer event, counter-kidnap knowledge brokers like 
the English NCA team, organise week-long trainings, or three-day 
trainings, and in these trainings, counter-kidnap teams receive 
knowledge straight from those who have developed it. In other 
cases, these knowledge brokers are invited to the country which 
seeks to receive knowledge on a specific subject matter.  However, 
inviting the trainers is not always feasible, and that is due to the 
high cost of having a group of trainers carrying out the training. 
What is usually preferred is the payment of a few thousand pounds 
for the training of one person, and then the dissemination of 
knowledge and the things learned to the others by the person who 
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initially received it. This technique is done for both trainings and re-
trainings of staff members. 
Something similar happened in the case of the Cypriot team 
of negotiators. In 2011, a negotiator took part in a five-day training 
on negotiations in Manchester, and when he returned back to 
Cyprus he transferred the knowledge he had learned to the other 
negotiators of the country. First, in 2011 he trained a team of 
twenty negotiators, and two years later, in 2013 he trained another 
team of ten negotiators from across the country13. In my 
ethnography with the Cypriot negotiators‟ team I met twenty eight 
of them. As it was explained to me, it is mandatory for all of the 
negotiators to attend the annual training, and if, for any reason 
they fail to do so, they are suspended for a year. This means that 
they are not allowed to negotiate in any type of incident, and if they 
do not attend the next year‟s re-training, then their negotiation 
diploma is taken away and they are no long members of the Cypriot 
team of negotiators. After contacting the leading negotiator who is 
also organising these re-trainings, I managed to participate in and 
presented at this event, which lasted for four days.  
Apart from seeing how knowledge transfer works and how it 
can be applied in mock exercises, I also transferred my knowledge 
about kidnappings and, specifically, kidnappings for ransom. In the 
re-training of the negotiators, four different types of knowledge 
                                                          
13
 It should be noted though that the negotiators have only received training for general cases where 
negotiation skills might need to be used, and not specifically to kidnaps. 
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transfer techniques were used. One technique used was my 
presentation which consisted of two sections. It included some 
information which I thought might be useful to them, and it 
consisted of things I have learned from my interviews with former 
hostages, information I have received at the three London 
kidnapping-related events I have attended, as well as discussions I 
had during the breaks with practitioners from around the world. In 
addition, the third hour of my presentation was a close analysis of 
letters exchanged between the kidnappers and the wife of a 
kidnapped for ransom businessman14. The close analysis of 
anything given or sent by the kidnappers is something that they 
might be asked to do at some point in their careers as negotiators. 
The analysis also requires the application of skills they have learned 
as negotiators, such as “active listening”, and paying attention at 
what one is saying, in order to use the information provided. The 
aim of this exercise was to make them imagine being responsible 
for negotiating in a similar case, and having to provide their 
incident management skills where they might have to deal with the 
kidnappers, the family and the media all at the same time.  
The second knowledge transfer technique was the narration of 
a real negotiation incident that had happened in the past months by 
one or two of the negotiators. The negotiator(s) who took part in 
the incident had to stand in front of everyone and talk about a 
                                                          
14
 When I interviewed the couple they gave me copies of all the letter exchanges they had, and after 
asking for their permission, I used these as part of my training session. 
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specific incident which had some kind of difficulty. The narrations 
usually started from the moment they were informed about a 
specific hostage situation, and the objective was to underline what 
went wrong and what should have been done in a different way. 
This technique is useful for both those who have experienced it and 
those who have not, because one group can reflect on their actions, 
and the other group is able to be deterred from making similar 
mistakes. The third technique of transferring knowledge was with 
small negotiation-activities at the end of each day, where all the 
negotiators had to negotiate in groups of two in turns, after which 
there was a discussion. They had to negotiate either in a hostage 
incident or in an incident with someone holding a knife or having a 
gun.  
The negotiations were filmed, and after all the twenty eight 
negotiators had attempted to get information, relax the subject, 
and take away any guns or hostages, they would all sit down and 
watch the negotiation-attempts together, something which would 
last around two to three hours each day, and talk about mistakes, 
problems and possible solutions. The point of that was to see what 
mistakes they had done and what needed to be improved. The 
fourth and final knowledge transfer technique was the big exercise 
which took place in three different locations across the country 
simultaneously. This exercise, I was told, is supposed to be as close 
as possible to a real hostage incident where negotiators are 
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needed, and such an exercise is not just important to test the 
knowledge and techniques of the negotiators, but also because all 
the different teams have to work together. If there is a kidnapping, 
the group of three to four negotiators will have to work with the 
counter terrorism team, and the team gathering intelligence, which 
is what usually happens when there is any kind of hostage 
situation. 
 
4.3 The Barriers to Transferring Knowledge 
4.3.1 Subjective knowledge and stickiness of 
information 
In most cases there is a schism and a big gap between information 
and knowledge, and in reality, what I believe is that when it comes 
to counter-kidnapping, the only thing that is transferred is 
information. In addition to that, when there is a “knowledge” 
transfer event, that “knowledge” is purified and distilled. What is 
transferred is someone‟s extract of a wide volume of data, which is 
later codified, and wrapped in a pretty package of “to do” lists and 
“five-step” solutions, aiming to get sold to or by a private or public 
organisation. These are presented as sophisticated tools which are 
said to be able to deal with a variety of issues, even though they 
have been created out of someone else‟s experiences in a specific 
context which does not imply that the knowledge is distilled, but 
rather it is sterilised and useless to different contexts. This 
codification was also seen in the two official documents that I have 
148 
 
discussed in the previous chapter. However, every kidnap for 
ransom case creates an environment of uncertainty and 
imprecision, so relying solely on a specific pre-existing method or a 
schematic approach will be unreliable because everything, including 
knowledge, is a matter of subjective perception. The world is not a 
binary opposition, black or white. The world is messy, fuzzy, with 
blurred boundaries, there are many options, infinite combinations 
and many things that can go wrong and create ambiguities. When it 
comes to “knowledge” transfer, the goal should be to improve the 
recipients‟ understanding and logical thinking. In addition, if 
someone has no knowledge or experience of the informational 
context received, then they will have to rely on the knowledge of 
others. However, for information to become knowledge, one has to 
evaluate the received information against their prior knowledge or 
ideas, and work in order to update the information into knowledge.   
The information received, combined with one‟s experience in a 
diversity of jobs, as well as the individual‟s learning abilities, can 
lead to the creation of knowledge. Individuals need to be acceptable 
to new ideas, flexible and open to learn and change what they 
already have as a preconception. In a sense, there are two 
components which can help someone receive information and later 
create personal knowledge of a subject matter; first is the need to 
be open and acceptable to what other people are saying and 
transferring, and second is the need to have the patience to work 
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hard in order to upgrade the information into knowledge through a 
variety of ways.  
When it comes to knowledge (or rather information, as I have been 
arguing in this section of the chapter) transfer, there is stickiness, 
ambiguity and uncertainty as to whether the knowledge received 
can be used by those who received it or otherwise. There is also a 
lack of motivation by the donor to share their knowledge for various 
reasons, which is mainly connected to the idea that knowledge 
equals power. Recipients lack the capacity to absorb the knowledge 
transferred to them, either due to limited prior knowledge or to 
limited or no relevant experience, while in some cases recipients 
might realise that what is being transferred is not applicable to their 
national context. This can make them less likely to understand, 
absorb and apply the information transferred.  
Additionally, during the last day of the Cyprus training, after 
finishing an exercise (where the negotiators had to try and calm a 
man down who held his wife hostage and was threatening to kill her 
with a knife), a negotiator asked if in such a case he could have 
started cursing the man or beating him. Such a question goes 
against any negotiating principles, which shows that although there 
is transfer, there is no capacity to effectively absorb what is being 
transferred. Recipients cannot remember and re-create the 
knowledge received, and there is no familiarity with the subject 
matter. In Cyprus, whenever a negotiator is invited to a case of 
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emergency, they have to take a heavy book with them which has 
possible sentences they can use to calm someone down, various 
questions they can ask in order to get more information out of 
them, as well as replies they can give to what the subject of 
interest is saying.  
Another example where in practice I realised how sticky the process 
of sharing someone‟s knowledge can be is during my presentation 
in Cyprus. Language is very important and the linguistic factor in a 
training can definitely become a barrier or the opposite, make the 
process smoother for both the transmitters and the receivers. As is 
stated in the literature review chapter, Guille (in Lamieux, 2010) 
believes that when it comes to the process of transferring, and the 
cooperation between people, the linguistic factor is more important 
than having different legislations or policies. Hellenic Greek and 
Cypriot Greek are similar languages, although not the same. Many 
words have different meanings in the two languages, and, knowing 
that, I informed the audience before the beginning of my 
presentation that if anything was misunderstood, they should stop 
and ask for clarification. During my presentation I was stopped at 
various points because the words I was using were not known or 
did not have a clear meaning to the negotiators, yet I do not have 
the illusion that all of them understood completely what I was 
discussing. Because of the linguistic differences, there were some 
gaps during the transfer, so one can only imagine how difficult and 
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sticky the process is when it is done between two completely 
different languages with interpretations or through the use of 
English. There is a big distance between teaching and transferring 
knowledge to learning, understanding and retaining what has been 
transferred, and language can add extra difficulties. The fact that 
negotiation techniques, questions and phrases are not absorbed, 
but can only be used with the help of a book, is possibly a sign 
which shows that we are not talking about knowledge but the 
sharing of information. At this point it should be reminded that in 
this work, the word „knowledge‟ will be used instead of 
„information‟, only because this is how the interviewees have 
referred to what they do („knowledge transfer‟) and what they 
receive („knowledge‟). 
4.3.2  The criticism of the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime  
As I have mentioned in the previous chapter on the ways of 
transferring the counter-kidnap knowledge, the EuNAT brochure 
and the UNODC manual seem to be ignored by those working in the 
counter-kidnap field, and they are degraded and treated as 
documents of minor importance. The EuNAT brochure, although it is 
openly accessible, offers very basic and common sense information 
which is mundane, and even those who are working within the 
travel-safety businesses seem to disregard it. In a discussion I had 
with two individuals, one who is the CEO of a risk management 
company in Holland, and another one from Belgium who is 
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providing training for those travelling in hostile environments, I 
brought up this brochure in our discussion.  The man from Brussels 
immediately recognised what I was talking about and with a 
sarcastic smile on his face replied „Oh, yes, I know that, I‟ve read it. 
Have you [he asked his colleague from Holland]? It‟s amazing how 
little you learn after reading things like that. You should read it!‟ 
[interviewee 10] 
When it comes to the UN manual, the man who was in the 
team responsible for its creation had some conflicting ideas. At first 
he claimed that the manual is something that „should be used‟ 
[interviewee 1], but it is „not to be used by every country‟ 
[interviewee 1], even though it is allegedly sent to each and every 
UN member state around the world. More specifically, the NCA 
high-ranking official who also assisted towards the creation of the 
UN manual explained:  
We've been doing that [the NCA kidnap-related work] for 
the last 10 years or so, and the UN asked if we could help 
them to write the global counter-kidnap manual, and we 
advocate that this [the manual] is something that should 
be used. But not to be used by every country, you have a 
look at it, read it and you take the learning and the 
content out of the manual and you adopt it then for 
Cyprus or for Greece, you take the UN model and say 
'yes', 'yes', 'yes', these things will work, or „i don't think 
that will work‟. [interviewee 1] 
Based on what the NCA official said, I understood that the manual 
is not used as a standardised step-by-step approach for each and 
every nation, but it is more like an introduction to kidnappings, with 
some suggestions of responses. However, I was wrong, because, as 
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he explained later, when I ask for further clarification, he argued 
that the manual is offering a standardised approach. As he 
explained, this means that countries can follow the advice 
suggested by the manual model of operations, or another model 
similar to this one, without however explaining what the alternative 
model would be like. What he replied to my question was mainly an 
attempt to highlight how things have changed compared to the past 
when the manual, along with its suggestions, did not exist. The 
reply of the NCA official is stated below:  
No, it is a standardised approach. All countries use this 
model or a variation of that model now. But before, if a 
kidnap happens in Sudan for example they thought it 
wasn't a problem, but then they realised that it is a 
problem, and they need to have a working model that 
they can use, and operate successfully to secure the 
release of hostages. So it is something that, fortunately, 
has been used by more and more countries around the 
world. [interviewee 1] 
In relation to the UN manual, the reality is that from all those 
interviewed who are working in the counter-kidnap, private or 
public, business, only the English trainer and the senior member of 
the NCA who both assisted towards its composition were aware of 
the manual‟s existence. Not only people have not read it or do not 
know that such a manual exists, but in the case of Cyprus, the 
trainers and the negotiators did not know what the UNODC stands 
for. I asked all of my interviewees from the public and the private 
sector, as well as the people who participated in the Cypriot re-
training, and all of them replied in a similar tone „what is that [the 
UNODC]?‟ [interviewee 11], „what is it about?‟[interviewee 11], „can 
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you find it for us?‟[interviewee 12]. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the manual has some information about prevention 
methods, and the main focus is on the police response to a 
kidnapping incident. The manual begins by giving information and 
examples of some of the different types of kidnappings that exist 
around the world, but it is dated because it was written more than a 
decade ago, in 2005, and it does not include some prevalent types 
of kidnaps along with their characteristics, such as bridal 
kidnapping, and tiger kidnapping. The manual is of little use to 
someone who already possesses knowledge around the 
phenomenon of kidnappings, yet it can be useful for those who are 
at the first stages of receiving information on the topic, and it can 
potentially stimulate further discussions.  
Interviewees working in the public sector were simply ignorant 
of the manual‟s existence, or what the UNODC is, while those 
working in the private sector have chosen to ignore it. A man who 
has worked with the UN in various occasions and currently owns his 
own security and risk evacuations company explained why 
practitioners might choose to ignore the UN and its documents, or 
policies: 
They have terrible security. I work with the UN guys all 
the time, they are a mess. They have to re-do everything. 
Their security is bad, their procurement system is bad, 
their manuals and policies are bad. They lived off this 
whole legacy stuff from the 60s and they are just trying to 
figure out that they are not able to fund things right away, 
they are unable to run policies right away. [...] They don't 
have a recovery system. Once, when we considered doing 
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a joint recovery centre, they don't have anything like that. 
So a lot of the stuff they are doing is pick-up games. So at 
one point we were doing a cargo services for them, and 
we offered that we do evacuations; they added it right to 
the contract because they didn't have it. There is nothing 
inherent to their system at all. I don't know how they have 
been operating all these years. On a wing and a prayer. 
And they are funded well, i mean they are funded from 
donors, but the way they manage it (their finances) has 
been really poor, so they are technically not really funded.  
[interviewee 13] 
The United Nations and the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime are not seen as an important source of information and 
knowledge. Many of those interviewed from the public sector are 
not aware if or how the UN or UNODC can help them with their 
work in the counter-kidnapping field. In addition to that, those 
interviewed from the private sector are quite sceptical of the value 
of such an organisation or what it has to offer in terms of 
preventing or dealing with kidnappings. Contrary to the 
unintentional ignorance of the public sector, in many cases, people 
from private businesses just do not know what the UN and UNODC 
stands for, but have also done business with them and after that 
they have deliberately chosen to ignore them. As one of them 
explained, this ignorance is because of the UN‟s bad quality, lack of 
concrete ideas, techniques, and qualified staff. In more detail, the 
man who is working on the evacuations and the recovery of people 
who have been kidnapped or held hostages in various locations 
around the globe, explained: 
They have an annual conference at the UN headquarters 
on kidnapping, asset taking and personal recovery and 
every year they come back and they try to find „is there 
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anybody here who will be able to help‟, you know they are 
trying to find people to write their policies, and manuals, 
because they don't have anything inherent. Policy writing 
is a big business; they have to do their policy first in order 
to get funding. If policy and manuals are not kept up, they 
just fall apart. [interviewee 13] 
From the words of this recovery and evacuations business owner, it 
seems that the UNODC agency is just managing to get the job done 
in order to secure funding, possibly for other projects. Their policies 
are ineffective, and my understanding is that if a piece of 
information or legislation is coming from the UN, it is believed that 
it will be of a bad quality, due to the absence of inherent 
knowledge. Things are done just for the sake of doing them, and on 
a similar note, one can argue that the counter-kidnap manual was 
created in order to tick a box and say that they have done 
something for this type of crime. 
The UNODC manual was created in 2005 by the National Crime 
Agency, and after that, and until the point of writing this, a more 
recent version has not been written. In addition to that, no one has 
had any interest in assessing the impact or the use of the manual 
from agencies such as the police. Interestingly, the NCA official 
referred to the constantly changing nature of this specific crime and 
he used phrases such as „every day is a school day‟ [interviewee 1], 
and „every day is a learning day‟ [interviewee 1]. More specifically 
the NCA interviewee said: „I have been involved in this counter-
kidnap role for the past 13 years, but I am not an expert. Every day 
is a school day‟ [interviewee 1]. However the manual is not updated 
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and it has stayed the same over time, even though there are new 
ransom-kidnapping styles that the various counter-kidnapping 
police departments around the world have to deal with. A good 
example of this constant change in the nature of kidnappings is a 
new type of „ransom‟ kidnapping case which was dealt by the NCA 
team, and which resembles a case which took place in Greece in 
2015. 
We have been involved in various operations. Historically 
kidnap for ransom is for money, but Albanians here in the 
UK threatened to kill a hostage unless 5 kilos of cocaine 
was handed over to the organised crime group. There was 
evidence of torture and we had enough evidence showing 
that they were going to kill their hostage. But they were 
not persuaded to go for cash, or go to cash as opposed to 
cocaine, so we were in a dilemma as to the type of tactics 
we were going to use, but thankfully for us the hostage 
escaped and was safely recovered in London, but the 
lessons coming out of that is that all kidnappers don't go 
for the money, they can go for other forms of commodities 
as well. [interviewee 1] 
If the family of the hostage or the person to whom the demand is 
made (victim) has easier and faster access to commodities such as 
gold, diamonds, jewellery, or drugs, asking for something else 
other than money is not just welcomed but is actually preferred to 
cash by the kidnappers, because these commodities cannot be 
followed up, and this makes it almost impossible to catch the 
offenders. Another very interesting and unusual kidnapping case is 
one which took place in London between a man and an organised 
criminal group in 2016. During my interview with the NCA official, 
he referred to the case to show that although he has been working 
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in this specific position for many years, he is still coming across 
kidnappings which are of a unique nature. As he explained: 
Honour is a major thing as far as they [the organised 
criminal group] are concerned. It's quite bizarre, but that's 
a real life situation where a husband left to go to work, 
text messages were coming in his wife's phone saying that 
her husband has been kidnapped, demands for £5000 
were made and to be taken in Oxford Circus, tube station 
in the centre of London, and then for the money to be 
burnt. A question of honour, again, but with a serious risk 
to life, and reputational risk to the organised criminal 
group. [interviewee 1] 
On a similar note, an interviewee who, after retiring from the Greek 
police started working in the private sector, talked about the 
importance of being prepared by noticing what is happening in 
other parts of the world. He explained: 
Crime is evolving, just like everything else. Anything and 
anyone dealing with [crime] prevention and control should 
stay open with their antennas up high, receiving what is 
happening elsewhere [in other parts of the world] 
regardless if they have reached them or not. [interviewee 
14] 
 
4.3.3 Criticisms of transnational training initiatives 
When discussing transnational trainings and kidnappings, we mainly talk 
about the role of the United Kingdom‟s National Crime Agency counter-
kidnap and extortion unit at the global level. They are considered to be 
the knowledge brokers, and this is the reason behind their creation of the 
UNODC counter-kidnap manual which is based on the English version. 
Although not many people from the counter-kidnap sector seem to value 
the opinion of the UN, the NCA official was proud of having his team 
acknowledged by the UN as a knowledge broker in the field of kidnap-
response:  
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We do suffer from a lack of report, but arguably, in 2015, 
411 lives were saved as a result of what we do and the 
successful structure of the operations we have been 
involved to. And the UK law enforcement has 
acknowledged us as the world leader in kidnap and 
hostage operations, and this is something which has been 
previously said by the United Nations. [interviewee 1] 
The NCA official referred to 411 kidnappings which took place in 
2015 in the United Kingdom and had a positive outcome, although 
another interviewee said something slightly different. Undoubtedly 
there is a substantial number of kidnappings in the United Kingdom 
every year, and some of them might go unnoticed and unreported, 
however, the person who is training the counter-kidnapping police 
personnel and is based in Manchester, argued that the number of 
kidnappings is smaller than the officially reported one. As he 
argued, this is done because there are „vested interests‟, however 
he did not explain what he meant by that. It might mean that 
through presenting a big number of cases, there will be more 
financial support for the counter-kidnap team, or the NCA team 
might have some other type of gain. The interviewee actually said: 
Statistics here [in the UK] are messy. The anti-kidnap unit 
[the NCA unit] has a vested interest in having lots and lots 
of kidnaps, so they will say that there are 500 [kidnapping 
cases per year], but there really aren‟t. There are about 
200 or 250, we have [kidnappings] mainly in Birmingham, 
Manchester and London. [interviewee 15] 
Going back to the quote from the NCA official, the UNODC manual 
is disseminating the English approach around the world, aiming to 
create a unified system of kidnap-related responses, so it can be 
easier for the English team to collaborate and offer their help when 
English citizens (although not exclusively) are involved in kidnaps 
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abroad. In addition to that, the manual seems to be a form of 
advertisement for the quality of the work and the services offered 
by a UK public organisation. The manual is not only there to make 
collaborations easier, but it is also proof of the National Crime 
Agency‟s expertise, and it is part of the transnational trainings 
offered by this national law enforcing agency.  
There are many questions surrounding these trainings and 
their practical usefulness. Organising a training in a country which 
is in a different geographical location, with different types of 
kidnaps and stakeholders involved, does not imply that the 
knowledge transferred will be useful or appropriate.  Preparedness 
is valuable, but it is very different from usefulness. Also, in some 
cases the terminology used is different, which can make the 
transfer even more complex. For instance, an important difference 
in the terminology is the word „victim‟, which in the UK context is 
used for the person to whom the demand for ransom is made, 
whereas in all the other nations is used for the person kidnapped. 
In Greece, when the trainers are not providing the training in 
Greek, they have interpreters. However it is likely that these 
interpreters are not familiar with the difference between the terms, 
which can lead to a confusion of who is supposed to do what. 
Having these differences in the geographical location, kidnap case 
and terminology in mind, when I asked the NCA high-ranking 
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official if after the training countries are better equipped to deal 
with kidnaps, his reply was very positive:  
Yes, yes! I am very impressed with the colleagues in 
Athens, I was there last year and this year as well. They 
have an awful lot of experience, and they've been very 
successful, but they've been unsuccessful as well. If 
you've got a machine that is programmed to deal with a 
kidnap and you stick to the policy that comes out of the 
creation of that machine, then as long as you adopt the 
principle of saving life as paramount, and everything else 
as secondary, you will become successful, because you 
will exhaust every little bit of intelligence so you will 
identify where the stronghold, the hostage, is kept. That's 
what the training and the UN manual is all about, so 
you've got to stick to that. [interviewee 1] 
According to what the interviewee said, by the „well programmed 
machine‟ he possibly means the UN manual and the trainings 
provided by his team and himself. As I have previously stated, 
Greece has not received the manual, or at least the counter-kidnap 
team is not aware of its existence. In addition to that, the Greek 
team working with kidnapping cases follows a different approach to 
the one the UK counter-kidnap team is following. A Greek 
negotiator said: 
Our kidnappings are long. They last for many days, weeks, 
even months in some cases. We had one which was 
running for forty days. Everything was ready from day 
five; the ransom money, and the courier whom we have 
trained of different scenarios and how she will have to 
react to each one, but we couldn‟t identify where the 
hostage was kept and the most important who the 
kidnappers were, so we were waiting for more information 
to come in. We acted the last day, sent the money and 
received the hostage. [interviewee 16] 
This approach appears to be very different from the one followed by 
the UK, in their ransom kidnap cases, and used in their theoretical 
trainings, where usually they use the examples of kidnaps which 
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lasted only for a few days. In Greece, apart from the fact that 
everything lasts longer, the shortest kidnapping lasted for five days. 
There are of course cases which have never been solved and the 
hostage is still missing, but, the longest, successfully solved 
kidnapping was running for over a month. Usually the kidnappings 
last quite a long time because it takes time to collect all the ransom 
demanded, while in the meantime the team is trying to collect all 
the necessary information about the location of the hostage, and 
the identity of the kidnappers. Nevertheless, this is not always 
possible, so they can only rely on the fact that after paying the 
ransom, they will follow up the registered bank notes to find who 
the kidnappers are and their location. The NCA team has three 
options and, depending on the case, they either do one of them or 
try to do all of them at the same time. These options are to pay up 
the ransom, to pay up the ransom and follow the money, and, 
finally, to locate the stronghold aiming to intervene and set the 
hostage free. The interviewee from Greater Manchester police who 
has also assisted in the creation of the manual told me: 
You do all three [pay up, pay up and follow, locate 
stronghold] at the same time, a team of people try to find 
the stronghold, if they cannot find it you wrap a bubble 
around the money so you can protect the courier. If you 
can securely follow the hostage takers you will do it. If 
you cannot locate the stronghold, depends how long the 
kidnap lasts for, obviously after 24 hours your chances of 
finding the stronghold run out, or you are trying to follow 
the money, you get the hostage back. If there is an 
opportunity to arrest people, you arrest people. Then the 
last thing you can do is to pay up, so you put a bubble of 
security around it [the money], and pay the ransom. […] 
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You can‟t have a security operation if you don‟t know 
where they [the hostages] are. [interviewee 15]   
Going back to the comment of the NCA member who stated 
that he is „impressed by the colleagues in Athens‟, it should be 
stated that some of the kidnap hostages and their families 
interviewed have a different view regarding that. Even though all of 
the three families interviewed argued that, at first, the team of 
negotiators was great and they did their best, later on in the 
conversation they made some interesting comments. In all the 
cases, the negotiators were selling, or giving information to the 
media, which led to the increase of the asking ransom by the 
kidnappers. In most kidnaps, during the first contact with the family 
of the victim, the kidnappers give the ransom price, and they also 
stated that any contact with the police might risk the life of the 
hostage or might increase the asking ransom. In one of the cases, 
during this first contact the kidnappers gave two prices, one without 
the police getting involved, and an increased ransom in case the 
police was informed and involved, so the family had to choose 
between the two options. The wife of the businessman who was 
kidnapped in Greece at first was very positive about the work of the 
Greek police, however when I asked her if there was anything she 
thought should have been done in a different way, she opened up 
and talked about two issues. During our interview she said: 
The guys [police negotiators] were amazing; they were 
really helpful, very good at explaining things, they 
respected my need to be around people. At first they were 
strict [with the fact that she wanted to have friends and 
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family members in the house with her whilst her husband 
was kept hostage]. Later they saw I couldn‟t function 
without support. In my head I could only think the 
moment the kidnappers would call to tell me that they 
have killed my husband. If that happened police would 
leave and I would be alone, me and the girls [her two 
daughters]. That wasn‟t the plan [for the kidnappers to kill 
her husband], everything was done for the money but still 
I wanted people around me. […] They accused my sister in 
law that she planned the kidnapping. My husband‟s sister 
is family, she would never do anything like that. I was 
offended; out of all the people who know us, they said 
that she did it, she planned the kidnap. I was there when 
they kidnapped him, I saw the body-types of the 
kidnappers, their guns, one of them had a particular 
accent. I was sure it was x [she told me the name of the 
main kidnapper who had a broad criminal history, 
including kidnappings, and the ransom money was traced 
back to him a few years after the end of the kidnapping]. I 
was saying that it was him from the beginning, I insisted, 
but they were suspecting my husband‟s sister. They kept 
saying it‟s early to say who the kidnappers are, but they 
were openly suspecting my sister in law. […] You know we 
were having meetings just the three of us [the lady with 
the two main negotiators] in a room, we were the only 
ones who had access to that room, there were important 
and confidential things inside, sticky notes on the walls 
with things I should say to the kidnappers if they called 
me, and general things, details about the case, you know, 
the way we were going to deal with the kidnapping. We 
had a few sad cases where we were talking about specific 
things inside that room, the three of us, and then the next 
morning everything we said would be all over the media, 
so we had to change our plans because the kidnappers 
knew. There were a few leaks, but I didn‟t know who was 
leaking them to the media. It wasn‟t me so I guess it was 
one of them [the negotiators]. After three or four days I 
have had enough. It was very wearing, it was too much, 
so I asked the head of the Greek police for another team 
[of negotiators] and they send me two [negotiators] from 
Athens [the original team was from another city]. After 
that there were no leaks and we still talk every now and 
then. [interviewee 4] 
  Another woman that I interviewed in Cyprus about the 
kidnapping of her son had some comments regarding the support of 
the Greek police. This kidnapping case is particularly interesting 
165 
 
because the kidnap took place in Greece, but the demands for 
ransom were made in Cyprus, so the woman had to travel in order 
to pay the ransom herself. I will refer to this case again in this 
chapter regarding the cooperation between the negotiators from 
Cyprus and those from Greece, but at this point it is important to 
mention what the mother of a young kidnapped man said. 
x, x, and x [the three main negotiators of Cyprus], were 
coming here [in her house] every morning and they were 
staying here until very late. We were organising things, 
trying to find the money [for the ransom], preparing for 
the next phone call of the kidnappers. […] When we found 
the money, x, x, and myself book a flight [to Greece]. 
Each one of us had a backpack with a few millions of euros 
inside. When we landed I called the kidnappers and told 
them that I am in Greece with the amount they asked, 
and after that we went straight to the Greek police 
headquarters. I thought that the Greek team was going to 
train me or prepare me for being a courier, but they didn‟t 
do anything. They didn‟t prepare me for what to expect. I 
had to do everything on my own and there was no plan B. 
[…] The kidnappers told me to go to a specific location, 
get into a taxi and ask the taxi driver to start driving and 
go outside of the city to the first toll way. […] I got into a 
„taxi‟ which was driven by a police officer who was armed, 
but they called me and told me to get off that taxi and get 
inside another one which was waiting for me in another 
location. I paid the „taxi driver‟ and got off. This is when I 
realised that I was completely on my own. I never learned 
if the taxi driver [the one who was waiting for her] was 
also involved in the kidnapping, I think he knew what was 
happening. Police could have followed the taxi I was on, 
but they didn‟t, I was very scared. They [the kidnappers] 
called me again and told me to get off the taxi and wait at 
a forest. There was no one there and throughout the 
motorway there were no other cars [it was late at night as 
well], the taxi I was on was the only one [the only car 
around]. That‟s why I think police haven‟t sent anyone 
outside to follow me and look after me. […] I left the bag 
with the money in the forest, just like I was told to do, 
and waited somewhere else near the toll gates. 
[interviewee 5] 
166 
 
These two quotes from people who had to communicate with 
the kidnappers, cooperate with the negotiators and carry the 
ransom money, are used in order to show that offering a 
training and seeing how trainees work in a simulation exercise 
does not mean that you can actually know whether they would 
be good in a real life situation. The NCA trainer was impressed 
by the quality of the work of the Greek team and their success, 
but those family members of kidnapping hostages had a 
different view. The mother of the kidnapped young man, and 
courier of the ransom, felt unprepared for her role as a courier 
and completely unprotected. The wife of the businessman felt 
that the media leaks were putting her husband‟s life in danger. 
At the same time she felt that her voice was unheard since she 
was pointing them in the right direction in terms of who the 
leading kidnapper was, but police were suspecting her sister-
in-law. In both cases the interviewees first talked about the 
fact that they were happy with the way police treated them 
and their cases. However, after talking they opened up and 
started pointing out some negative aspects which they wished 
hadn‟t happened. This might be because the overall outcome 
of the kidnapping was positive, with their loved one being 
safely released, so everything negative was buried and almost 
forgotten. 
167 
 
The NCA official, after talking about Greece and how impressed 
he was with the colleagues in Athens, referred to Cyprus to say how 
qualified the Cypriot negotiators are:  
Cyprus doesn't have a great deal of experience as far as 
kidnap is concerned, but they have got a structure and 
they have got qualified negotiators, they have surveillance 
and they have an intelligence capacity as well through 
their technology. So, that has got to be fused together 
and used in the right way. People should never become 
complacent, because they [the Cypriot team] came to the 
EuNAT for a strategic board meeting, and i am casually 
talking to the chief negotiator about all aspects of a kidnap 
hostage taking, and then a week later the world's media 
and focus is on a hijacking. It wasn't a hijacking by a 
terrorist, but Cyprus reacted really well. Well, it wasn't a 
real hijacking. No, it was on an aircraft, let's face it, but it 
wasn't by a terrorist. The chief negotiator, i was very 
impressed by him. I have a lot of confidence that they will 
do the right thing [in the case of a kidnap]. [interviewee 
1] 
The NCA official seems to be very confident about the Cypriot team, 
in case a kidnapping takes place in the country. From my 
ethnography and the four days I have spent with the Cypriot team 
of negotiators, I would be quite reluctant to say that „they have got 
qualified negotiators‟. I have met the chief negotiator who is the 
person who invited me for my presentation/training in Cyprus, and 
he is the man who negotiated the hijacking that the NCA official 
referred to. With confidence I can say that he is a very passionate 
and hard-working negotiator, but he is the only one out of the 
almost thirty negotiators I have met who has such an attitude. The 
day after the end of the training the chief negotiator asked me what 
I thought of the training, so we had an interesting discussion. We 
talked about the negotiators who attended the training-event, those 
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who did not attend it, and during that discussion he started 
referring to a couple of things that went wrong during the 
kidnapping of the Cypriot man in Athens.  
I never expected I would have to do it [be a negotiator in 
a kidnap case]. You go to training-events, I have been to 
trainings in England and here. It‟s different; YOU have to 
decide everything, and there is no one next to you telling 
you whether what you are doing is the right thing. Of 
course you discuss some things with the head of the 
counter-terrorism department [negotiators belong to this 
department], because a kidnap is a serious thing for a 
country like Cyprus, but it‟s a very difficult job. […] One 
day, I remember, we [by „we‟ he means the mother of the 
young man, the negotiators were only listening to the 
conversation] have just talked to the kidnappers, and x 
[one of the two other negotiators involved in the case] 
comes to me and he looks like a ghost. No one knows 
that; now I am laughing when I think about it, but it is 
very serious. I asked him [the negotiator] what has 
happened and he told me that the moment the kidnappers 
hung up the phone instead of calling the head of the 
counter-terrorism department to inform them about the 
call, he basically called back the kidnappers from a police 
phone. We were very lucky they didn‟t call back to check 
who called them, but imagine what would happen if they 
knew police were involved in the kidnap. [interviewee 12] 
The other negotiator who was on the case wanted to comment on 
the fact that he called the kidnappers and he said „if something like 
this happens in an exercise we would laugh about it. The exercise is 
different from the real thing. I think about it [him calling the 
kidnappers] and I freak out. It could have meant the end of my 
career, it could have meant the end of the hostage‟s life‟ 
[interviewee 17]. Apart from the unfortunate incident with the 
phone call to the kidnappers, the chief negotiator also referred to 
the fact that they had not registered the numbers of the ransom 
banknotes. As a result of that, the millions of euros which were 
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given for the release of the young man were never found, even 
though the kidnappers and some of those involved in the case got 
arrested. From this particular quote it is discernible that attending 
trainings and exercises is very different from taking part in an 
actual incident. This is something that the chief negotiator and 
organiser of the annual re-training events in Cyprus is aware of, 
and no matter how close to reality they are, they would possibly 
never be close enough.  
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have analysed the different ways of sharing the 
high security counter-kidnapping knowledge. From my research I 
found that there are three methods of sharing counter-kidnap 
knowledge, and these methods are via documents, transnational 
trainings, and trainings within a country (intranational trainings).  
In relation to the transnational trainings, I tried to explain 
how the EuNAT training and re-training work, and what their aim is. 
The objective of these knowledge transfer and sharing events is to 
create not just European communication and cooperation, but also 
to create a system of world-wide and cross-national surveillance, 
negotiations, and general assistance. The third and last method of 
moving knowledge around is through intranational trainings and re-
trainings, which are all those knowledge-oriented events that take 
place inside a nation. As I explained in this chapter, there are three 
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techniques to passing the knowledge someone holds to other 
people. These techniques are through presentations, similar to the 
one I gave to the Cypriot negotiators, or through small and big 
exercises. During these exercises the negotiators have to apply 
what they have learned throughout the course of their training, 
followed by a criticism of those who are more experienced and 
more senior within the police hierarchy.  
In the second section of this chapter I addressed some of the 
issues around the dissemination, reception and application of the 
counter kidnapping knowledge and, as I have explained, these 
issues are mainly related to things associated with the 
appropriateness of the training materials or the trainers. I began by 
discussing that although practitioners refer to what is being 
transferred as „knowledge‟, in reality they are transferring 
„information‟. Knowledge is made out of personal beliefs, ideologies 
and a variety of other things, which means that when it is 
transferred it is acontextual to the person receiving it, thus what is 
being transferred is knowledge for the transmitter, but once it is 
received it becomes information for the receiver. However, I 
explained that in this thesis the word “knowledge” will be used 
instead of “information” in order to describe the context of what has 
been transferred. The word „knowledge‟ is the chosen word of all 
those who were interviewed for this research, and in an attempt to 
avoid any confusion I decided to go by their chosen word. 
171 
 
 In addition to the difference between information and 
knowledge I discussed the fact that knowledge can be sticky and 
there is a plethora of reasons which can contribute to its stickiness. 
This stickiness can be due to people‟s lack of experience, which can 
limit their ability to understand the content of what is being 
transferred and consequently make its application difficult. In other 
cases the transfer can be sticky because of linguistic barriers, 
where there is a different terminology used between nations, or 
simply because the transfer does not take place in the mother 
tongue of transmitters and/or receivers. The stickiness can also 
exist because trainers are usually unable to assess what has been 
received by the participants of the trainings and how they are going 
to implement the received knowledge in a real-life situation.  
After the subjectivity and the stickiness of knowledge, I 
continued by mentioning some issues around the UNODC counter-
kidnapping manual, which is one of the only two documents on 
kidnappings which have been produced by formal organisations. 
The UNODC manual is supposedly sent to all the UN member-states 
but from the interviews it became clear that practitioners have not 
had any contact with this document. Only the two interviewees 
from the United Kingdom have read it, and that was because they 
were in the team responsible for its creation. The other 
interviewees either did not know what „UNODC‟ stands for, or they 
had decided to disregard it and not pay any attention to its 
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existence. As some of the interviewed private practitioners 
explained, that was because the organisation which is disseminating 
the manual is not regarded as being of great value. However, even 
if the practitioners had read the manual, they would have noticed 
its dated content and the lack of detailed explanations at certain 
points. These two characteristics, along with the fact that such 
formal documents are offering one-size-fits-all solutions to nations 
which do not have the tools or expertise to follow them, makes an 
official document to be regarded as an unimportant and possibly 
worthless source of information and knowledge.  
In relation to the transnational trainings provided by the 
counter-kidnap team of the National Crime Agency, it was pointed 
out to me that there are some issues regarding the high number of 
kidnappings in the United Kingdom. This is because of the inability 
or indifference to arrest and prosecute the offenders. These, along 
with the fact that different nations have different types of 
kidnappings, duration, police capabilities and techniques, raise 
questions in terms of the usefulness and appropriateness of 
transnational counter-kidnap training. Providing a training to a few 
people does not mean that they will be in a position of reproducing 
or applying what they have been taught. Although the NCA high-
ranking official was very positive with the work of the Greek and 
Cypriot team of negotiators, the interviewed families of former 
hostages had a different view. According to them, police negotiators 
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were wrongfully accusing family members, leaking investigation-
related information to the media, accidentally calling the kidnappers 
on the phone instead of the police office, or sending the mother of 
one of the hostages to deliver the ransom without any prior 
preparation or coverage for her protection. It is not possibly for the 
trainers to assess if the training was successful, since they do not 
know how the trained team will behave in a real incident. 
Transnational trainings take place without anyone knowing to what 
extend they have an effect on the trainees, and if they work at all.  
I have discussed and criticised the knowledge that is being 
transferred through official documents, mainly the one created by 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the training 
which is being provided transnationally between different nations, 
as well as intranationally within a state. I have tried to explain how 
perplexed, messy, problematic and biased knowledge transfer can 
be, even if it comes from organisations such as the United Nations. 
In the next chapter I will focus on how the police sub-culture itself 
can work as a barrier when it comes to the transfer and application 
of the counter-kidnapping knowledge. 
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Chapter 5:  Police culture as a 
barrier of knowledge production and 
transfer 
5.1 Introduction 
So far in this thesis I have looked at two of the ways in which the 
knowledge of dealing with kidnapping cases is being transferred: 
the official and formal documents by Europol and the United 
Nations, and also those trainings which take place internationally, 
offered by specific organisations or individuals who are perceived to 
be knowledge brokers to other states and individuals. However, 
both of these ways of moving knowledge around have some 
problematic aspects which prevent knowledge from doing what it 
was created for.  
In this chapter I will provide a critique of those trainings 
which take place intranationally within a state. Similar to the 
international trainings, the intranational ones have some sticky 
aspects which block the counter-kidnapping knowledge from 
moving around and being applied in real-life situations. The low 
quality of the training, the pride and the differentiation of those 
working in the counter-kidnap police departments, as well as the 
power and the value knowledge-holders have, are all some issues 
that affect the transfer and application of knowledge. This chapter 
is going to focus on police sub-culture, and more specifically, the 
sub-subculture of those plain-clothed counter-kidnapping police 
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officers who appear to be part of a unique sub-culture inside the 
police. 
5.2 Intranational Trainings Criticism  
Reiner has stated in relation to the British police that until the 
1920s „training was not taken very seriously‟ (2010: 71), but that 
after this era and even up to now, there is a „stronger 
standardization and central direction‟ (ibid) within all aspects of 
policing. From my ethnography with the Cypriot negotiators I 
understood that the trainings were more related to what Reiner 
described about the police of the United Kingdom of the early 20th 
century, before the turn to a more professional police force. In the 
re-training in Cyprus, when the negotiators were referring to the 
big exercise, they were using the phrase „it‟s show time‟ 
[interviewee 12], while the person who organised the re-training 
event asked me sarcastically, at the end of the exercise, if I liked 
the „Hollywood show‟ [interviewee 12]. For him it was like a show 
because there was a mansion, a helicopter, a yacht, and a 
passenger plane involved. There seemed to be more emphasis on 
the spectacle rather the actual outcome of the training exercise, 
and the event was regarded in terms of its visual impact. The need 
for a strong spectacle was also clear from the organiser‟s demands 
to include in my three hour long session pictures, stories, 
information about people who died, guns and a lot of action. 
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Interestingly, in this exercise there where only four members of the 
counter-terrorism team of Cyprus, whereas in a real life incident 
there would have to be almost all the members of this team. The 
exercise lasted for around ten hours and it took place in three 
different locations of Cyprus almost simultaneously. I was lucky 
enough to witness parts of all of the three different hostage 
incidents because I was in a car with the head of the Cypriot police 
who was the person that planned the exercise, so he knew when, 
where and what was going to happen and we were going to the 
exact location of the incidents. In addition to these two people, 
there was also a female negotiator in the car who was responsible 
for explaining to me what was happening, and discussing what 
negotiators were doing and if that was the right thing to do, 
according to what they have learned in their training and re-
training. The head of the police was there to observe what was 
happening and how the negotiators were dealing with the hostage 
situations.  
To me they seemed that for this training they had put a great 
effort into arranging for the right permission for access to specific 
locations, but there seemed to be a lack of a story line, making the 
plot unelaborate and facile. Young police officers had to play the 
roles of the hostage-takers who were all part of a terrorist group, 
but that is all they knew about their role. I spent some time with 
one of those playing the terrorists who was in the mansion and was 
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keeping the maid of the house as his hostage. In the house with 
him were two negotiators whose role was to assist the „actor‟ (who 
as I said was a young police officer) in terms of what to say and 
how to respond to those negotiating the case in order to make it 
harder for them. At first they told him to inform those negotiating 
that the maid is from the Philippines. In a real life situation this 
would mean that a translator will be called to the scene in order to 
be able to communicate with the hostage. Interestingly, after an 
hour, the negotiators and the head of the counter-terrorism 
department asked them to change the plot because it was not 
possible to find a translator. This raises questions about the level of 
preparedness in case an actual incident happens where there is a 
need for a translator. 
In the second incident which took place a yacht which, 
according to the plot, contained explosives, as the head of the 
counter-terrorism team told me, the point of the exercise was to 
see if they were going to negotiate with the terrorist in order to ask 
him to step out of the yacht for his safety. However, what the 
negotiators did was to go inside the yacht (page 115), a decision 
which did not make the head of counter-terrorism very happy. In 
the final incident, which took place inside an Aegean passenger 
plane, according to the quite simple plot, there were three terrorists 
and around thirty passengers (those who were not negotiating in 
the final incident, some young police officers and me) who were 
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kept as hostages. In the three hours that we were waiting inside 
the plane to be “rescued”, the other negotiators were observing and 
trying to explain to me the mistakes of those who were outside, 
trying to negotiate the case, which is a non-active method of 
learning. According to those observing, the negotiators dealing with 
the case did not try to find either the number of hostages nor the 
number of terrorists on the plane. The incident ended with a rescue 
operation by the four members of the counter-terrorism team, but 
instead of arresting all of the three “terrorists” who were on the 
plane, they only arrested one of them, and mistook the other two 
for hostages/plane passengers. This was something that also came 
up in the debriefing of the three incidents which took place the 
morning after the exercises. When I asked an experienced 
negotiator why there is such a shallow reaction, and superficial 
turnout to an exercise which I was informed was to be as close to 
reality as possible, he replied: 
They [the counter-terrorism team] had something else to 
do today, and they couldn‟t come, but that‟s ok, if we 
have four representatives of the team, it is still fine. […] 
Yes, we have to be as accurate as possible, but we all 
know that this thing will never happen here [in Cyprus]. 
This is a show that we put up every year, and we both 
know that if something happens, I will be the one dealing 
with it. Not these negotiators. [interviewee 12] 
Not only is a hostage training exercise the closest training to a 
kidnapping incident that the negotiators will receive, but also these 
trainings and exercises are not perceived in a serious enough 
manner, because as the trainer said, this will never happen in 
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Cyprus. Interestingly, a few months after the re-training and the 
exercise with the hostage incident on a passenger plane, something 
similar happened in reality, which actually proved that the location 
does not exclude specific crimes from happening. In addition to 
that, apart from my three hour session/training on kidnappings, 
there are no other trainings specifically focusing on this type of 
crime. The closest training they have to a kidnapping is hostage-
taking, which is definitely not the same. The Cypriot negotiators are 
not prepared for a kidnapping case, and the chief negotiator seems 
to be at peace with the fact that he will be responsible for all the 
serious hostage and kidnapping cases on the island (or outside). 
Knowledge transfer does not produce the desirable outcomes, and 
that is partly because the process of sharing knowledge is done 
superficially. With such a superficial reaction they are only 
scratching the surface of the issue, without getting deeper into it.  
The knowledge shared is often incomplete and it only involves 
obvious things, or already known to the participants/attendees of 
the training. There is a denial of finding out what happens in other 
countries in terms of kidnappings, although it is crucial to have a 
broader view of what the police techniques are, or what types of 
kidnappings other countries have, as a form of preparation. In the 
case of Cyprus, there are annual trainings in negotiating 
techniques, but kidnappings seem to be neglected as a potential 
type of negotiation incident. According to one of the participants in 
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the Cypriot police training, they are not specifically trained for 
negotiations in kidnapping cases because, as someone said, „we 
don‟t need specific training on that, we are on an island; kidnappers 
will have nowhere to hide and that‟s simply the reason why we 
don‟t have kidnappings here‟ [interviewee 18]. The United Kingdom 
is also an island and according to the numbers given by the English 
trainer of the counter-kidnap trainers, there are a few kidnappings 
taking place every week. At this point it should be mentioned that I 
initially became interested in Cyprus because in the summer of 
2015 there were suspicions of an attempted abduction of a child 
from the United Kingdom15. Although there were only suspicions, 
and this was not an actual kidnapping case, it can show that the 
threat of a kidnapping is always there, either on the mainland or on 
an island. These perceptions of the training being a „show‟, the 
need for a spectacle, possibly in order to keep the attention of the 
trainees, the idea that a kidnap will not happen on an island, and, 
as I have mentioned in the previous chapter, the fact that a 
negotiator asked if he can hit or curse someone who does not 
comply with what he says, are only a few signs which show a lack 
of credibility by people who would be responsible in case a serious 
type of crime occurs.  
These Cypriot negotiators who attended the re-training will be 
the ones who will have to take part and advise the family of the 
                                                          
15
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/18/britons-hotel-cyprus-child-abduction-attempt 
 (accessed 12.08.2016) 
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hostage in the case of a kidnapping. According to the person 
organising the training, all of them allegedly know a few things 
about kidnappings for ransom. However, observing these 
negotiators throughout their whole re-training, and witnessing that 
in reality they do not know things they are supposed to know well, 
made me slightly change my presentation and include more basic 
information about kidnappings in general.  
During my presentation, among other things, I talked about 
the different types of kidnappings, and where we tend to have each 
type of kidnap, what hostages should do to avoid getting killed, 
which are the first steps negotiators should do, and the importance 
of having professional kidnappers. I strongly believe that my 
presentation was too broad, which in a sense makes it superficial as 
well. However, interestingly, those who participated in the training 
had a different view. One of them actually approached me 
afterwards and, after shaking my hand and thanking me, he said 
that just by listening to my session on kidnappings, he believes that 
they all have more skills, and that they had gained something that 
others had not, „after that [presentation/training], I feel we have 
advanced to the next level‟ [interviewee 19]. This shows a lack of 
understanding of what meaningful knowledge of something is, and 
how this meaningful knowledge can be acquired. Sitting in a room 
and listening to a three-hour talk on kidnappings does not enhance 
someone‟s skills, and it will definitely not make them capable of 
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negotiating in a kidnapping incident or capable of calculating the 
effects of possible decisions in relation to the case.  
Regarding Greece, although they are asked to train other 
Balkan countries on ways to deal with a kidnap for ransom case, 
they neglect training those negotiators in their own country. After 
the initial training a year before the 2004 Olympic Games which 
took place in Athens, there have only been two other trainings; the 
one aimed to extend the Greek team of negotiators, and the other 
one aimed at training the negotiators to deal with an ISIS-related 
negotiation-incident.  All those kidnapping negotiators interviewed 
in Greece agreed that this is a very big drawback; „It‟s like we have 
it [the negotiation skills] inherently, we are already very good 
without any training, so imagine our level of expertise if we could 
participate in a re-training event every now and then‟[interviewee 
20]. Another negotiator, when asked if there are any problems or 
issues that need to get fixed, he replied: 
 I don‟t know what to tell you, the only think that comes 
to my mind now is that maybe we [police negotiators] are 
forgotten, the things we know are old, we need to refresh 
everything, not annually, but at least doing that every 
three or four years would be good. At least it would be 
better than what we do now, once every 9 years, or [for 
some] even never. We will be safer, and the public will be 
at better hands. Maybe we are satisfied with what we have 
achieved so far and we have relaxed, I don‟t know. 
[interviewee 9]           
Police training in the academy is mimicking military training, 
however, crisis intervention and negotiation is very different from 
what it is learned during the trainings in the police-academy. 
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Negotiators deal with from cases of people who are mentally ill and 
suicidal, to cases of kidnappings, thus they need to be calm, use 
language and their voice, be patient and not use their force or their 
gun to handle a situation. It is a big transition which can require 
many hours of training and exercises as well as practical 
experience, which seems to be absent from the Greek police. In the 
case of Cyprus, as I mentioned before, the quality of the trainings is 
superficial, aiming to tick the box of the mandatory annual training, 
but in the case of Greece, training on kidnappings have ceased 
existing, even though they put the effort and the time to offer their 
knowledge to counter-kidnapping departments of other nations. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the nature of kidnappings is 
constantly changing, with methods which used to be implemented 
by offenders in Latin America now being used all over the world, 
and kidnappers asking not just for money as part of the ransom but 
other goods as well. Obviously the new wine cannot be contained in 
the old bottles and the knowledge needs to always be updated so 
practitioners will know what to expect and how to deal with the 
changing nature of this crime.   
 
5.3 ‘We are the best’. Pride and Differentiation. 
As it has been mentioned in the literature review chapter, Praveen 
Kumar, a former police officer, referred to pride inside the police as 
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being something very beneficial. He said that „pride is the fuel of 
policing [… and] pride is the root of morale‟ (Kumar, 2011: 146), in 
addition to that, he also states that this professional pride „is a sure 
way of nurturing and promoting high professional standards and 
efficiency‟ (Kumar, 2011: 50). However, Kumar is not talking about 
the effects of unjustified pride, which instead of creating efficiency 
and higher professional standards, might actually create arrogance 
and unnecessary sufficiency with what they know and how they 
deal with kidnappings. In various shapes and forms, pride was 
something expressed by all the interviewees and this non-
supported competency can act as a barrier towards further 
improvement. The fact that there were certain aspects of pride seen 
across nations, agencies and departments means that kidnap units 
have potentially some similar characteristics across territories. Of 
course there is no attempt to make any generalisations, but I have 
looked at an intelligence agency and two police units which all 
appeared to have similar cultural characteristics.  
 
 
5.3.1 The Case of the United Kingdom  
From my interviews with the Greek police negotiators I was 
informed about the very practical and hands-on experience-based 
trainings. The retired Greek negotiator who is now working in the 
private sector compared the American FBI training the team 
received in Athens and the NCA training, and he explained: 
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In 2006 the Greek police brought trainers from the FBI for 
a five-day re-training but everything was theoretical. The 
Brits were extremely practice-based, they were saying five 
things and then through the exercise we were learning 
fifteen more. That was the analogy, they would only say 
the basic theory and then the rest was to be learned from 
the ground. […] The training was tough, starting at 8 in 
the morning and finishing between 12 and 2 the next 
morning, endless work, but amazing work. That was a 
good training. I have adopted the toughness in my 
trainings [when he was the leading trainer before his 
retirement], and at the beginning of my training I used to 
say „welcome to hell‟. [interviewee 14] 
The former negotiator and trainer praised the NCA method of 
training and especially the practical aspect of it. Yet, when it comes 
to the case of the United Kingdom‟s National Crime Agency and its 
counter-kidnapping team, although they seem to be the most 
professional and organised team between the three counter-kidnap 
teams I have looked at, there is still a drawback which prevents 
them from achieving their highest potential. This drawback is the 
fact that the emphasis is not put into arresting the offenders. In my 
interview with the NCA official, he seemed to be proud of the work 
of his team, even though they are still learning, and in more detail 
he said: 
We are still learning, but we are very good at what we do. 
We don't say that what we do is the best. It isn't, but the 
module we use is successful and people have become 
aware of the work we've been involved in, so they just 
want to have a look at what we've got. [interviewee 1] 
 
According to the NCA official, they are „very good at what [they] 
do‟, but they are not able to eliminate or minimise the numbers of 
kidnapping cases inside the country because they „do not have the 
opportunity to engage‟ and ideally arrest those organising and 
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executing a kidnapping. During the interview the high ranking 
official of the counter-kidnap team explained:   
 
During the last 15 years, all hostages in the UK have been 
safely recovered, what i mean by that is that when we 
have a kidnap situation in the UK and calls are made to 
the family of the hostage or the friends, when the police 
has been alerted, we've been able to put in structure, and 
in all the situations the hostages have been safely 
recovered. But as we know sadly, kidnaps happen every 
single day for various reasons. I do not conclude that we 
will stripe off figures, because we do not have the 
opportunity to engage with the offenders. [interviewee 1] 
 
It is interesting that NCA, the world leader of kidnapping 
resolutions, is showing no interest in finding and arresting the 
kidnappers, and the work they can offer ends the moment the 
ransom money, or the commodities, are given to the offenders. 
They state that „saving [one‟s] life is paramount, and everything 
else is secondary‟ [interviewee 1], which places importance on the 
life of the hostage. However, this might be problematic as it might 
create the impression that those who planned and executed a 
kidnapping can carry on doing it, or that others can get involved in 
a crime with low risks and high rewards. The person who co-
authored the UNODC manual and whose role is to train those who 
will later become counter-kidnap trainers, mentioned this issue 
during our interview, as well as the fact that, in some cases, it is 
difficult to prosecute the kidnappers. He said: 
 
Regularly we do not catch the kidnappers, mainly because 
many kidnaps are done by criminals kidnapping other 
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criminals. […] We call them criminal vendetta-kidnaps […] 
In most cases police are the last resource. The victim [the 
person who has to pay the ransom-not the hostage] will 
know who the kidnapper is, but they won‟t tell us. Sadly, 
that‟s the reason we don‟t catch that many, and if we do 
catch them, there are problems in prosecuting. […] We 
can produce a victimless prosecution even if the victim 
does not want to. [interviewee 15] 
 
This quote shows a fault in the United Kingdom‟s law enforcement 
and criminal justice system which makes it more complicated not 
just to arrest offenders, but also to prosecute them. It also raises 
the question of whether the perception of the NCA official about 
being „very good at what [they] do‟ is a valid one.  
 
5.3.2 The Case of Greece 
Those in Greece who are involved in the trainings of the other 
countries, insisted that they are asked and specifically chosen to 
transfer their knowledge. That was due to their great practices, and 
as one negotiator and trainer said, they are asked because of their 
„famous success rate‟, but there is a different view which seems to 
be more realistic and plausible. There seem to be high levels of 
ignorance amongst those trainers; they were doing something, but 
they did not know exactly why they were doing it, and they were 
not interested in finding out why as well. There is anecdotal 
information in existence about the role of Greece in the trainings of 
other countries, with two training centres in the country and many 
police negotiators from other nations who have been trained in 
Greece by the Greek counter-kidnap team. As a police officer said, 
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this role of Greece is because „we have exceptional success rate for 
solving kidnapping cases, it is almost a hundred percent‟ 
[interviewee 8]. This rhetoric was repeated throughout almost all of 
my interviews in Greece and no one seems to question this belief.  
This allegedly successful rate is anecdotal, since we are 
talking about a nation which does not keep a statistical track of 
kidnappings and does not have a clear understanding of what a 
kidnap is, but it still seemed to be the most common rhetoric 
amongst those interviewed. At the same time, three negotiators 
mentioned an award which was allegedly given to the counter-
kidnap team by the head of the Greek police. The award was given 
for the team‟s exceptional work and high rate of successful solution 
of kidnap for ransom cases, but although I asked a couple of times 
to see it, I was told that they do not know exactly where it is.  One 
of the negotiators said: „it is somewhere here, on the 11th floor [of 
the police building], but I am not sure exactly where, […] I haven‟t 
seen it‟ [interviewee 7].  
 
As I have been informed by all of my interviewees, the Greek 
team, contrary to the UK case, does not receive any type of 
payment in order to transfer its practical knowledge, and this is 
something that kept coming up in the interviews. Interviewees 
would seize every opportunity to underline the fact that they are 
volunteering as negotiators, and some of them actually argued that 
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they are very good at what they are doing simply because they are 
volunteering; „it is coming from deep inside us, from our heart‟ 
[interviewee 6], said the experienced negotiator and trainer of the 
Greek team, and he continued „it is tough, [when there is a 
kidnapping] we have to be in the family‟s house for days or weeks 
in some cases, for twelve hours a day or more, preparing and 
waiting for a phone call [from the kidnappers]‟ [interviewee 6]. The 
main meaning of volunteerism is doing something which is unpaid, 
e.g, those who are willingly offering themselves and their time. 
However, aside from what these negotiators say, what they are 
doing is part of their job, and since they have attended the 
negotiators‟ training, they have gained an extra skill, which also 
possibly means a slightly higher salary.  
Both formal and informal transfer of knowledge is part of 
every job, and especially when it comes to policing, sharing what 
one knows has a vital role. With a tone of feigning naivety in my 
voice, I asked those negotiators who are also trainers, why would 
they agree to transfer their knowledge without any apparent benefit 
from doing it, and offer to train someone if they, and their team, 
are not paid to do it. Interestingly, when asked this question no one 
seemed to be able to give an explanation apart from the fact that 
sharing their knowledge makes them feel very proud of what they 
do and who they are. To me, this does not mean that the 
interviewees were withholding information, but rather that they 
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were doing something without knowing the reason behind it, as well 
as the importance of transferring the skills they have gained 
through their experience. For them the belief that they are the best 
seemed to be more than plausible. The former police negotiator and 
trainer was more open to mentioning the issue of unsupported pride 
inside the team of negotiators, and in our interview he talked about 
a case where he actually witnessed a team from another nation 
being better than the Greek team: 
 
We had organised something like a workshop between 
teams from the Balkan countries and Cyprus. We didn‟t 
train them but we exchanged practices and ways of doing 
things [in relation to hostage takings]. It lasted for four 
days. We were practicing with cases of bus and plane 
hijackings. I was very surprised with the team of Serbs; 
they were very organised, the team was amazing and they 
were trained by the FBI. I am glad we were reserved 
these four days, we weren‟t bragging about how great we 
[the Greek team] are, or pretending we know everything. 
I was jealous of them [the team from Serbia]. Luckily we 
understood from the beginning how good they are so we 
didn‟t make fool of ourselves by bragging about our 
success. [interviewee 14]      
 
 
5.3.3 The Case of Cyprus 
The issue of pride was obvious across all the counter-kidnap police 
departments in Greece, Cyprus and the UK. Pride was something 
reinforced through the alleged success, but also through their 
differentiation from the other police teams or the other police 
officers, which is something that was also obvious in the case of the 
Greek negotiators. Negotiators work in an office environment, and 
some of them even have their own offices. All of the main 
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negotiators in the capital cities of both Greece and Cyprus occupy a 
specific part of a building, in order for the whole group to be 
together, making it easier to cooperate during hostage cases. In 
addition to that, all the negotiators do not wear the formal police 
uniforms of the nation. As I have mentioned in the literature review 
chapter, De Camargo (2012) referred to the police uniform as the 
„most powerful tool of the police trade‟ (1), which is very iconic. 
Clothing is a way of expressing one‟s authority, status and 
occupation and in the same way the police uniform produces 
particular stereotypes. Blumberg and Neiderhoffer (1985) also cite 
the fact that when a police officer wears their uniform, they are 
automatically entered in a subculture which has its rules and 
norms.  
 
From my research with the Cypriot and the Greek police 
negotiators I have understood that there are many different sub-
cultures within the police, and although there has been some 
research around the uniformed police, the non-uniformed police did 
not receive the same amount of attention. De Camargo (2012) in 
her research found that police officers „whilst wearing their uniform, 
have a „“celebrity” status‟ (1). Nevertheless, in my research I have 
seen that in a work environment where wearing a uniform is the 
norm, not wearing one is seen as quite important, and actually 
those who are not wearing a uniform are the ones seen as having a 
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„celebrity‟ status. As mentioned before, the uniform produces 
particular stereotypes which do not fit the profile of a negotiator. In 
Greece police negotiators wear plain clothes of their choice without 
any individualising feature or a number. In the case of Cyprus all 
the negotiators need to wear a specifically designed t-shirt which 
discretely says „negotiation team‟ on the one side of the sleeve, and 
also they all have a specific bag, so they can have their notes with 
them. However these uniform style clothes are not the typical police 
uniform.  
To my understanding, the Cypriot t-shirt is to further 
distinguish them from the other police officers, and, as a matter of 
fact, on many occasions during their re-training, I heard negotiators 
saying that „we [negotiators] are not like them [the other police 
officers]‟ [interviewee 12], whilst further distinguishing themselves 
from the other police officers by saying: „that‟s what the others 
[counter-terrorism team] are doing, we don‟t do that, we should be 
the good guys‟ [interviewee 12]. Reiner has stated that „the “them” 
and “us” outlook which is characteristic of police culture makes 
clear distinctions between types of “them” (as well as of “us”)‟ 
(2012: 122). There are divisions inside  police culture with the 
existence of various sub-cultures based on the organisational 
division of labour. The number of each police officer on the uniform 
is a feature contributing to recognisability and individuality, 
however, not having a number does not mean that there is no other 
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way of being recognised. From the re-training I observed in Cyprus, 
I heard that whenever a negotiator attends a hostage situation, 
whether it involves the family of a kidnapped hostage or a suicidal 
teenager, the first thing they say is their name: „hello, I am x 
[name of negotiator] and I am here to help you‟, which is more 
personal compared to a collar number.  
One can say that a uniform works as a barrier between the 
public and the police, police officers are depersonalised and their 
identity is shown through a number. However, when it comes to 
negotiators, showing their personality seems to be important for 
their work and the emotional connection with those who need their 
assistance. These small differences and also the fact that the 
negotiators say that they are not like the other police officers, 
because they are the „good guys‟ practically shows that there is a 
plethora of sub-cultures (or possibly sub-subcultures) within the 
police and each one has its own characteristics and norms. Perez 
and Moore have stated that „there are as many different types of 
police subcultures as there are different types of police 
departments‟ (2013: 212)  
 
5.4 Knowledge as Value  
In theory, police are a service-based sector, they offer their 
knowledge and skills in order to provide services in the society. 
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Stabell and Fjelstad (1998), as well as Geoff Dean and Petter 
(2007) refer to the police as a “value shop”, and by that they mean 
a problem-centred organisation which aims at the creation of value 
through solving unique problems and bringing the right results for 
the client, whoever this client might be. The value shop is 
characterised by five primary activities: problem finding/definition 
and information acquisition, problem solving, solution choice, 
solution execution and control. These five activities describe the 
effectiveness of the police investigative success.  As Glomseth, 
Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther (2007) state, there is a „cyclical nature 
of these five primary activities for managing the knowledge 
collected during and applied to a specific police investigation in a 
value shop manner‟ (98). The “value shop” is indeed designed to 
solve client problems by applying different methods every time, for 
the best solution in each case. However, this term cannot be 
applied to all the different activities of police. Stabell, Fjelstad, 
Geoff Dean and Petter are partially right, because although in some 
cases there can be improvisation, what they call a „value shop‟ can 
possibly be applied in more mundane police work and not so much 
in kidnappings. When it comes to kidnappings, my understanding 
from my research is that although those responsible will go through 
all the five activities of the value shop, there is though a very fixed 
set of activities utilised to bring about the best possible solution. 
„There is not a lot of free space to move, we know exactly what we 
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have to do from the second someone informs us about a kidnapping 
incident, we do the same thing every time‟ [interviewee 21] said a 
negotiator in Greece.  
During the break of a private counter-kidnap conference in 
London, a risk manager of an NGO working in Europe seemed to be 
quite baffled and stressed when other risk managers were saying 
that they had already created a set plan of moves in case of a 
kidnapping incident. By the end of the conference the risk manager 
of the NGO had already arranged a meeting with one of the leading 
crisis response companies in the UK and abroad. The aim of that 
meeting was to create an organisation manual with the steps and 
the approach the NGO is going to have in case of a kidnapping. This 
shows that public and private organisations seek to implement a 
pre-designed set of activities, and they are not interested in the 
aspect of the „value shop‟ which addresses problems with a different 
approach every time. If there is a kidnapping case, my 
understanding is that they will attempt to address all of the five 
activities described in Gottschalk‟s (2006) value shop even though 
those involved into countering a kidnapping have pre-set activities. 
In relation to problem finding/definition and information 
acquisition, when there is a problem, different people from a 
specific police section are involved to understand and determine the 
exact nature of the crime. When it comes to kidnappings, as an 
interviewed Greek negotiator explained:  
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when we look at the first signs and characteristics of a 
crime, we have to give a definition to the crime. By 
defining a kidnapping, we automatically upgrade it or 
downgrade it to serious, not very serious, a terrorist 
kidnap, an amateur kidnap, or a professional one, and this 
definition is going to determine our approach‟ [interviewee 
6].  
 
Interestingly, as we are going to look more in detail in the section 
which is on ignorance, a negotiator explained that for police 
officers, definitions are not important. However, the person 
organising the training-events in Greece, whilst commenting on the 
lack of a specialised counter-kidnapping unit, referred to the 
prioritisation of specific cases, such as the case of a „serious‟ 
kidnapping, and said: 
 
there is a bitter truth; there is no organised unit looking at 
kidnappings. The unit which looks at kidnappings is the 
Homicide department. There, they investigate homicide 
cases, and when there is a serious kidnapping case they 
will also look at it. […] When a case becomes publicised, 
they [the Head of the Greek police and the Minister of 
Interior] call the people in Homicide and ask them to look 
at the case and solve it, whereas for another case they 
might not show such interest. From the moment a serious 
case is solved, the feeling of safety and trust increase, 
police are congratulated and it is a publicity issue. 
[interviewee 21]  
 
The interviewee pointed out the fact that there is an absence of a 
specialised police force which will be solely responsible for 
kidnappings in Greece. What happens instead is the dealing of 
kidnappings from the negotiators of the homicide department. In 
addition to that, from the above, we can see the first activity of the 
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„problem finding and acquisition‟ of the value shop, which is the 
process of determining the nature of the problem.  
Those police officers who are working in kidnapping cases will 
never accept that there is a different approach when it comes to 
those kidnappings of minority groups or poorer individuals, and 
their double standards can be extracted from the words they use. 
Frequently, they might use the word „serious‟ in order to refer to a 
kidnapping of a businessman or someone who is coming from a 
specific financial background or societal group. In another interview 
with a negotiator/trainer, he asked me if I am interested in serious 
kidnappings, or kidnappings of undocumented migrants and 
refugees, „so what do you want to talk about? Are you interested in 
the serious kidnappings or the kidnappings of those coming here 
illegally?‟ [interviewee 6]. During an interview with another 
negotiator who was trained by this negotiator/trainer, I commented 
on the fact that in the United Kingdom there are many kidnappings, 
he said „do you mean between Pakis? These are not kidnappings‟ 
[interviewee 7], and by that he revealed how certain ideas can also 
get transferred and disseminated along with knowledge. In addition 
to that, apart from the racism inside the Greek police, one can say 
that this will affect the problem finding/definition and information 
acquisition activity of the value shop. 
 
198 
 
In theory, whether a kidnaping is defined as serious or not so 
serious, the Senior Investigative Officer (SIO)16, will have to form 
the team of specialists who will work on the case. In practice 
however, this is not always the case because the way they are 
going to define a kidnapping is going to determine how seriously 
they are going to look at the case, but also if they are maybe going 
to look at it at all. During my research I talked to many police 
officers in the corridors of buildings, or while I was waiting outside 
offices to be called inside. I also talked to some others trying to 
deceive me into thinking they are part of the counter-kidnap team, 
or those who were actually part of it, and as mentioned before, 
almost all of them referred to the „one hundred percent of success‟.  
One of the people interviewed said that there is quite a high 
success rate only to those kidnappings which are publicised through 
the media, „yes, it is almost that high [almost a hundred percent 
success], but we only count those kidnappings which reach the ears 
of the public. And you [the public] learn about how many? One? 
Maybe two kidnappings [cases] a year‟ [interviewee 21]. 
Kidnappings are seen all across the society, as well as towards 
people coming from the lower parts of societal structure, 
undocumented migrants, refugees, or drug traffickers and dealers, 
but no media outlets, no insurance companies, or counter-
kidnapping teams seem to care. Cases like these go unnoticed and 
                                                          
16
 There is not always a Senior Investigative officer. In Greece and Cyprus it is not very clear who the 
SIO is; in some cases is the chief negotiator and in other cases is the head of the police. 
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from the interviews they also seem to be unimportant or not 
serious enough to warrant care. 
 
The definition given on the type of crime will set the direction 
of the approach, and later, the members of the specialist team will 
have to generate ideas which can solve the problem. In a value 
shop way of problem solving, it means that they need to create a 
specific plan of actions, which will set the tone of the negotiation 
and the approach to the kidnapping. Based on this approach, they 
also have to create the team of experts who will have a critical role 
on the outcome of the case. For example, based on what the 
negotiators have told me, if a kidnapping of a child is committed by 
a group of inexperienced amateurs, then it is usually advised to 
intervene with the counter-terrorism team and attempt to save the 
kidnapped child. As I have previously mentioned, when it comes to 
kidnappings there is a fixed set of activities, and there are not 
many things that can change in these practices. The only 
differentiation is that if there are minors involved in a kidnapping, 
the negotiators with the counter-terrorism team might attempt to 
end things as early as possible, which might be in two or three 
days. This can be either through paying the ransom without any 
negotiations, or through locating the stronghold and intervening, 
where they arrest those who are at the crime scene and free the 
hostage, however, the latter is not always possible. 
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In a “value shop” environment, when it comes to “solution 
choice”, the SIO, along with the formed team, has to consider all of 
the alternative moves and make an informed decision based on 
logic. It is crucial that all the involved parties are aware of the 
criteria which led to a specific decision, and that this specific 
decision is the best possible option that can be followed. At the 
same time they need to keep in mind all the alternatives in case 
there is anything unexpected which demands a change of plan. In 
ransom kidnappings there are many different parties involved; the 
kidnapped individual, the kidnappers, the victims to whom the 
demand of money is made, the negotiators, the media, and the 
police in general. This creates the perfect environment for 
unforeseen circumstances. Of course logic is very important, but 
moves or approaches are pre-decided, and the only discussion is 
around whether or not the victims can pay the full amount of the 
asking ransom. In terms of “solution execution”, the team, along 
with the SIO, need to have a specific goal in mind or a deadline, for 
instance, the return of the hostage in a couple of days, so they do 
everything in order to meet this deadline. A strategic execution of 
the plan involves perfect communication between the different 
parties, organisation of moves, and the implementation of 
decisions.  
Finally, according to Gottschalk (2006), after monitoring and 
controlling the activities of the specialist team which is involved in 
201 
 
the case, there needs to be an evaluation of each individual 
member, while at the same time there should be a measurement of 
the outcome, and whether it agrees with the original goal planned. 
This is something which does not happen in the police after the end 
of a kidnapping case. From what I have seen in the re-training in 
Cyprus, this evaluation is partly what they do in a few sessions 
where they talk about a specific case which took place and then 
analyse what went according to plan or what went wrong. Although 
this is a great technique, the problem with this is that the sessions 
are held months after the incident, which makes it more unlikely to 
evaluate the actions of those involved in a case, making it difficult 
to assist towards their improvement.  
In a way, the “value shop” approach and its five activities 
show the general investigative process every time there is a crime. 
First there is the assessment of the crime scene, where evidence is 
gathered, and other potential sources of evidence or information 
are identified. By investigating the crime scene and gathering 
information, it is attempted to create a hypothesis. With this 
hypothesis in mind, the SIO will develop a feasible line of moves, 
and prioritise actions while at the same time they will have to test 
various scenarios and their outcomes. What happens in kidnappings 
is a slightly altered approach where there is no need to have some 
activities, and there is a very specific pattern followed every time 
there is a kidnapping, „we know what we have to do, so we will go 
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straight to business and do it‟ said a negotiator in Greece 
[interviewee 7]. The problem with that is that so far, most of the 
kidnappings for ransom within a nation, whether that is Greece, or 
Cyprus, are of a similar, although not identical, nature. However, 
every time some of the variables change, there is chaos, simply 
because a fixed system of activities are implemented in every single 
case of kidnapping. This is particularly relevant in the case of the 
Greek police negotiators who, although follow almost all of the five 
activities of a value shop, usually have the same approach to all of 
the kidnappings, if of course they are, according to my 
interviewees, „serious‟ kidnappings. Following the same techniques 
and approach means that if and when there is going to be a kidnap 
case that is different from the past cases, this is going to cause a 
mess and potentially the outcome is not going to be the desired 
one17. The counter-kidnap units are quite special in terms of 
policing culture. High policing agencies are increasingly involved in 
low policing and vice versa. Generally speaking, although 
kidnappings are not a high-policing matter, they are treated as one 
and even though in high policing intelligence is collected to create a 
plan of action that is unique, in kidnappings things are more 
mundane. Of course every case is different, but those involved in 
                                                          
17
 I am currently (19.09.2017) reviewing the thesis before its submission and I would like to note that 
the past few months there has been a kidnapping going on in Greece which although has some 
similar characteristics with past kidnappings, there is an unrest. This is due to the fact that this 
kidnapping took place on a Greek island and is, at the moment, the longest kidnapping lasting for five 
months. 
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countering kidnaps tend to follow a specific set of activities rather 
than adapting their practices on every case. This seems to be the 
chosen approach for all those agencies involved whether they are 
an intelligence agency, a police unit or risk advisors from NGOs and 
private firms.  
 
5.5 Knowledge as Power and the Secrecy Around it 
Knowledge equals power, and those who have it are aware of its 
powerful qualities. Knowledge is a great driver for any kind of 
status rise, political leverage, personal gain, and exchange of 
services. When it comes to knowledge transfer, people usually know 
more than they can explain or transfer to others, but also in most 
organisations, having knowledge on something specific is a 
competitive advantage in the marketplace and can be exchanged 
for a high value return. This means that those who have specialised 
knowledge tend to protect it and prevent its exploitation, while at 
the same time they use it as a bargaining chip (Wood, Shearing, 
2007: 110), both inside and outside an organisation. This shows 
that knowledge has a symbolic meaning. Knowledge as cultural 
capital is a symbolic good which is used for social mobility and as a 
way, for those who have it, to achieve a higher social and 
occupational status.  
Especially when it comes to the Greek and Cypriot police, 
having specialised knowledge on something can prevent you from 
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being shared to other departments or in some rare cases to police 
stations in another city or town. There has to be something in it for 
someone to decide to share their knowledge, and they need to 
receive something in exchange, otherwise they will simply refuse to 
do it. Researchers in the past have said that police work involves 
the accumulation, analysis and transfer of knowledge, and that 
police are knowledge workers (Ericson, Haggerty, 1997). Similar to 
that, Reiner (2010) states that „the police have become knowledge 
workers whose main function is to broker information about risks to 
the public and private organisations concerned with the regulation 
and governance of people and territories‟ (2010: 146).  
Policing does involve the handling of knowledge and 
information which makes police personnel be knowledge workers. 
However, thus far I have used my gathered data in order to 
demonstrate that although police are knowledge workers, they 
engage in a complex type of knowledge work. All those who have 
written about police are partially right because, although there is 
knowledge involved, there are some particular details which make 
these processes more complicated than an outsider can understand. 
What I have seen from my research is that the police, just like 
other organisations, is a knowledge market where knowledge is 
bought and sold in return for other valuable things. These things 
can be intelligence and information, it can be other knowledge, a 
higher salary, respect, or a promotion. The symbolic meaning of 
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knowledge means that it has currency and value in terms of money, 
status and mobility among other things. There is an existing pricing 
system and the knowledge „consumer‟ needs to state what they are 
willing to pay. In most cases, those seeking to buy knowledge are 
trying to solve a complex issue which requires specific knowledge 
for its resolution, and they are willing to pay for it. Usually for 
specialised knowledge they will approach the source of that 
knowledge, and those who have the reputation of being good at 
something, and a good example of that is what the NCA does. 
Many might think that when it comes to knowledge transfer, 
police are different from other organisations because the 
exchange/transfer is based on altruism, their shared passion for a 
specific subject, and their fulfilment through sharing whatever they 
know. Altruism means genuine concern for the transfer of anything 
that is perceived as important, which is something that does not 
happen in the police units I have looked at. Mentoring can be a 
form of altruistic long-term knowledge transfer, however, the 
sharing of counter-kidnapping knowledge is more like a one-off 
event, without any follow up sessions, re-trainings or any close 
observation of how knowledge-receivers apply the knowledge they 
have received. At the transnational level, counter-kidnap knowledge 
brokers are apparently holding back some of the things they know. 
Knowledge of a specific practice appears to be a tactic and a tool of 
maintaining a visible counter-crime team and its reputation to the 
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neighbouring countries. It is also taking place because the 
“compensation” will be a way of receiving information which 
otherwise might have been difficult, if not impossible, to be 
acquired. In a sense, holding back information is going to maintain 
a nation‟s monopoly of knowledge in the counter-kidnap market; 
the United Kingdom can be the knowledge broker of America, parts 
of Europe and Africa, while Greece was aimed to be the knowledge-
broker of the Balkan countries, as well as Cyprus. This was the 
original plan for Greece where, after the training provided by the 
FBI, the trainer advised the chief Greek negotiator to be responsible 
for the trainings of South-eastern Europe and the Middle east; the 
former negotiator of the Greek police talked about the conversation 
he had with one of the trainers of the FBI and said:  
The last day x [name of FBI trainer] called me and said he 
won‟t have to come back, we are ready to create a school 
where we could train countries in the South-east of 
European and the Middle-east. The result is that we never 
did this school, although I have repeatedly suggested it to 
the Greek police.‟ [interviewee 14].  
 
In relation to the transfer of knowledge inside a nation, it is 
expected that experienced officers transfer their knowledge to the 
inexperienced ones, but in reality things do not work exactly this 
way. There seems to be a „resistance‟ to share the known 
information. For knowledge or information transfer, there needs to 
be a high level of willingness, from both the side of the receiver and 
the transmitter, to co-operate and work with each other. Sheptycki 
207 
 
has argued that in many cases, police intelligence is only 
transferred on a “need to know basis” because of its sensitive 
nature (Sheptycki 2002:120). As I have seen from my research the 
same rule applies to the counter-kidnap knowledge only in this case 
it appears to be even harder for knowledge and expertise to move 
around. When transferring knowledge or information 
intranationally, there is a high chance of not transferring every 
aspect one knows, in order to maintain one‟s position in the specific 
team, and the specific department, in the city one is already in. 
Apart from that, maintaining part of one‟s knowledge equals power 
because it can help them enter into their desired position and 
maintain it. In the case of the former police negotiator and trainer, 
during our interview he explained that because of his views on 
certain things he was forced to retire earlier. He also referred to the 
fact that he was disseminating his knowledge without any hesitation 
which might have had an impact on his early retirement, but he did 
not want to provide more information on that, he only said:  
 
I was saying some hard truths, pointing out things that 
they did not want me to, so they retired me. […] Yes 
maybe if I was smart enough I wouldn‟t have been in that 
situation, not everyone is like me [he possibly means 
police officers are not sharing everything they know]. 
They didn‟t need me any more so they got me retired. I 
was very angry for the first couple of years. Now I see it 
as an opportunity to do other things. [interviewee 14] 
 
Glomseth, Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther state in their research 
that in order to deal with the crime-related problems of the modern 
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world there needs to be cooperation, because complex types of 
crimes „cannot be solved by the lone Sherlock Holmes. Traditional 
homicide could‟ (2007: 105). Interestingly, from my research and 
the people I interviewed, it became clear that when it comes to 
kidnapping negotiators, cooperation was almost absent. Reiner 
states that very often police are isolated by society, but despite 
that „there are many conflicts inside the police organization. Some 
are structured by the rank hierarchy and the force division of 
labour, say between uniform and detective brunches‟ (2012: 122).  
In relation to kidnappings, not only will the knowledge holder 
not offer help when an emergency appears, but they might also put 
obstacles in the way of their former trainees. For example, when 
there was the kidnapping of the Cypriot citizen in Greece, as I 
explained in the previous chapter, the mother of the young man, 
along with two Cypriot negotiators, travelled from Cyprus to Greece 
in order to pay the ransom. The Cypriot negotiators asked for police 
undercover protection from the airport to the police headquarters in 
Greece, but the Greek police refused to do it. The reply of the 
Greek counter-kidnap team to the chief negotiator of Cyprus was 
„you‟ve been working in the counter-terrorism team for fifteen years 
and you need protection? ‟[interviewee 12]. The Greek team of 
negotiators declined to provide coverage and security while they 
also showed an antagonistic attitude towards a group of people who 
have been trained by them in the past. Police occupational culture 
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can also get in the way and affect the outcome of a kidnapping. The 
retired negotiator from Greece about the problems around his work, 
he referred to the fact that sometimes those who are higher up in 
the police hierarchy are not willing to listen to what other police 
officers, and more specifically the negotiators, have to say:  
 
When you are a negotiator, sometimes you have to go 
against your superiors‟ views; you have to say what you 
think. Those high-ranking officers don‟t want to hear 
anything else but their own voices. If you are a careerist 
and you want to go higher up [in the police hierarchy] you 
won‟t spend time to think about the negotiations of a 
kidnapping. [interviewee 14] 
 
What the negotiator is trying to say here is that in many cases the 
decisions are taken by people who are higher up in the police 
hierarchy, even though those who are working on a case have a 
different view. When there is a kidnapping it is important for the 
various teams to cooperate and share information, but it seems 
that those working on kidnappings are not part of a team-oriented 
subculture. The retired police negotiator revealed that throughout 
his time as a kidnapping negotiator, this cooperation never actually 
existed, and some people inside the police did not want to use his 
experience and skills when there were kidnappings in Greece. In 
our interview he said: 
 
I was the chief negotiator in many big cases. In these 
cases I didn‟t take part simply because police asked me to 
do it since I was the most experienced. No. I took part 
because I went and I told them “you need me, I am here, 
you have to use me, I am available”. They [possibly he 
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means the high-ranking police officers] didn‟t even know I 
existed. They didn‟t know what I could offer. They didn‟t 
want to use me to kidnapping cases. They used to put 
people who weren‟t able to deal with the kidnapping 
cases. There were many things that I had to face and the 
system never worked properly. Those doing the 
preliminary inquiry have to give information to 
negotiators, so that they [the negotiators] could work. 
This cooperation never existed, and for reasons of self-
protection we never pushed for this [to happen]. […] Self-
protection because they [those doing the preliminary 
inquiry] might tell us something, and then some of them 
could leak it in the media so we would be charged with the 
leak. [interviewee 14] 
 
Police are reluctant to share information and their knowledge 
because it is a powerful commodity. Only when no one else has it 
and by remaining silent or by a partial transfer of their knowledge, 
they will flourish as being the main knowledge holders. When it 
comes to high security policing and knowledge transfer, secrecy can 
be quite exaggerated. In general, there is a certain level of secrecy 
in policing and this secrecy increases as we move from visible 
policing to the less visible one where police officers are not dressed 
with uniforms and they are trying to maintain a low profile because 
they do not want to be targeted, which is the case for the counter-
kidnap team. However, when it comes to the transfer of knowledge 
which is related to the counter-kidnapping practices, this secrecy is 
exaggerated and in a sense it is also hypocritical. Excuses like 
„high-security information‟ or „confidential knowledge‟ were often 
used during my interviews with counter-kidnapping practitioners, 
but these seem to be yet another mechanism put in place to reveal 
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information only to very specific people. The English trainer of the 
counter-kidnap unit agreed on that; „I think we generally overdo 
the secrecy thing. Some of our tactics obviously if you don‟t keep 
them secret, people will defeat them, but there is a whole culture of 
secrecy around kidnappings‟ [interviewee 15]. He continued by 
giving another example of why people sustain this secrecy in the UK 
law enforcement: 
 
 it is because people don‟t have a lot of experience […] 
people don‟t want to expose themselves to having not 
done a very good job. […] Very few jobs are de-briefed 
and then write down the learning. To my knowledge there 
has never ever been an independent review of someone 
with experience in investigating kidnap, reviewing the job 
of another senior investigator in kidnap. […] In homicides, 
another investigator will come and check what you‟ve 
done in this case and review whether you‟ve done the 
right thing, or whether you‟ve missed opportunities when 
a case concludes. [… In the case of homicides] everyone 
in the UK learns the best practice and the things not to do. 
That is not replicated in kidnap […] people are much more 
reluctant to share that info with you, a lot of people feel 
vulnerable about sharing that information. [interviewee 
15] 
 
What is clear from what the English trainer said is that by revealing 
information related to kidnaps, the vulnerability of those working in 
this field is increasing, either because they do not have the 
monopoly on that specific knowledge anymore, or because they will 
be open to criticism, either from inside the police unit, or from 
outsiders, and especially criticism coming from within academia. 
„People will not talk to you Eleana, they are afraid of you, and I 
don‟t mean as a person because they don‟t know you, but because 
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of your links to an academic institution‟ [interviewee 21], argued 
the person who is organising all the trainings in Greece.  
I gained access to the Cypriot training of negotiators by 
offering to give a presentation on kidnappings as an exchange. 
However, the content of this presentation was controlled by the 
organiser of the training. When they called me to inform me about 
their approval of my attendance at the training, the organiser asked 
me specifically to prepare a non-academic presentation, saying „we 
won‟t like it if it‟s academic‟ [interviewee 12]. In addition to that, he 
gave me a list of things I must not talk about which included 
definitions, what happens in other countries in terms of 
kidnappings, and how the police should respond to a kidnap. Two 
weeks before the training he called me again to remind me that I 
should not refer to anything about the negotiation processes or 
what police are doing wrong. Instead his suggestion was to talk 
about violent kidnap for ransom cases in Greece because „they [the 
negotiators] will really like that‟ [interviewee 12], as well as „use 
the real names of the hostages and have their pictures to make it 
more realistic‟ [interviewee 12].  These superficial suggestions and 
their attempt to control what I am going to say and how I am going 
to present the police in general illustrates that there is censorship 
because of their fear of being criticised.   
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In addition to the above, although initially the idea was for 
me to open the one-week long re-training of the Greek negotiators 
team which took place in Athens (May 2015) and talk about the 
importance of transferring information, and if we can transfer 
knowledge, the plan changed when the head of the Greek police 
rejected my application to participate in the re-training. The reason 
for that rejection was because members of the public (non-police 
officers), are not even allowed to observe high security training, let 
alone have a session on it. In the answer that I received, via fax 
(page 215), the head of the Greek police states: „in response to 
your request for your participation or observation of the training, 
we inform you that according to the existing legal frame governing 
the operation of the Hellenic Police, the observation of trainings, or 
even re-trainings, is not envisaged or allowed by individuals outside 
the Hellenic Police‟.  
A very small group of negotiators were allowed to attend this 
training, and from what one of the participants told me a couple of 
months later, „a female police officer asked to observe the training, 
but they didn‟t let her do it, so I can imagine that it was impossible 
to let you inside‟ [interviewee 21]. The police seem to be 
unresponsive to the willingness of academics to help, and there is 
absence of any linear exchange of knowledge or possibilities for 
collaborations aiming for a better outcome. It seems that academic 
research and counter-kidnapping policing are fundamentally 
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disconnected. Holdaway (1983) has put some occupations in a 
group which he called „challengers‟ (71) because they are allowed 
to challenge the work of police. Reiner (2012) later explained that 
these people whose jobs allow them to penetrate the police secrecy 
of their culture and can potentially challenge police are „doctors, 
lawyers, journalists, and social workers […] (as are police 
researchers). Efforts will be made to minimize their intrusion, and 
presentational skills used to colour what they see‟ (124). Contrary 
to what is currently happening, I argue that there should be a 
broader development of knowledge based on the mutual sharing of 
practices and techniques. In order to facilitate that, there needs to 
be a combination of researchers and practitioners, so as to have a 
mutually beneficial outcome.     
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5.6 Ignorance 
Although it can be said that the police are working with knowledge 
on a daily basis, I can argue that when it comes to police officers 
working in kidnappings, we should not simply talk about non 
knowledge, but about strategic ignorance. In relation to the Greek 
counter-kidnapping team, there is a strategic institutional ignorance 
of definitions. This ignorance was apparent in various cases where 
there seem to be a confusion of criminal activities such as 
trafficking, smuggling, abduction/hostage taking, and ransom 
kidnapping. Of course, having one criminal activity does not exclude 
another one, and there are cases where, for instance, smuggling 
has escalated into ransom kidnapping, spanning into multiple 
jurisdictions. However, the interviewed police officers had a very 
limited knowledge on the definitional differences, often ending up 
talking about trafficking instead of ransom kidnappings. Their 
dictionary knowledge should provide labels and definitions of 
different types of crimes, but in reality their criminological 
dictionary appears to be very limited, if not absent. At the same 
time there is a deliberate indifference towards understanding the 
differences between each definition.  
During an interview with a Greek negotiator, when I 
commented on the fact that there are definitional ambiguities not 
only between different countries, but also between police officers 
inside the same country, the answer of the negotiator was: 
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To us definitions are not relevant, this is for academics. 
Kidnap is both taking you as a hostage, and transferring 
you to another place without your will. The point is that 
they take someone and they ask for money. We should 
make things simpler, one can call it kidnapping, the other 
can call it hostage taking or abduction or give it a different 
label. These are word games; we [police] are interested in 
the essence of things. When we [Greek police officers] talk 
about a kidnapping, we talk about ransom kidnapping. 
[interviewee 9] 
 
What this negotiator in a way argues is that, contrary to police 
officers, academics are not interested in the serious points, whereas 
they tend to pay unimportant attention to small details, such as the 
labels of criminal offences and the types of crimes. However, at this 
point it should be remembered that, as mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter, the label they are going to put on a kidnapping case 
will determine whether it is serious or not, thus whether they will 
pay the necessary attention or not.  
For police, researchers are focusing on issues that 
practitioners have little interest in, while for researchers, 
practitioners and the police need to have a clear understanding of 
definitions or how things should work, in order to achieve their 
highest potential. These institutional ambiguities are due to the 
ignorance of its members which is something that is also underlined 
by the comments of a negotiator in Greece. He said that in the 
United Kingdom there are no kidnappings because they last for very 
few days „these aren‟t kidnappings, they last for two days only‟ 
[interviewee 7], at which point I commented that they are 
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kidnappings, they just happen to be short, and he continued by 
saying that when the English trainers, during the re-training of the 
Greek negotiators, referred to a kidnapping which lasted for three 
days, „those of us who knew, laughed. That isn‟t a kidnapping. It‟s 
too short‟ [interviewee 7]. The same person at some point of the 
interview told me that at that point they were looking at a 
kidnapping of a doctor, and when I asked if he could tell me more 
about the case he replied: „you won‟t hear about that in the news. 
Some burglars entered his house, but he returned while they were 
still there, so they took all of his valuable things and they also 
kidnapped the doctor. We found him dead two days after‟ 
[interviewee 7]. In that case the negotiator used the term 
„kidnapping‟ to refer to a case where, although the person was 
moved, so there was a change of the location, there was no 
demand made for money or anything else. It was just a burglary 
going wrong, and not a kidnapping.  
 The UNODC manual is dated and does not include a quite 
prevalent type of kidnapping called “tiger”, but one can read inside 
that there are many different kidnap types, and only some of them 
can be related to ransom money. Viewing kidnappings as a 
predominantly ransom-related crime appears wrong, hence I would 
argue that there needs to be a descriptive word specifying the type 
of kidnap (ransom, political demands, family disputes, fraud, etc.). 
From the definitional understanding of police officers, we can see 
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that what one thinks as apparent “common knowledge”, for 
someone else might be not so common. 
In addition to the above, the quotes show the strategic 
decision of the police to ignore certain facts. An ignorant person is 
someone who does not know, someone who is not informed and 
chooses to remain this way. By strategic ignorance, it is implied 
that there is a decision not to be informed, and not to receive any 
knowledge as an input. This decision indicates that an individual is 
aware of the fact that there is useful information out there, or even 
worse, has decided not to acknowledge the fact that there is 
information available. There is a distinction between those things 
we are aware that we do not know and those things that we are not 
aware that we do not know. In a sense, knowledge and ignorance 
are different aspects of the same coin because one is about the 
things one knows, and the other one is about the things one knows 
that exist but chooses not to pay attention to and has no interest in 
finding out. They seek to preserve their ignorance and as long as 
they maintain “good”, for their institutional standards, they want to 
remain ignorant. Ignorance helps to guard towards criticism and is 
„useful to those seeking to conceal information while appearing 
transparent‟ (McGoey, 2012: 4), which is connecting both the 
secrecy around anything related to kidnappings and the ignorance 
inside the specific police sub-culture. 
 
220 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the different things that can 
prevent the sharing of knowledge or make it difficult. However, at 
this point it is crucial to talk about the choice to not implement 
what has been transferred. Supposedly, everything is working 
perfectly and all the conditions are ideal; the transfer of knowledge 
is done with no linguistic barriers, everyone has similar capacities to 
absorb what is being transferred, no one is holding back 
information and the training involves practice as well as theory, yet 
this does not mean that the receipted knowledge will be 
implemented. What is inside the transnational and intranational 
trainings has been created at the local level. For instance, the 
UNODC has produced a document which includes global practices, 
but it has been created locally, in the United Kingdom, based on 
kidnappings which mainly took place in Manchester, Birmingham 
and London. Connecting this idea to the literature review chapter, 
Massey (1994) supported that global actions can take place locally, 
which resembles the produced manuals and the global knowledge 
disseminated by NCA, in order to be applied in different locations. 
When it comes to the application of what has been learned, 
practitioners in Greece and Cyprus to a big extent ignore the 
content of the trainings (or from manuals).  
Knowledge is shaped locally, then in some cases it can 
become part of global trainings in order to be transferred to a local 
context and either get accepted or rejected. It seems that 
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practitioners are rejecting that knowledge coming from abroad, but 
according to Massey, a place is a mixture of identities and 
everything is interconnected. There is a constellation of relations, 
people, social interactions, movements, communication and 
networks which are being interwoven in one particular place. A 
place and its practices are transformed at the local level by various 
international influences. In reality global ideas are not opposed to 
local ones and globalisation does not mean homogenisation (Dator, 
Pratt, Seo, 2006: 176; Benyon, Dunkerley, 2000: 25). Each place, 
culture, practices and knowledge are created as a result of blending 
global and local social reactions, and this hybrid mix is what some 
call “glocality” (Hufnagel, Harfield, Bronitt, 2012; Hobbs and 
Dunnighan, 1998 in Ruggeiero, South and Taylor). The locale is 
important, and the fact that practitioners have chosen not to 
consider the things transferred as important might be the result of 
pride and ignorance, or all those things transferred can 
unconsciously affect them to some level. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to counter-kidnapping, the local appears to be more 
powerful than the global.  
The former police negotiator and chief trainer of the Greek 
police, when asked about the application of the received knowledge 
gave inconsistent answers. When I asked him if, after his trainings 
by the FBI and the NCA, he had followed exactly what the trainings 
suggested, he first commented by saying that he tried to apply 
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everything he could, but later in our conversation he gave a 
different answer: 
I tried to [to apply the shared global methods and 
knowledge]. Once, after the end of a training, x [the name 
of the trainer] approached me and told me to apply 
everything I have learned to the Greek reality and use it. I 
told him that we [humans] are all the same. I said: „let 
me ask you something? You have been all around the 
world. Have you ever seen anyone crying when happy and 
laughing when sad?‟ He replied: „No‟. Humans are all the 
same everywhere. […] Albanians are very dangerous, the 
same is for Bulgarians. It is so easy for them to cut a 
couple of fingers and send them to the families of their 
hostages […] I will be honest with you, so, we do one 
thing [in a specific way], and after the trainings we carry 
on doing it [in the same way]. Old shoes are comfortable. 
[interviewee 14] 
 
The honesty -and disparity in his words- of the former negotiator 
and trainer shows that global practices might be created locally, but 
once removed and transferred to another locale they can lose their 
power, and the local way of doing things is preferred. This means 
that Newburn‟s (2002) belief that the nation-state is steadily 
becoming more and more insignificant and its ways of dealing with 
crimes are shaped by „Atlantic crossings‟ is not applicable when it 
comes to the counter-kidnap field. Police are often seen as being 
future oriented. Bayley and Bittner (1984) have stated that „not 
only do police want to restore order, they want to lower the 
likelihood that future disorder, particularly crime, will occur. Though 
they tend to deny it, police officers are future oriented‟ (41).  
My research demonstrates disagreement with this statement, 
and without feeling the need to make any generalisations, I have 
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seen that the police have a reactive approach to kidnappings. When 
there is a kidnapping they will respond to it, possibly and hopefully 
as best they can, but they are not prepared to respond to such an 
ever-changing type of crime. There is a neophobic attitude and a 
resistance to change inside the counter-kidnap teams. The dynamic 
nature of crime demands new approaches, new knowledge, new 
information, new skills and constant fluidity. Old shoes, as my 
interviewee said, might be comfortable but once they are old they 
stop being practical or function the way shoes are supposed to. 
There have been a few occasions where the Greek counter-kidnap 
team has been under duress because the kidnap cases they had to 
deal with where „too unique‟ [interviewee 6]. One of these cases is 
the kidnap of a man who had his fingers cut and posted to his wife 
in order to make faster arrangements for the ransom asked. A week 
later after that case I re-interviewed some of my Greek 
interviewees [Interviewee 6, Interviewee 7] and they both said how 
unexpected that case was, and how unprepared they were to deal 
with such a kidnap. However, I said that this is a common practice 
in many countries in Latin America and asked them if they feel 
there is a need for practitioners to know the practices in other 
nations, but they both declined. Their response shows the fear of 
anything new, of change itself, and also illustrates that there is a 
common reactive approach. They seem to believe that once 
something happens they will then try to deal with it, but there is no 
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need to prepare in advance. This response resembles the Cypriot 
negotiator‟s belief that kidnaps will not happen on an island, but if 
they do happen, then they will see how they are going to respond.  
 
5.7 Sub-culture 
The specific occupational culture appears to have differences from 
what we would call „police culture‟ or generalist and low policing. 
The sub-culture of those involved in countering kidnappings has 
interesting characteristics and the two police counter-kidnap units, 
in Greece and Cyprus are sharing these characteristics. Although I 
do not intend to make grand statements, this shows that other 
units across territories might do the same. Some of these 
characteristics also appear to be visible in the NCA kidnap and 
extortion specialist unit. All types of policing involve certain amount 
of secrecy, and particularly in high policing there is the retention of 
information until it can be used efficiently. However, in kidnappings 
it is noticeable that there are double standards, with media-leaks 
during kidnap investigations, but when it comes to the counter-
kidnap knowledge there is secrecy and suspicion. Those involved in 
kidnaps say that their involvement is voluntary, but such a 
philanthropic attitude is unfounded, leading us to believe that its 
purpose is to further add to the image and prestige of the police 
negotiators. Through these trainings apart from maintaining the 
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status of those involved in kidnaps, units also manage to sustain 
their visibility and possibly their funding as well. 
Knowledge is something personal that is kept to be used in 
the future for private gain. High policing involves intelligence 
gathering in order to shape the response according to the problem 
faced. In kidnappings, although there might be some intelligence 
gathering (the extend depends on the nation conducting the 
research), there are certain steps which are always followed, hence 
there is no space for improvisation, or problem-related solution. In 
the particular police sub-culture there is an attention to the 
spectacle, but everything, including the knowledge transfer events, 
takes place for the preservation of the status of those involved. The 
counter-kidnap units are treated as high policing and the police 
negotiators are seen as elites inside the general occupational 
culture of police. As Manning (1978) has noticed, police do not have 
one common culture, they are both culturally and structurally 
diverse. By undergoing trainings and participating in kidnap cases 
they create a „we‟ which becomes part of their distinct identity 
inside the police. The reality might be slightly more complicated 
than how Brodeur (2008), O‟Reilly and Ellison (2006) explained it. 
There are indeed complex networks with high policing agencies 
dealing low policing threats and crimes (and of course the opposite 
as well), but in the case of the counter-kidnap units, they are 
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perceived as high policing entities but they do not have all the 
elements appearing in typical high policing.  
 
5.8 Summary  
In this chapter I criticised those trainings which take place inside a 
nation, and I presented a different police subculture. The 
occupational culture of the police and the sub-culture of the 
kidnapping negotiators can work as a barrier when it comes to the 
transferring of knowledge. Training events and re-trainings inside a 
nation are not taken seriously, the reaction is superficial and they 
are organised just to tick some boxes. As it was explained by some 
members of the Cypriot negotiators team, this superficiality is 
because they believe it is unlikely that any serious type of crime, 
such as a kidnap, will ever happen on an island. This is also the 
reason why the closest training most nations receive in relation to 
kidnappings is on hostage-takings. In the case of Greece, they are 
more interested in training other nationals rather than training their 
own team of negotiators. As I have attempted to explain in this 
chapter, this lack of training, among other reasons, is also 
problematic because these negotiators have spent a maximum of 
five days of training developing their skills, although their training 
in the police academy lasted for at least four years. Dealing with a 
kidnapping is fundamentally different from dealing with street crime 
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or mundane police work; it demands the implementation of 
different skills and techniques.  
Another negative aspect of the sub-culture to which police 
negotiators belong, is their apparently unjustified pride and their 
sense of superiority over others. There appears to be a mentality 
that each team is the best compared to others, and the fact that 
they are not wearing a police uniform (or a typical police uniform in 
the case of Cyprus) is adding to their feeling of differentiation. All 
the teams (from the three different countries I have looked at) 
appear to have some flaws, but this pride works as a barrier 
towards improvement. Being conceited and not realising that work 
for further improvement needs to be done can only create 
arrogance and keep them stuck in time. 
In this chapter I also discussed the value of knowledge and 
the “value shop‟s” five activities which can lead to investigative 
success. Although these activities are followed, there are some 
flaws in the process; for example, in a police investigation in a 
value shop the solution is unique because each case is distinctive. 
However, in kidnappings they always follow the same techniques, 
even though there is a lot of diversity amongst them. Businesses 
and organisations are interested in this pre-designed set of steps 
and contingency plans which are to be followed in case of an 
emergency. After the talk about the value of knowledge, I 
continued by discussing the power of knowledge. Knowledge equals 
228 
 
power, which means that the people who are, in principle, placed in 
a position which aims at disseminating that knowledge, very often 
decide to hold it back. The knowledge that someone has can be 
used as a bargaining chip to receive something in exchange, to 
remain in their position or go even higher because of being the only 
one who is perceived as an expert in a specific field. The transfer is 
not based on altruism, and the more monopolised knowledge is, the 
better for those who have it, whether it is an individual or a team 
such as the team of NCA. 
From my research I have also seen that there is a lack of 
cooperation, which was obvious in the case of the Cypriot 
negotiators who rejected the provision of protection while carrying 
the millions of ransom money from the airport to central Athens. 
Not only there is an absence of cooperation, but there is a 
competitive attitude between the police negotiators inside the team. 
This means that doing the job properly by placing the right person 
in the right position, for an appropriate work, is side lined due to 
expediencies. In a sense there is a lack of cooperation between 
academics and police officers. The secrecy around anything 
connected to counter-kidnapping practices and trainings might be 
due to their fear of being criticised. Interviewees were secretive 
towards me as well, which is potentially the result of my 
connections to an academic institution, and my capacity as a 
researcher. This secrecy towards me shows the schism between 
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police practitioners and researchers.  The final section of this 
chapter focused on the preferred inclination of the police 
negotiators towards ignorance. They seem content with the things 
they know and the way they have been doing things, aside from 
their failures and problematic approaches. This strategic ignorance 
can be viewed as an unwillingness to make any effort towards 
personal and occupational improvement. 
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Chapter 6:  The limits of the state 
and the limits of knowledge 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters of this thesis have focused on the way 
the counter-kidnap knowledge is being moved and transferred 
inside or outside a nation, followed by two chapters on what hinders 
the transfer and application of that knowledge. This chapter is going 
to analyse two main aspects around kidnappings. Through the 
arguments presented in this thesis so far, a question arises. After 
presenting and explaining why the counter-kidnap knowledge is 
either not properly transferred or if it is transferred then it is not 
always applied, naturally one might ask why organisations still try 
to do it. As I am trying to explain in the first half of this chapter, 
there is a variety of reasons behind this superficial, and maybe of a 
questionable usefulness, attempt to transfer knowledge. These 
reasons are connected to the police occupational culture.  
Nations need to have a common understanding of the crime, 
and through these training exercises it is created the illusion that 
they achieve this common ground. In addition to that, there is 
possibly an exchange of services between nations. One nation for 
example can provide a training-event on kidnappings, and those 
receiving it can either provide a knowledge-transfer event on 
something else as an exchange or give intelligence information. 
Although trainings are not free, they possibly create a collaborative 
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environment and a line of communication between nations and 
police teams. As discussed below, another reason why the counter-
kidnap knowledge is still being transferred though without any 
success, might be because the trainings are a way of improving 
work conditions and asking for further equipment. Finally, there 
might be an attempt to transfer and receive knowledge because it 
can enhance the position and the status of those involved in the 
process.  
These knowledge-transfer difficulties which are related to the 
police sub-culture of those involved in kidnappings, are creating a 
sense of inability of nations to provide kidnap-related security and 
protection to their citizens. This has created a space for private 
companies to come in and do it on behalf of nations. At the same 
time the knowledge is not being transferred for free which makes 
nations unable to pay for the training fee making it even harder for 
knowledge to move around. These private companies are 
capitalising on fear and as I am going to explain knowledge is 
codified and distributed in a non-individualised way.  
 
6.2 The Persistence of Practice 
It is difficult to know for sure why knowledge transfer still takes 
place the way it is described in this thesis, with its issues and sticky 
aspects. I will now discuss three reasons I believe play a role in this 
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persistence of practice. These three reasons are connected with the 
police politics and the way kidnaps are used to enhance and assist 
in various other fields.   
 
6.2.1 The illusion of common ground  
During an interview I asked a member of the Greek counter-
kidnap team whether it is important for police teams of 
neighbouring countries to share a common level of knowledge in 
relation to counter-kidnapping and have similar techniques, he took 
some time to think and replied: „I have never thought of that 
before. I don‟t know why we should deal with things in the same 
way. I don‟t know. I don‟t understand why something like that can 
be important‟ [interviewee 7]. This negotiator has also participated 
and presented in a collective training with representatives from 
other nations, and although he rejected the importance of equally 
trained and crime-aware nations, his reply can show the 
superficiality of these collaborations. On a similar note, every time I 
asked about the reasons behind the collaborative training-events, 
people would respond by saying the previously mentioned phrase 
„we are the best‟, and they would continue with the argument that 
other nations asked to receive training by the Greek counter-kidnap 
team. Although it is unclear if all those involved with counter-
kidnaps in the national level share the same view, it is almost 
certain that there is an unawareness of the reason behind 
collaborations.  
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As it has already been mentioned, trainings are not always 
transferring useful knowledge, but they can raise awareness on the 
issue. In a “glocalised” (Robertson in Featherstone, Lash, 
Robertson, 1995; Hufnagel, Harfield, Bronitt, 2012; Hobbs and 
Dunnighan, 1998 in Ruggeiero, South and Taylor) world, local 
criminal activity can be linked to global networks or somehow be 
connected to another part of the world. In addition to that, people 
are constantly travelling around the world, changing borders and 
jurisdictions.  The world is a global village and while police act 
locally, they should also think globally and train their minds to think 
beyond their territorial borders and boundaries. Being on the same 
page does not imply that neighbouring nations have to follow the 
same response to a kidnap case, but it rather means that they can 
have a common knowledge around the phenomenon and be aware 
of how other teams deal with the same type of problem. 
Kidnappings can start in one part of the globe and end in another 
one, hostages can be moved inside the geographical borders of a 
country or outside. Also in a few cases the hostage is in one 
country, whereas the demand for ransom is made to family 
members who live in another one. There is definitely a level of 
interconnectedness and there are cases in which nations might 
have to cooperate in order to deal collectively with a kidnap case, 
thus a common understanding of the nature of this specific crime, 
might prove very helpful and avoid future problems and 
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misunderstandings. In addition to that, based on the storytelling of 
cases from the negotiators in Greece, all of those kidnapping cases 
which took place inside the country had at least one kidnapper from 
another nation. In kidnappings usually each member offers 
something different, thus, the more diverse the group, the more 
foreign networks can be used for various stages during a kidnap.  
Duan, Nie and Coakes (2010) have talked about the need to 
have common motivation, common reasons for collaboration, clear 
objectives and similar level of understanding whilst transferring 
knowledge transnationally. However my research shows that in 
practice these do not seem to have any significance to the 
practitioners. In practice it is difficult to make each and every 
nation have the same level of knowledge, but in theory this would 
be very helpful for collaborating in cases involving more than one 
nation. Having a common knowledge of the crime, the most 
prominent types of kidnaps in a geographical area, and which are 
the most common problems that might arise while dealing with a 
kidnap case, is quite important. However, there is a difference 
between having a common ground and indirectly forcing specific 
techniques of dealing with kidnappings to everyone. This is not just 
problematic, but it is also unachievable. As mentioned before, the 
NCA member argued that the EuNAT trainings are created to 
„[make] sure European standards are equivalent‟[interviewee 1] 
which is not possible due to resistance to the received knowledge 
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and lack of understanding of the importance of collaborations. 
Valverde and Mopas (in Larner, Walters, 2004), have a view of 
transnational policing organisations and international policing in 
general which one might say is negative. They have stated that 
transnational organisations like Europol and Interpol have limited 
usefulness and that policing does not have a global character (236). 
My research proves the point of Velverde and Mopas, and thus far 
in this thesis I have proved that indeed states have the most 
significant role and are the decision makers when it comes to 
policing.  
 
6.2.2  Exchange of services and intelligence 
The person who is responsible for all the police trainings in 
Greece (kidnap or non-kidnap related trainings) [interviewee 21], 
gave a different view from all the other interviewees. He argued 
that these trainings are part of an exchange of various types of 
information between countries. There is a plethora of formal 
mechanisms designed to transfer information about specific 
individuals and general crime-related knowledge. From a variety of 
protocols, to SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the 
National Entries), and the Schengen cooperation, people and 
institutions inside them had foreseen the importance of sharing 
information and techniques both at the global and the European 
level.  
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Regarding the Greek kidnap for ransom trainings, the 
knowledge of the Greek team is exchanged in return for intelligence 
from people who are inside the Greek borders. Bowling and 
Sheptycki (2012) have referred to the policing knowledge transfer 
as the „life-blood‟ (2012) of policing, which is adding to its vitality. 
However, at least in regards to counter-kidnapping, it seems that 
the police are not willingly and voluntarily sharing knowledge and 
intelligence. The share is done as part of an agreement after long 
discussions on what a nation can offer and what should be the 
exchange for it. After all those agreements on sharing and 
transferring knowledge around, it seems that counter-kidnap 
knowledge is done forcefully, after meetings and agreements 
between nations of what can be offered from each side. When I 
asked the person organising the police trainings in Greece about his 
view on the topic of knowledge transfer through trainings, he 
replied with a rhetorical question „what do you think the ministers 
of interior do when they travel to other countries to meet with other 
ministers of interior?‟ [interviewee 21]. With an ironic smile 
embellishing his face he tried to make it clear that politics is related 
to the transfer of counter-kidnap knowledge. It is determined and 
driven by political imperatives and cross national agreements. This 
explains the true reason of police knowledge transfer behind the 
idea of pride and exceptionalism. In reality, the reason knowledge 
is moving around is not because of the great success rate of the 
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Greek police negotiators or in the case of the UK, the fact that the 
team offering the training has written the UN manual, but it is done 
as part of political agreements. The fact that knowledge depends on 
politics for its movement is yet another filter, adding another layer 
of complexity to its exchange and transfer. 
In some cases, assisting a kidnapping case can be seen as a 
good excuse to be allowed to know more of what is happening 
inside other nations. Through building networks with other public or 
private organisations, it gives to the UK an advantage and easier 
access to other nations‟ surveillance and intelligence information.  
The NCA official argued that intelligence is very important for them 
when dealing with a kidnap case, and, as it has been previously 
stated, he referred to the positive impact of having cross-border 
surveillance: 
So, what we say to other countries is that „if there is an 
incident involving a company, an organisation, or 
individual anywhere in the world that potentially could 
impact the UK, or not, and you just want someone to 
speak to, then please feel free to ring one of my duty 
officers any time of the day or night‟. For kidnappings and 
extortion, it doesn't matter where in the world, if there is 
anyone, someone from an organisation or locally 
employed staff as well, we tell them to call us and we can 
have a discussion and exchange information. Quite often, 
when an incident occurs, people are running around like 
headless chickens, not all the time, but sometimes. You 
can get the critical decision maker in order for him or her 
to start making decisions at a very early stage. We need 
to be prepared, we need to have plans in place, and we 
need to know who to contact, because in each and every 
incident, there are people waiting to use the information, 
the intelligent companies have got, or what‟s out there. 
[interviewee 1] 
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When there is a kidnapping, the intelligence team tries to 
gather information about the potential kidnappers, in order to 
assess the professionalism or unprofessionalism of the kidnappers 
[interviewee 6]. Understanding whether or not a kidnap is planned, 
organised and executed by a team of professionals or amateurs is 
going to define the moves the team is going to follow. If the 
kidnappers are amateurs, the team and the victim (person paying 
the ransom) will have to carefully plan the next moves because 
there is a high chance of the kidnappers killing the victim for a 
variety of reasons. In most cases, although not always, those who 
are professionals and whose only goal is to get the ransom and 
release the hostage, are possibly going to cooperate and let the 
negotiators do their job. Intelligence plays a significant role in the 
assessment of the kidnappers. My understanding from the 
interviews is that since someone has provided a training session or 
event, the nation receiving that knowledge can make available 
intelligence information. The idea is that by sharing a nation‟s 
knowledge and experience, there is going to be, of course, a fee for 
that, as well as a form of intelligence exchange. Another example 
supporting the argument that knowledge transfer is a way to gather 
intelligence is the recent training (May 2015) of the Greek 
negotiators from the Crisis and Negotiation Unit of the Greater 
Manchester Police, which aimed to supply more knowledge towards 
the understanding of ISIS related hostage situations. Someone who 
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participated in this training said that the first two days of the 
training were on methods to tackle ISIS related kidnappings and 
hijacks, and although the cost of this training was quite high, 
possibly after that training the Greek state has the obligation to 
share intelligence regarding potential ISIS members within Greek 
borders [interviewee 7]. 
On a similar note, the NCA member kept making references to 
the fact that they gather intelligence in other countries for cases 
which might have nothing to do with the UK. This is done directly 
through the UK or through sub-contractors from other nations. The 
NCA member called these sub-contractors „contacts‟ who are paid 
by the UK in order to gather intelligence and he explained:  
How can we get urgent cooperation without delay? That's 
simply done through the contacts we have got across the 
world, so we can pick up the phone and have a 
conversation and then get or give immediate support. 
[interviewee 1] 
 
According to the interviewee from the NCA, their mission is to 
„provide tactical orders and support to any national or international 
investigation in the prevention of a crime in action with the UK‟s 
response‟ [interviewee 1]. The NCA is positioned as the primary 
knowledge broker around the world, since not only have they 
created the counter-kidnapping manual, which is in theory globally 
disseminated, but they are also working as sub-contractors.  
Interestingly, in the annual counter-kidnapping, hijacking and 
hostage-taking event in London, an NCA invited speaker did not 
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talk about kidnappings in general, but, in a way, advertised the 
NCA‟s work and what they can offer, finishing his talk by giving the 
NCA emergency phone number in case of a kidnap around the 
globe. My understanding was that the NCA is definitely asserting 
itself as the global knowledge brokers and counter-kidnap experts 
and attending events such as the London counter-kidnap one is a 
way to reach out to private companies which can use NCA as a sub-
contractor, or the other way around, eg, NCA using private sub-
contractors.  Part of what the NCA can do when there is a kidnap 
incident is to gather intelligence which will assist towards the safe 
release of the hostage. By intelligence they mean a variety of 
things, as the NCA interviewed official said: 
[We gather] photographs, details of local telephones, 
addresses, social media. So when one is in conversation 
with a member of my team [NCA team] at 3 o'clock in the 
morning, which might be dealing with more than one 
cases, with time differences, then if we have this 
intelligence available, then we can plan according to 
opportunities that may arise the next hour or so. 
[interviewee 1] 
 
 
 
6.2.3  Trainings as tools for improving conditions and 
for personal future use 
In any other context, trainings are done to transfer 
knowledge and move the important aspects of it around. However, 
in the case of kidnappings, the knowledge transfer events are 
taking place in order for other things to happen. Usually, police-
organised counter-kidnaping knowledge transfer events are forced 
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to attend, and they seem to be more like an obligation which needs 
to be fulfilled rather than an event aimed to enrich their already 
existing knowledge. There are boxes which need to be ticked and 
activities which have to be done in order to show those higher up in 
the hierarchy that they are doing something. Police-organised 
trainings aim to achieve something different from what the obvious 
goal is. As has already been mentioned before, the trainings are 
organised because of the cross-national agreements in exchange 
for something else, either intelligence information or another 
training provided by those who have previously received the 
training. However, these training or re-training events have a 
symbolic value with little practical effect, as they can be an indirect 
way to put pressure on the right people and demand more 
equipment, tools and benefits.  
From what I was told during my ethnography, in the 2014 
training of the Cypriot negotiators, after completing the big 
exercise, on the final day the person organising the training spoke 
to the head of the Cypriot police who was there to observe the 
exercise, and asked for a “negotiating cell”. This “cell” is a van used 
by police where negotiators can make all the negotiations from 
there if there is a long negotiating-incident, as well as record any 
conversation they or the hostage‟s family member(s) are having 
with the kidnappers. While I was in Cyprus, almost every 
participant commented on the fact that they have this “cell”, which 
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can „make [their] life easier‟ [interviewee 11], and as a female 
negotiator told me, „this distinguishes us from the others 
[negotiators of other countries, presumably those of Greece], 
because the others don‟t have it [the “negotiating cell”], and 
obviously we are good. That‟s why we asked for it, and we got it. 
We can show them [superiors of Cypriot police] that we are 
successful to what we do‟ [interviewee 22].  
In that Cypriot-police training of 2015, something similar 
happened at the last day of the training event. After the big 
exercise, the head of the Cypriot counter-terrorism team was asked 
to comment on what he witnessed from their exercise, and discuss 
any issues the negotiators had. The discussion ended with the head 
of the counter-terrorism department agreeing on buying more 
bulletproof vests for the negotiators. He also promised that there 
will be a chest in every main police station of Cyprus with tools and 
equipment to be used only by negotiators, and that they will be the 
only ones with a key to open that chest in case of emergency. From 
my experience during the Cypriot training, I got the impression that 
apart from making sure that after the end of the training they ask 
for more equipment in order to do their job, there was also a lot of 
attention paid to their informal team building. Although these 
negotiators do not necessarily work together, the organisers made 
sure that they all had lunch and dinner together, as well as a night 
out with music, food and alcohol. Team building and improvement 
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of work conditions are possibly the main aims of events like this 
one. 
In principle, the aim of trainings is for teams to be better 
prepared and to use the received knowledge in future cases. 
However, as I have explained so far, knowledge transfer events can 
create the illusion of being on the same ground, they are used as 
tools for intelligence and exchange of services as well as a way to 
ask for further funding and equipment. Nevertheless, knowledge 
events have an extra purpose, both for those transferring the 
knowledge, but also for those receiving it. These trainings are a 
way to establish the status and the position of the trainers and the 
trainees inside their respective law enforcement agencies. As has 
been already mentioned in the previous chapter, this can be used 
towards boosting their pride whilst they are still working there, but 
it can also play a big role in their future careers. It is the case that 
very often people from the public counter-crime sector move to the 
private one once they are retired, thus by training others or 
receiving training, they build trust and a legacy around their name. 
These people are not simple police officers, but they have either 
received or given specialised knowledge on a type of crime which 
although is very profitable, there are very few people around the 
world who can offer assistance in case there is a kidnapping. 
A great example illustrating this move from the public to the 
private sector is a woman I have met on a few occasions in 
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counter-kidnap events in London. In a male-dominated industry, 
she is the only female, thus I cannot reveal what her positions were 
in the public sector, but after retiring she went on to create her own 
counter-kidnapping and counter-piracy business. Although this 
happens quite frequently, the interesting part is that during her 
time in the public counter-kidnap sector, she had created such a 
legacy that she formed a brand name and later used her name as 
the label of her private company. On a similar note, when I 
interviewed the wife of the Greek businessman who was kidnapped, 
she revealed that apart from the Greek negotiators who were 
working on the case, a former Scotland Yard negotiator was also 
assigned in order to make sure that no mistakes were made by the 
Greek team. I did not want to ask if the family was insured for 
kidnappings or who approached the former Scotland Yard external 
evaluator, but it is very likely that insurance companies work with 
people who are coming from the counter-kidnap field and their 
presence during a kidnap is part of the insurance contract. Possibly 
the current NCA counter-kidnap official will take a similar role once 
he is retired from the public sector.  
Similar to the future use of knowledge for personal benefit, it 
is quite common for police officers to moonlight for news agencies. 
Their position inside the police and their knowledge on various 
cases, as I have explained in the previous chapter, can help them 
agree on secretly giving information to the media, usually in return 
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for financial benefits or future favours. Training events and re-
trainings do not have a real value but they do have a symbolic 
meaning; they assist towards team-building and the (re)assertion 
of the status of those working in the counter-kidnap field. In the 
counter-kidnap public and private business, there is a constant 
struggle for status, which can be used at this moment in time or in 
the future once they are retired. 
  
6.3 Limits of knowledge transfer: Can the States Protect 
their Citizens? 
With globalisation, as well as freer movement of people and capital, 
there are also increased efforts to transfer knowledge by 
organisations, through trainings or manuals. Organisations and 
individuals exploit their knowledge-related assets so as to become 
more competitive and have more advantages over others. Many are 
supporters of transnational organisations such as Europol, Interpol, 
and the UN, stating that they provide current information of high 
quality to practitioners, they are considered knowledge brokers and 
they fill the void between operational assistance and police 
cooperation (Guile in Lemieux, 2013; Gerspacher, Lemieux, 2013). 
However, in practice and in real life, high security knowledge 
transfer encounters obstacles, and there are some filters which 
make its movement harder. Transferring knowledge which can be 
potentially used in a different context from the one where it has 
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been produced is a lot more complex than it sounds and it can 
actually make things unnecessarily complicated and poorly suited. 
The allegation of the reason behind knowledge transfer is that it is 
very important to have a common ground between all the public 
and private organisations in the world. Nevertheless, this seems to 
be just a mechanism which uses the transfer of knowledge as a 
vehicle for other things. For example it can be used for improving 
the work conditions through getting funding, or in some cases for 
getting access to intelligence information of other nation-states. 
It is the role and the responsibility of the state to generate 
effective preventive strategies, to respond to risks and protect its 
citizens. Based on article 3 of the UN declaration of human rights, 
the primary responsibility of each state is to protect the right to life, 
liberty and the security of its citizens. Yet, when it comes to 
kidnappings, the power of the state and of the police seems to be 
very limited and there is a tendency towards what Garland (1996) 
calls the „responsibilization‟ of individuals. A great example showing 
exactly this turn towards making people responsible for their own 
safety and security is the story of a German woman [Interviewee 
29] who was kidnapped in Colombia whilst she was backpacking in 
the jungle with other tourists.  
I heard the former-kidnap hostage talking about her story in 
one of the counter-kidnap events in London. After being held 
hostage for around two months, she was released and her 
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kidnappers asked those negotiating her case for a helicopter to take 
her from the jungle to the airport at Bogota. Her flight back to 
Germany was covered by her, but the helicopter ride was initially 
covered by the German state. The day after her return to her 
homeland, she received a call from the German foreign ministry 
where she was informed that she has been charged with the 
helicopter costs (around 13,000 €). The reason why she was billed 
for the helicopter fees was, according to the government, that she 
had put herself in a risky situation, that she was negligent and 
irresponsible, because there was a travel warning in place for that 
area. Before listening to this story I was not aware that if there is a 
travel warning for a location and something happens there, then 
this means that the nation to which you are a citizen is not obliged 
to save you. This definitely limits those academics who present, 
teach or research in locations for which there is a travel warning. 
The former hostage was released without a ransom, but if there 
was one, then I imagine she would also have had to pay it back to 
the German state after her release. Although it was not clear, my 
understanding was that her case was dealt with by a private 
company employed by the German state. The responsibilisation 
strategy „merges neatly into strategies of privatization and public 
expenditure reduction‟ (Garland, 1996: 453). What the states do is 
create disparities in the distribution of security, which is something 
that it is going to be analysed in the following subsection.  
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Through looking at kidnappings as a case study, one can 
observe not only how the state has given away a lot of its 
responsibilities to individual citizens, but also what a big role the 
private sector companies have, and that nowadays the protection of 
citizens is not very centralised. Because of this boundary, different 
actors and intranational organisations, for example the United 
Kingdom through the United Nations, can get involved in the 
domestic affairs of other states, which is not always principled or 
helpful. The idea behind manuals like the United Nations Counter-
kidnap manual and the formal knowledge transfer events are that 
they stop ambiguity or ignorance from being used as excuses for 
failing to protect individuals. While interviewing someone who 
works in a private US company which specialises in kidnapping 
cases, he said that the way kidnappings are dealt with by the public 
sector is dangerous and time consuming: 
In the US they don't want to deal with it [kidnappings]. 
Everything falls to the state department within the United 
States and it is messed up. The FBI takes over and you 
cannot recover anyone if it falls to that level, it is really a 
mess. It is better for the private sector to recover people, 
just because it is easier. It's all about how you figure out 
the authorisation of the process so if you can figure that 
out you can have the job done, and that's the things that I 
mostly work with. Policy pieces caused David Foley [sic] 
(It is James Foley) to lose his head in Syria. That idea 'we 
don't pay ransom', ok, we get that, but in fact that they 
do, and it is based on who is brought to at a given time. 
Department state didn't want to entertain that because 
they had just funded a 220.000.000 dollars project to 
combat ISIS, and as soon as ISIS heard that, they raised 
the price to 220.000.000 dollars and then it went down to 
20.000.000 dollars the next day. The family couldn't 
manage it. It was going private. [interviewee 23] 
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Although the interviewee mainly works in the US, his example does 
not solely apply to that context.  
Initially the states were responsible for the security within their 
borders, but now, with the growth of globalisation and neo-liberal 
politics, the state is becoming less and less central to the delivery 
of security. The state is reduced in its role to provide security, and 
it keeps devolving down. This limit and inability of the state to 
protect its citizens has generated the space for private businesses 
to work and flourish, creating ambiguities between where the state 
ends and where private companies begin. It might be the case that 
private risk management businesses can guarantee that they can 
try to avoid the “sticky” aspects of knowledge when it is being 
transferred to others, or guarantee that they will do whatever they 
can in order to get the best possible results. However, the existence 
of the private sector makes the landscape much more contested 
and complex. In another interview with the CEO of a private 
business specialising in emergency recoveries, he actually said that 
in the US there is not a choice between going private or using the 
state organisations to help save a hostage: 
Trying to solve things by country is really important, so 
here in the UK they understand the situations you have to 
deal with, and your policies account for that. It's very 
fortunate. There is nothing like that in the US, you have to 
go private for that. If someone is kidnapped, the family 
goes to the state department; there is no middle men to 
buffer the changes in the policy. There is a lot of virtual 
kidnapping. [In virtual kidnappings] we have only a few 
hours to short it out before the family ends up paying the 
money. If you go to a private company,  while you are 
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busy working with the recovery of the hostage, and 
working out the ransom and all those things that go with 
it, but meanwhile you have to make sure with the state 
department that you comply with all the licenses and 
everything. That‟s why it's always good to have a third 
party and that's why the private part is so helpful in some 
countries, especially in the US. [interviewee 24] 
In the 7th Kidnapping, Hijacking and Hostage Taking event in 
London, I realised how interesting the relationship between the 
private and the public security sector is. There are very few people 
working on kidnappings around the globe, and this annual event is 
a place where counter-kidnap practitioners can offer and be offered 
jobs and kidnap cases. As Ekblom (2002) has stated, part of the 
crime prevention knowledge is to „know who‟. By that Ekblom 
underlines the importance of knowing the right people who can 
become collaborators and provide services in case of an emergency 
and this is the aim of events like the one held in London. It is not 
just the United Kingdom working for other countries and getting 
involved in cases abroad, where there are no English nationals 
involved, but also that the UK is offering jobs to other people from 
private businesses all around the world. As a matter of fact, I was 
offered a job during a break, and the same luck happened to the 
CEO of the private US company, who tried to explain to me how 
things work, and where the line is between public and private 
businesses:  
We are sub-contractors; we deal with 4-5 cases a week. 
People get stuck in different places, business has been 
blooming. […] We are pretty busy. I just got another one 
[kidnapping case] to do from x [the NCA member], he 
said 'you can do this one for us because he [the hostage] 
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is an American', but that's how things work. I still think 
that UK is the best, there is no problems attached to the 
recovery or the arrangements and the negotiations with 
the kidnappers. [interviewee 24] 
He continued giving examples of things his company has been 
involved to, and how the nature of his job has changed over time: 
We do work for John Hopkins university, and their 
academics for when they travel out. It is a new kind of 
business and it comes at different levels. Sometimes it is 
just the intelligence, sometimes it is going in and doing 
the recovery, sometimes you just write the action plan for 
a university, just a crisis action plan. Anything that they 
require, we can do it for them; it is a new game for us, for 
all the security companies out there. It started out as 
doing pure evacuations, just taking people out of bad 
places, now it has gone down to the micro level, doing 
individual travellers or company trainings. [interviewee 
24] 
He carried on by providing two very interesting examples of the 
cases he is currently working on, one in Venezuela and the other 
one in Pakistan: 
Right now i am working in Venezuela for a Japanese 
company, they have at least around 1800 employees, the 
company wants their people out, and they are trying to do 
it in a discreet way. […] Also, There are these two girls, 
they are from Czech Republic, and i got approached by the 
ambassador of Czech Republic in Washington at a cocktail 
party. He said he had a problem, there are these two girls 
who got kidnapped in the Pakistani border, so I did some 
research, I talked to their travel agencies, and we worked 
very closely together. A private company is working with a 
government agency for a foreign government. In the US 
we have the FARA, the Foreign Agency Registration Act, 
and we have to fill out all these documents every time we 
are working for a foreign government. So now we are 
working for a foreign government, for the safe release of 
their citizens, and that actually works quite well. In the 
Czech Republic they don't have any counter-kidnap 
agency on a national level, they are always coming to the 
private side to do work for them. So as far as work is 
concerned, public and private has become something 
very, very, natural to do. [interviewee 24] 
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In theory, a state is responsible for providing security and 
protection for its citizens. However, the reality is a lot messier than 
that and international contacts, coalitions, and interactions, as 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) have stated, have a great 
significance. A kidnapping was once exclusively in the public police 
domain, but now there is a constellation of commercial and public 
institutions, either working together or, when it comes to 
kidnappings, assigning the work to private businesses. There is an 
emergence of complex networks of policing where there is an 
interplay of private and public security providers. The public police 
contract out a kidnap case to another state‟s public police, and later 
that public police contract out the same case to a private firm. 
Policing is no longer a state monopoly, and in many cases, the 
demand for safety and security exceeds the state‟s capacity to 
provide it. As a result of that, it is not clear any more where the 
state ends and where the private sector begins. The two examples 
provided by the interviewee perfectly illustrate the fluidity in the 
security territory where private companies take the role of security 
providers where sub-contractors are approached by a 
representative of one nation in order to save individuals in risk-
situations in another nation. These rescue agreements are made 
informally during cocktail parties and conference coffee-breaks, 
possibly in an attempt to avoid the potential bureaucracy and delay 
of a response organised formally between two nations. 
253 
 
7.3.1  Private Companies 
The number of kidnappings around the world is not something 
that can be measured, but in both the developing and the 
developed world, kidnappings are quite common, and this has 
created a market as a response to this type of crime. The need for 
safety and security has created a complex environment where there 
are public and private organisations providing services. These 
organisations can be competitive, co-exist, or co-operate at the 
global and local level, but there is a tendency towards more and 
more private security businesses taking over the role of providing 
security. The global movement of money and finances has become 
important to the private sector‟s interests, which is yet another sign 
of neoliberalism and globalisation. These private industries are 
treating knowledge as a commodity, and trading it for profit. 
Knowledge can be sold and bought, and counter-kidnap knowledge 
can have a very high price. Nevertheless, knowledge itself seems to 
have a different currency depending on where it is being delivered 
to and who is selling it.  
Police are no longer the sole authority of counter-kidnap 
knowledge and practices, and actually the private sector is more 
associated with this specific type of crime „we have to stay ahead of 
the game. We are obsessed with quality, if we don‟t do that, they 
[people/businesses/organisations] will find someone else who does 
it‟ [interviewee 25], said a man sitting next to me at the London, 
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2016, Tackling Kidnapping event, who flew from Switzerland just 
for this event. The private counter-kidnap businesses are doing 
their best to be informed around this topic, so as to create and later 
sell their knowledge. This shows that the way of dealing with a 
security problem is completely turned into a commercial product 
and there is antagonism in a field in which there is no room for 
mistakes. Knowledge is sold by private risk-management 
companies run by self-labelled experts who used to work in the 
military or in the secret services of various countries.  
Almost every year there is an international conference on 
kidnappings, hijackings and hostage-taking, which is a meeting 
place for all those “experts” which allegedly creates a space for 
sharing knowledge, but the reality is far from that. When it came to 
the 6th and the 7th International Conference on Kidnapping, 
Hijacking and Hostage Taking, taking place in London, it was 
apparent that many of those practitioners attending had a narrow-
prismed understanding of kidnappings. According to the 
practitioners who took part in this conference, the type of 
kidnapping is based on the person or group who commits it. Hence, 
there are only two types of kidnappings, either the commercial ones 
which are those kidnaps committed by organised criminal groups or 
those committed by terrorist groups. In many countries however, 
kidnappings are not committed by either organised criminal groups, 
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or from terrorists, but they are organised and executed by 
opportunists.18  
The fear of being kidnapped can be present within all the 
groups inside a society, and in many cases the threat of being 
kidnapped can be exaggerated and in a sense forced onto a big part 
of the population. Human fears are a constant source of profit and 
the security-related consumption has become a defensive 
mechanism against fear. This is a form of preventative consumption 
which mainly aims at reducing the feeling of fear and insecurity. 
Trainings on kidnapping prevention and management use terror 
language such as „what price life [has]? - Only you can decide[.] 
Can you afford NOT to attend?‟19.  In other cases, specialists on 
kidnappings underline the „evolving‟ threat of this type of crime or 
the fact that „the world is getting more and more dangerous‟, as a 
speaker in the conference said, supporting these views on the „sole 
evidence [of] turning on the TV‟ (presenter at the 6th international 
conference on Tackling Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Hostage Taking 
in London). Someone who was working in a private risk-
management business in the UK and is responsible for creating 
contingency plans for companies and businesses, said: 
Secrecy is paramount and it's non-negotiable. We deal 
with tiger-kidnaps which thankfully are a very rare 
                                                          
18
 It should be added that most of those who were there (at the events I attended in London) seemed 
to not have a clear understanding of what it is meant by “organised crime” and “terrorism”, while 
these terms were clearly used to suit specific agendas and to exaggerate the problem and the fear 
associated with it. 
19
 http://rdc-uk.com/portfolio/taken/ (accessed 20.05.2016) 
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occasion here [in the UK]. I see naivety on a very regular 
basis: I was there and I hear the CEO ask to the head of 
security [of his company] -'when was the last time we had 
a kidnap situation?‟, -„we've never had one; the last one 
we had was five years ago‟ -„do we really need to invest 
all these resources in preparing for combat and prevent a 
kidnapping situation?', my answer is: the most definitely 
yes.  Failing to do so will be rather naive in this day and 
age and the world we live in. [interviewee 26] 
  Although kidnappings happen to people from all social classes 
and backgrounds, only a limited number of individuals can do 
something about that. This division of kidnapped individuals as 
profitable or not, or as practitioners call them, „high worth targets‟ 
or otherwise, gives an extra business-like aspect to a crime which is 
already very lucrative. Insurance companies are definitely not 
interested in the kidnappings of those who cannot pay their 
insurance fees for the incident of kidnapping, even though they 
reinforce the idea that a kidnapping can happen to anyone.  
During the 6th annual conference on Tackling Kidnapping, 
Hijacking and Hostage Taking, it was repeated throughout the 
event that the world is a very dangerous place to be in, reinforcing 
the feeling of fear and feeding off paranoia. As a matter of fact, 
someone who is currently running his own insurance company said 
that for an organisation, „it is not a question of “if” a kidnapping [of 
one of its employees] is going to take place, but a question of 
“when”‟ [interviewee 27]. At a coffee-break, a Spanish female 
kidnapping insurer shed some more light on the business-earning 
aspect of kidnappings, saying, „I am making money out of people‟s 
fear of being kidnapped and it feels very wrong, but then I think 
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that we also cover post-kidnapping expenses, psychological 
therapy, and it makes me feel better, but still in my job I am trying 
to sell insurance packages to people, after convincing them their 
lifestyle is dangerous‟ [Interviewee 28].  
There is definitely a gap between those who can afford to be 
insured, secure or rescued in case something happens to them, and 
those who cannot afford to do so. There are some security 
inequalities which have been intensified through making both the 
prevention and rescue a privilege to be enjoyed only by those who 
have an elevated status in the society. This „privilegisation‟ of 
security goes far beyond gated communities and alarm systems. 
This inequality is also depicted, according to O‟Reilly (2011), in the 
distinction between the „deviant‟ (2011: 181) traveller (often 
referred to as undocumented immigrant), and the affluent traveller 
(the tourist or the businessperson). The so called “deviant” ones 
are trying to go off radar in their attempt to secure a better life, but 
they are frequently captured and repatriated back to where they 
came from, to the life and the conditions they were running away 
from. Contrary to that, the affluent travellers are „tracked and 
traced by security consultants oversees, who send security updates 
to their clients […] steering them away from emerging danger 
zones and pinpointing their global locations when incidents unfold‟ 
(ibid).  
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Most transnational corporations, and especially those with 
personnel in dangerous or high-risk locations, have the duty to 
protect their staff („duty of care‟). Failure to prepare their staff 
through trainings and by having a kidnapping-protocol can hold 
them accountable for corporate negligence. In case anything 
happens to the affluent traveller, they will be directly located and 
rescued. Adding to that, some corporations have insured their 
personnel for ransom kidnappings, with the precondition that „the 
insured party [is] unaware of that cover‟ (O‟Reilly, 2011: 188). 
Some affluent people have even had transmitters implanted under 
their skin in order to be found in case of an emergency or a 
kidnapping20. Both the deviant and the affluent traveller can be 
victims of kidnappings, but with security becoming a privilege, only 
the latter can afford to protect themselves. Risk consultants, 
private security providers, insurers, mediators, negotiators and 
evacuation experts are available to help only those who can afford 
it.  
Garland has correctly stated that „once “security” ceases to be 
guaranteed to all citizens by a sovereign state, it tends to become a 
commodity which, like any other is distributed by market forces 
rather than according to need‟ (Garland, 1996: 463). As it has been 
noted (Levitt, 1999; Thacher, 2004; Pantazis, 2000), those on the 
bottom of society, the poorest groups, are the ones most affected 
                                                          
20
 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-crime-chips-idUSN2041333820080822 (accessed 
24.03.2017) 
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by crime, yet they are those with the fewest resources to combat 
their victimisation. Big kidnappings, with many millions of ransom 
demanded usually attract a lot of attention, but many, if not most, 
kidnappings are done with very little ransom, or other material 
things, asked. A research on kidnappings in Mexico City (Ochoa, 
2012) showed that it is not just the rich who are being kidnapped. 
Although initially there were more kidnappings of wealthy people, 
now the targets are coming from the middle and the working 
classes. Similar to that, Noor (2013) has stated that it is usually the 
lower parts of society that „make the largest victim pool‟ (2), but 
these kidnaps tend to go unnoticed. Ochoa in her research talked 
about a change in the nature of kidnappings in Mexico, and one of 
the reasons she proposes as responsible for that change is that the 
elite have learned to protect themselves. This does not imply that 
they are no longer victims of crimes, and in that case kidnappings, 
but rather that they are victimised less frequently. Those who are 
more privileged can afford private securities, gated communities, 
security boots outside their properties, CCTV cameras, accompanied 
by a general awareness which all exacerbate the inequalities 
(Ochoa, 2012: 16).     
Private counter-kidnap businesses attract the public‟s 
attention, and especially the attention of those who are seen as 
high risk targets. However, the evidence presented in this 
conference by those who are considered to be experts, was lay, 
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developed independently and was very subjective, with no 
academic input. The presentations were based on anecdotal 
evidence from the personal experiences of the practitioners, 
something which certainly adds another layer of complication when 
it comes to the application of these techniques into a real-life 
situation. Each one held their own understandings of how a kidnap 
for ransom case should be dealt. For example, someone, while 
presenting on the role of the media in kidnap cases, underlined the 
valuable help of having kidnap for ransom cases publicised through 
the media, because according to him it can create pressure on the 
kidnappers. Interestingly, he did not refer to the fact that this 
added pressure can lead into problems and might risk the hostage‟s 
life. In addition to that, when it comes to counter-kidnapping 
techniques, there has not been any integration of research evidence 
into the methods of preventing or solving a crime. Possibly this is 
the reason why there were some inaccuracies such as the one 
mentioned above, and an oversimplification of the information 
transferred, creating the illusion that, for instance, a kidnap for 
ransom case in an African country can be similar to a case in a 
European one. Overall, knowledge transfer is based on spurious 
evidence, as well as based on personal and individualised 
experiences which have been produced under very specific 
circumstances. 
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Even though the idea of having a universally applicable 
counter-kidnapping approach is definitely tempting, it is something 
that might lead to problems. The transformation of an individual‟s 
counter-kidnap knowledge created from their personal working 
practices into abstract systems of practices cannot be holistically 
applied throughout all cases and all nations. Linking the existence 
of the United Nations counter-kidnapping manual with the 
international conference on Tackling Kidnapping, it can be argued 
that having a universally applicable counter-kidnap approach has 
been instrumental in fostering both the creation of the manual and 
the international conference. Yet, having a universal application can 
also be the root cause of many problems and misapplications. From 
what I have seen in the conference, universal or wider knowledge 
and information transfer can be uncritical and underplay the 
complexities of events. There should be an acknowledgement of the 
shaping functions of the social and the geographical context in 
which a case took place, as these will influence the content and the 
direction of the knowledge produced.  
Transferring knowledge is demanding and might be 
potentially problematic.  When we talk about knowledge, we need 
to consider what is known and how this knowledge has been 
acquired, how this knowledge can be applied and how fast new 
knowledge can be created and applied in a different context. 
Knowledge is produced in the context in which it is used, so it is 
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pointless to transfer it in a different context as it becomes a void. In 
reality, very specific principles are being successfully marketed by 
big security corporations, and similarly with the allegedly public 
knowledge holders, the private businesses use their good name and 
their success to commodify their knowledge and sell it to those who 
need it.   
 
7.3.2  The Commodification of Knowledge  
Knowledge, as it has been mentioned previously in this thesis, 
is valuable and powerful. It can be used as a bargaining chip and 
the less people have it, the more powerful it can be. These 
characteristics are what lead to the commodification of knowledge, 
not only in the private, but also in the public sector. Knowledge is 
not simply transferred from one place to another, but it is 
commodified and transformed into something which can be 
replicated in exchange for money.  
The Palermo convention of transnational organised crime 
(entitled the „United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto‟), (2000) is a 
convention against transnational organised crime where the 
importance of knowledge sharing has been highlighted throughout 
the document. Although, as has been previously mentioned in this 
thesis, at least in Greece, kidnappings are not always an organised 
criminal act per se, in many cases organised criminal networks are 
used in order to carry out other aspects of the kidnapping, for 
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example money laundering. Either security-oriented or not, 
organisations and institutions such as Europol, the United Nations , 
the OSCE and the European Commission have referred to the 
importance of sharing practices and information. The Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) with regard to kidnappings, 
has stated that states need to „explore ways to facilitate the 
exchange of experiences, best practices, initiatives taken, and 
information at the strategic, operational and tactical levels between 
crisis centres, intelligence agencies, law enforcement…‟ (OSCE: 14). 
Conventions and declarations underline the importance of a free 
movement of knowledge and information, but the reality is far from 
that. There is a very interesting paradox between what is written on 
documents and protocols, and what happens in reality. From the 
moment something becomes a commodity, it becomes prohibiting 
for other nations to get access to that.  
The freedom of movement of knowledge is dependent and 
companioned with its commodification. This is what hinders the 
movement of knowledge since states cannot always afford to pay 
for it. The person who is organising all the police trainings in 
Greece, when talking about a scheduled, ISIS-related training in 
Athens (in May 2015) by three religion extremism experts from the 
Crisis and Negotiation Unit of the Greater Manchester Police, said 
that they had to pay 18,000 euros for a three-day event.  
This was prohibitive for us, especially in this day and age, 
but we still needed the training. It‟s a serious threat, it‟s 
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outside our door, they [refugees] first come here, and I 
am sure we will have to deal with that problem [ISIS] 
soon. We were very lucky because we got funding from 
the [Greek] Centre for Security Studies, and then they 
sent some people [from the Centre] to take part in the 
training along with our negotiators. [interviewee 21] 
In the case of Cyprus, the fee was even higher and, as there was 
no one to externally fund the counter-kidnap training provided by 
the NCA, the experienced negotiator seemed to be very proud of 
the way he handled it. He explained how he managed to have the 
training without paying anything directly to the trainers and their 
organisation: 
We are negotiators, that‟s what we do, right? I called 
them the next day [after he got informed about the cost of 
the training] and I negotiated. I said, look, the money you 
are asking for is not possible to be found, but we can pay 
your flight-tickets and your accommodation here, and you 
can have your holidays at the same time. For a week [the 
training lasted three days] we had them like kings, there 
was a car picking them up every day from their hotel, and 
we took them sightseeing and everything. We received the 
training and it didn‟t even cost a third of what they initially 
asked. [interviewee 12] 
The two quotes above are revealing of the nature of the transfer of 
high security knowledge. Even though NCA is not a private, 
commercial enterprise, it appears to have the profit-making aspect 
of one. It is ideal for information and knowledge to have a liberated 
movement. However, in reality, putting a price on knowledge 
makes it very difficult for it to be accessible to everyone who needs 
it.  
Safety and security are treated as commodities, but what 
happens is a negative consequence of the neoliberal societies where 
such a value-oriented treatment of knowledge makes people less 
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secure and protected. Knowledge itself has become an object of 
trade and in relation to kidnappings, there is deliberately a very 
limited ownership of that knowledge. The counter-kidnapping 
experience, accompanied by associated knowledge, has a high 
value which translates into a very high price. This makes nations 
unable to pay such a high fee in order to receive that knowledge 
which leads to the expansion of private companies. These 
kidnapping insurance, risk management, or evacuations firms are 
almost predominantly run by former police counter-kidnapping, 
special forces or secret intelligence service personnel who, after 
retiring, have taken advantage of their specialised knowledge 
towards the creation of their own parasitic companies. When people 
from the counter-kidnapping field leave their jobs in the public 
sector, they tend to take their knowledge with them. The former 
Greek negotiator who is currently working mainly as a freelancer 
negotiator said: 
No matter what you give, you should never give it for free. 
You have to put a high price on it, because after that 
people would value you more and appreciate your work. I 
used to give it for free [he means when he was a 
kidnapping negotiator for the Greek police] and no one 
was appreciating it. Now I sell it [his skills and knowledge] 
and I sell it expensively. [interviewee 14] 
 
It is difficult to trust statistics with regard to kidnappings, but it 
is safe to say that each nation has at least one kidnap case per 
annum.  Although kidnappings do happen throughout the globe and 
they can have a serious impact on lots of individuals, whether 
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involved or not, they are still not amongst the most prevalent types 
of crime. There are other crimes which happen more frequently. 
Thus, when there is a kidnapping, it might be more financially 
prudent for nations to give the cases to sub-contractors, instead of 
paying for the trainings and re-trainings of their counter-kidnap 
teams. By assigning the case to sub-contractors, the accountability 
and responsibility of the outcome is now moved to the private 
sector. The privatisation of knowledge ownership means that the 
state is not liable in case something goes wrong during a kidnap. At 
this point it should be stated that the role of a private company can 
be played by a national organisation, in that case the NCA. It is not 
very common nowadays to have a foreign public agency managing 
specific security threats on behalf of another nation. Two good 
examples of how the UK‟s NCA team is working for other 
governments, in this case the Nigerian one, and also how they have 
worked with private companies „third party intermediaries‟ to secure 
the release of a hostage, is demonstrated below:  
Last week, a 90 year old male was taken in Nigeria. He 
was there for vacations. Quite often they [police] shoot 
the courier [sic] (i think he means the person receiving 
the money), so ransom payment sequence, the currier 
then meets what appears to be the offender and their 
[police/counter kidnap team] objection is 'shoot to wound' 
in order that that individual can later be interrogated. We 
have tried to stop that and last week we were eventually 
successful in taking our message through in our 
colleagues in Nigeria, 'don't shoot, you might kill the 
wrong person'. 
[…] A fifty-year old man in Libya, with Somalian origin, 
was held against his will with demands going to his 
extended family in the UK. We engaged through third 
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party intermediaries, and we were able to secure the safe 
release of the fifty-year old, and in fact he is flying back to 
London today. [interviewee 1] 
 
As has already been mentioned in this chapter, knowledge is being 
treated as a commodity and the United Kingdom‟s NCA expertise is 
being used commercially. There is a very complex security 
landscape where national organisations can intervene in cases 
outside their national borders, possibly with a pricy service fee, as 
well as collaboration with the private sector. 
The aim of creating knowledge is to transfer it so that 
everyone can benefit from it. There is an emphasis placed on the 
commercial value of knowledge and a price placed on it, which 
makes the specialised counter-kidnap knowledge harder to be 
accessed by everyone who needs it. Still, when knowledge is 
transferred, it is formed in such a codified way in order to make 
that transfer easier. The counter-kidnapping high security 
knowledge is produced and compiled in a very specific context, and 
at the local level, but then an identical “copy” of this knowledge is 
transferred and applied somewhere else.  
Throughout the two international conferences on kidnappings 
that I attended, the way the information was transferred was very 
instrumental, with presenters enumerating and numbering actions, 
giving steps to be followed, and talking about the „golden hour‟21. 
Kidnapping consultants and so-called experts have managed to 
                                                          
21
 This, according to a kidnap expert, is the first hours after a kidnapping has taken place 
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reduce all their knowledge into “five steps”, and “eight moves”, 
trying to barter knowledge and make everything fit into a short 
presentation. These presenters believe that they are transferring a 
normative basis of processes, with expected actions and outcomes, 
but this is not the actual reality. The codification of personal 
knowledge is difficult to be applied in the broad context of ransom 
kidnapping cases, and this way of transferring information is 
possibly the result of the military or secret-services background of 
most of these practitioners.  
It is difficult to transfer knowledge because knowledge cannot 
be neatly packed into steps, bullet points, and schematic 
information. What these people do is to transfer knowledge taken 
from very specific contexts, but transferring knowledge which is 
based on personal “regularities” is not enough, because in the 
event of a change in one of the variables, there will be great 
uncertainty. Each kidnapping for ransom case is different; it 
involves different kidnappers, with different personalities, there is a 
different hostage every time, with differences in terms of personal 
characteristics and a different family which has to work with a 
group of negotiators. Kidnappings are like a game where in each 
round all the players change and they are replaced with very 
different ones. The rules are usually the same in every round, save 
the hostage and arrest the kidnappers, but there is little space for 
generalisations. Knowledge has become a commodity, and it is 
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easier to be transferred from one place to the other if it is neatly 
packaged in a „moves‟ and „steps‟ format; if it can be used though, 
is another issue. 
 
6.4 Summary 
The counter-kidnapping knowledge transfer does not work but it is 
still being practiced around the world. This is done because nations 
want to be on the same page. Nevertheless, these trainings have 
an accessorial role, and even those who are attending them are not 
certain of their purpose. In many cases those trainings are the 
result of political imperatives and agreements between nations. The 
nations and law enforcement teams receiving the training in most 
cases have to pay for it, and at the same time they either have to 
give something back in the form of another training, or provide 
intelligence information to the providers of the training. Of course it 
is expected that there is going to be cooperation between nations 
for information and intelligence in case it is needed, but it is also 
expected that nations will help one another and provide specialised 
knowledge transfer free of charge. From my experience with the 
Cyprus police-negotiators, it became clear that these annual 
training-events are taking place in order for police negotiators to 
ask for further funding, tools and improvement to their working 
conditions.  
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Attempting to connect this chapter with the previous one, all 
the interviewees from the three different countries I have looked at 
have, one way or another, mentioned how good they are at what 
they do in terms of kidnapping resolution. Training-events are 
enhancing both the status of those receiving the knowledge and of 
those transferring it. By doing that, these people can climb up the 
police hierarchy, and build a legacy around their names. Once these 
people are retired, this can turn into something useful towards a 
career in the public crime prevention and resolution industry. 
 With regard to kidnappings, it seems that there are some 
issues affecting the knowledge transfer and these issues are 
connected to the police culture. This is a sign that the states cannot 
any longer protect their citizens, at least from kidnaps. In the past 
it was the state‟s responsibility to provide safety and security, but 
now this is taken over by private companies. As a US interviewee 
explained, the government can be quite consuming and will not 
allow ransom payments, which might inevitably cost the hostage‟s 
life. What is being done instead is that families contact private 
companies without involving the state. An interviewee called the 
transition from the publically provided security to the privately 
provided one a „new game‟. In this game, the private companies 
have taken over and they are capitalising on fear. Knowledge is 
commodified and in order to have a smoother and easier transfer it 
is codified into steps and ready-made solutions that apply 
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everywhere and in any case around the world. This knowledge is 
not always applicable or useful, and also not free.  
There have been many formal agreements, protocols and 
documents supporting the importance of a liberal movement of 
information and knowledge, but similarly to the knowledge-transfer 
events, these documents are created in order to tick off boxes and 
gain symbolic value. Not only private companies and former law 
enforcement officers provide their expertise with a very high cost, 
but also the UK‟s NCA asks for a high fee in order to transfer the 
counter-kidnap knowledge. Nations are unable to pay the fee for 
the trainings, thus their only solution is to directly assign the 
kidnapping cases to private contractors. There is a very complex 
counter-kidnapping landscape where cases from around the world 
are initially assigned to the NCA, and then the NCA might assign 
that case to private contractors. There is a very complex 
environment where national organisations work as private 
companies and private companies are staffed by individuals coming 
from the public sector.               
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Chapter 7:  Conclusions 
 
This research gave an overview to the counter-kidnap high security 
knowledge transfer and the application of that knowledge. The 
literature on kidnappings is very limited, which is what initially 
attracted my interest to research this type of crime. Kidnappings 
have been used as a case study to interrogate a variety of themes 
such as knowledge transfer, policing culture and the neoliberal 
private approach to crime prevention and management.  The United 
Kingdom is a generator of this transnational knowledge and Greece 
is both a recipient and disseminator of knowledge to other 
countries, including Cyprus. This is justifying my choice to look at 
the UK, Greece and Cyprus in terms of kidnapping knowledge. 
In my research I have identified three different ways of 
sharing and circulating counter-kidnap knowledge. There are formal 
documents on kidnaps, as well as transnational and intranational 
training for specialised police officers. Documents are vehicles for 
knowledge transfer but through common sense information and 
phrases such as „don‟t be a victim‟, the EuNAT document is placing 
the responsibility for security and safety to the individual, what 
Garland named „responsibilization‟ (1996), which is an approach 
followed by more and more nations. Both these documents come 
with their own issues, questions of usefulness and sticky aspects. 
When it comes to kidnappings, the United Kingdom with its 
National Crime Agency, is considered to be the main knowledge 
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broker in the field of kidnappings, not only at the European level, 
but worldwide. The USA has a different approach where, after 
locating where the hostage is, they intervene, which can lead to the 
death of both the hostage and the kidnappers. The UN counter-
kidnap manual is used by NCA to show the team‟s expertise and 
capitalize on that with collaborations and training which are quite 
pricy. Both in Greece and Cyprus interviewees referred to the cost 
of these trainings, which are rather expensive considering their 
duration and the fact that such transnational trainings aiming at 
collaboration between nations should be free. Academic research 
has thoroughly discussed issues around transnational policing and 
its importance since there is a fluidity of risks, without referring to 
the fact that knowledge transfer and transnational policing in some 
cases comes with a financial cost. This cost is sometimes difficult to 
be paid by nations, which even resort to being unofficial “tourist-
guides” to avoid paying the high fee.  
At the same time, the training contains material which has 
been developed in one single nation and, as an interviewee 
explained, the UK itself is not perfect at what it does, hence the 
large number of kidnaps. Different nations have different types of 
kidnaps, different budgets to spent, as well as tools and technology 
to counter this crime. In a similar way, within the UNODC document 
there are references to tools that I know Greece does not own and 
is unable to utilise. Apart from the fact that knowledge has been 
274 
 
produced in a completely different context, and that it is being 
transferred with a very high price tag, language also plays an 
important role.  
National presentations and practical exercises have as a goal 
to train and re-train practitioners inside the police. However, the 
reality of knowledge production and transfer is blurry, messy and 
complicated. What is being shared is information and not 
knowledge. People can share their knowledge but this does not 
mean that the person receiving it will be able to use it. There are 
very few, sporadic trainings, and usually the closest to a kidnap is 
on a simple case of hostage-taking. At the same time it is very 
difficult to assess what has been received by those taking part in 
the knowledge transfer.  
In my research I have identified some characteristics of the 
specific occupational sub-culture which work as barriers. Kumar 
(2011) has talked positively about pride inside the police and has 
explained how it can power the police work, however, I have seen 
the opposite. There was a sense of pride in the work of the counter-
kidnap teams of all three nations I have looked at, which as I have 
stated can work as a barrier towards any improvement. In the UK 
there are many problems around arresting and prosecuting 
kidnappers, in Greece although they might think they transfer their 
knowledge to others because they are very good at what they do, 
in reality it is because of police imperatives and in Cyprus pride is 
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associated with their differentiation from the other police officers. 
There are many different subcultures inside the police, but 
negotiators, as a police sub-subculture (or just subculture) have not 
been looked at before.  
In addition, altruism inside the police does not exist when it 
comes to who has the necessary knowledge. There is an “us” 
versus “them” attitude that Reiner (2012) has also referred to. This 
attitude can be witnessed throughout the various police 
subcultures, but the interesting thing is that it can also be seen 
between the same teams of different nations (between the Greek 
and Cypriot counter-kidnap teams). Such an approach completely 
negates the idea of transnational cooperation and collaboration 
between nations in case there is a need for it, something that 
illustrates that in practice, things are a lot more complicated. In the 
sub-culture of people who hold high-security knowledge (which is 
not supposed to be disseminated freely), those who have that 
knowledge also have power, which can lead to people holding 
information in order to use their expertise as a bargaining chip in 
their current position, or later use their knowledge in the private 
industry once they are retired. An interviewee presented another 
explanation and said that there is secrecy around kidnappings and 
counter-kidnap, because people are afraid to be criticized due to 
their inexperience. Thus, secrecy not only means that people are 
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using the power that knowledge gives them, but that it can also be 
associated with vulnerability.     
Bayley and Bittner (1984), among others, have said that 
policing and police work are future oriented, and later, Ericson and 
Haggerty (1997) subscribed to that view. Generally, a lot of 
scholarship on policing suggests that policing is about the future, 
but the data that I have gathered from my qualitative research 
suggests that it is actually the opposite. When it comes to 
kidnappings, police are reactive and very often they do not know 
what to do. There are some steps that they follow when there is a 
kidnap, but if any of the variables change from the previous 
kidnap(s) then they would not know what to do, and kidnaps are 
known to be very dynamic and ever-changing. My findings mean 
that grand statements like those of Bayley, Bittner, Ericson and 
Haggerty do not apply.  
Future research can explore the extent to which policing in 
general is a retrospective activity. Practitioners usually value the 
incident and determine the seriousness of the problem. From my 
interviewees it became clear that kidnappings are divided between 
those of rich individuals and those of migrants, refugees or minority 
groups. Sadly, more attention is paid to those “high value” 
individuals or to cases which have been on the media. Sheptycki 
has called police „knowledge workers‟ (2002), but when it comes to 
the counter-kidnap teams I have researched into, there is a lot of 
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ignorance involved. Kidnappings are already very complicated, but 
the ignorance of the practitioners and the lack of knowledge of 
important terminology makes their work even more fragmented. 
Not naming a type of crime properly is potentially going to affect its 
response. Strategic ignorance comes when people are aware that 
they do not know something, yet they decide not to fill that gap, 
even though it is of major importance to their work. Police and their 
occupational culture have a very important role and it works as a 
barrier to transferring and applying knowledge. Newburn (2002) 
has talked about the Atlantic crossings which make the states more 
insignificant, but my research has showed the opposite. Knowledge, 
or more appropriately information, is being transferred, but what is 
going to happen after that is at the local level. My findings are 
similar to Massey‟s view (1994), who supported that although we 
have global actions, they take place at the local level, and the 
locale has a very important impact on the application of these 
global actions. 
There is a variety of issues hindering the transfer and 
application of the counter-kidnap knowledge. Those who are 
supposed to protect the safety and security of citizens are not 
capable of doing so. It is hard for the counter-kidnap teams to keep 
up with something that is constantly changing and evolving, 
especially since the maintenance of that knowledge will not come 
for free. Nations are unable to protect human life, at least from 
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kidnaps, which has led to the commodification of knowledge by the 
private field. From my research it became obvious that the risk-
management and counter-kidnap environments are very complex, 
with private companies being created by former public-sector 
experts, and public organisations such as the NCA resembling 
something more akin to a private business. All these are 
perpetuating victimization for those who cannot afford to protect 
themselves, and lead to the security and protection of a small 
minority who can afford to be prepared for a kidnap or saved in 
case there is one. There is a constant neoliberal tendency of making 
people responsible for their security, especially for a crime which is, 
wrongfully, perceived as one that will only affect the rich few. 
 
7.1 Findings and Theoretical Advancements 
With this research I can claim contribution to a number of different 
literatures. This research is the first one of its kind, combining a 
crime which has been under-researched with subjects such as 
knowledge, policing and security, offering another point of view on 
topics which have already received academic attention. In addition 
to that, this research is the first empirical study of the way 
knowledge is used. There are assumptions that knowledge moves 
easily, that once you tell something to a practitioner then this is 
automatically absorbed and straight put into practice. Yet, my 
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findings show that the reality is far from that. Not only is knowledge 
not always relevant to practitioners because it has been created in 
a different context, or it is suggesting the use of tools which are not 
owned by those receiving the knowledge, but there are also many 
barriers involved. This ultimately raises a question about the utility 
and value in transnational knowledge transfer and the overarching 
protocols on kidnap. Documents and manuals are not as useful as 
they were believed to be when they were created. Knowledge is not 
put into practice, but as I have seen, there is a lot of resistance and 
mitigation where practitioners are reducing the importance and the 
seriousness of what has been transferred, as well as those who did 
the transfer of knowledge. There is much discussion around 
knowledge transfer in a globalized world with risks and threats, but 
my research has uncovered an interesting disparity between calling 
for a unified, standardised approach, underlining the importance of 
collaboration between nations and the almost forbidding fee asked 
for the knowledge-transfer events. The reception of knowledge is 
not an “all or nothing” scenario, but the locale plays a very 
important role. 
The specific police occupational culture itself is a major barrier 
to the application of that knowledge into practice. As I have 
explained in this thesis, those involved in counter-kidnapping (or 
the team of negotiators in general) are a distinguished sub-culture 
with different characteristics. These people are seen as higher-up in 
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the police hierarchy, and the status associated with being a 
member of the counter-kidnap team explains why many 
interviewees initially said that they were police negotiators but later 
in the interview explained that they were not. In addition to being 
perceived by others and by themselves as superior, police 
negotiators tend to neglect their development in the field. Thinking 
that they are better than other nations‟ police-teams, acts as a 
barrier to their improvement in a crime that is constantly changing. 
Ignorance is definitely something visible in the specific police sub-
culture where not only are they not aware of something, but they 
have strategically decided to ignore it in order to make it fit their 
understanding of things, which in some cases can be simplified. For 
example, definitions are not important to those interviewed, even 
though the way a crime is defined is going to determine their 
approach and kidnappings or refugees are just arguments between 
“illegal” people. Also there is a misunderstanding of why 
transnational trainings take place and although they are the result 
of political imperatives and exchanges of services, it is widely 
believed that they are asked to do so due to their perceived success 
rates.  
Although there are all these systems in place for transnational 
knowledge transfer, my research has shown that on the ground, 
practitioners do not really recognize the importance of having a 
common understanding and up-to-date information on crimes that 
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can some way or another cross borders. Apart from that, when it 
comes to a type of knowledge that is not held by many, as an 
attempt to protect the safety of future kidnapped-hostages, there is 
further restriction to its transfer. Counter-kidnap knowledge is 
something that is not supposed to be shared by many but also 
those who hold that knowledge and are asked to share it with a few 
selected others tend to hold some things just for themselves. The 
police environment is quite antagonistic and in order for someone 
to secure their position, it is important for individuals to secure 
their position through access to privileged knowledge. This 
knowledge generates status in its own right but, potentially both 
this status and the knowledge it is derived from can be later used in 
the private field for commercial gain. This further convolutes the 
already highly complex field of counter-kidnap knowledge transfer. 
Any future policy or academic exploration of counter-kidnapping 
can take into account all of these complex operational and 
governmental aspects. Regardless of the knowledge one produces, 
if that knowledge is not associated to the local context, particularly 
the local way of doing things, then it is of limited value. 
The private field is a major stakeholder in the prevention and 
dealing of kidnap. As criminologists have long noted there is a 
neoliberal tendency towards privatizing many things and security 
seems to be one of them. When it comes to kidnappings, my 
research identifies how, the responsibility of each individual (or 
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business) is devolved and shifted away from the state onto 
organisations in order to ensure they are prepared, insured or with 
the right connections in the private field in case of a kidnap. Not 
only is the individual in many cases responsible for their own safety 
inside or outside their home nation, but also there is a collaboration 
of nations with the private field. Risk management and insurance 
companies are working for various nations and later the fee is 
usually asked by the person who has received that help, in that 
case the kidnapped-hostages. In addition to that, the National 
Crime Agency, a public organisation perceived as the knowledge 
broker in the field of kidnaps, is both taking kidnap jobs whilst 
asking for a fee, and at the same time they assign jobs to other 
practitioners from the private field. In a security field that consists 
of private businesses, even a public entity resembles a more private 
one, leaving no options for those who cannot afford to protect 
themselves. 
Attempting to summarise the above paragraphs, this research 
has contributed to three distinct areas of enquiry: first, the way 
information about kidnaps moves around, second, the police 
subculture, and finally how the problems of transferring knowledge 
and the police culture itself have led to the privatization of security, 
as well as the interconnectivity of private and public businesses. 
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7.2 Methodological Advancement 
To my knowledge police negotiators are a group of people which 
has not been interviewed or researched in the past. The fact that 
these people are only very few, they are handling sensitive 
information and they are perceived to be higher up in the hierarchy 
of their occupational culture makes them „elites‟. Policing elites can 
be „senior ranking officers influencing strategic direction […] 
specialist officers […] or those with discretion to influence or exert 
power without constraint‟ (Brunger, Caless, Tong, Gilbert, 2016: 
139). Conducting research with police elites „provides us with 
unique and rich insights into police practices and leadership through 
accessing the decision makers and keepers of specialist knowledge 
(Brunger, Caless, Tong, Gilbert, 2016: 140). Interviewing such a 
type of elites has particular difficulties both in terms of identifying 
the right people and approaching them. Elites of all kinds have not 
received the necessary attention throughout the years (Hunter 
1995), and this might be because they are a group of people with 
the means and the power to protect themselves from outsiders and 
criticism. Research on police elites gives us a unique and useful 
insight in the police practices since we access the decision makers 
and specialist-knowledge holders (Brunger, Caless, Tong, Gilbert, 
2016: 140). The most pressing concern and constant source of 
anxiety for the researcher is about gaining access. For people 
conducting research with elites it is better to assume that gaining 
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access will take even longer than expected, hence the access-
gaining process can start as soon as possible in order to avoid 
wasting time waiting for bureaucratic procedures. It is always 
helpful to remember that as Laurila (1997) has stated, the fact that 
elites are visible does not imply that they are also accessible. Of 
course access can be denied which might create problems, but at 
the same time, gaining access is not the same as establishing trust 
between the interviewer and the interviewee.  I found very useful 
the fact that I did online research on previous kidnaps in Greece 
prior to my interviews with the Greek police, and that I started my 
research by talking to some former kidnap-hostages. Hostages and 
their families gave me an inside view of how things work during a 
kidnap without fearing that they were revealing too much 
information. This way I learned what happens during a kidnapping 
and I was able to have a conversation with the police negotiators. 
At the same time, by looking into many kidnap cases in Greece I 
knew from a fact that them talking about the one hundred percent 
of success, was not based on facts.  
In my case, moving closer to the people I interviewed in 
Greece, was not possible for financial reasons. Had I had funding to 
cover my expenses I would have moved closer to my interviewees 
for a period of around three to six months. The more people hear 
about a researcher or get used to the researcher‟s presence around 
them, the easier it will become to gain access to participate to even 
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more things. A Greek negotiator said during one of our interviews 
that if I lived there I might even get the opportunity to participate 
in a kidnapping along with the negotiators. If there was one thing 
that I would do differently, it would be to be geographically closer 
to my interviewees for the opportunities this might bring.  
 
7.3 Future Research  
This research, by exploring the way kidnap practitioners work, can 
help us understand how we look at a lot of transnational 
knowledge-flows around crime, and globalisation. When it comes to 
kidnappings, knowledge becomes a tradable commodity, and it 
would be interesting for a future researcher to examine whether the 
same characteristics are held by other types of crime where 
transnational knowledge plays an important role. Such crimes can 
possibly be trafficking, organised crime, terrorism or anything with 
transnational dimensions. A future researcher can investigate to 
what extent the locale is important in the way practitioners work 
and apply the knowledge that has been transferred, which can 
possibly shed some more light in the efficiency of Europe-wide and 
world-wide tools used.  
Another way to add more usefulness to my research would be 
to expand the scale of what I have already looked at in this 
research. Such a research would have really important and 
substantial findings since it will not just look at three nations and 
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their practices, but it can comprise a bigger project with more 
nations involved and more practices. This study can, for example, 
focus on the European level, and it would be a great way to draw 
attention to complex narratives, practices and resistance to the 
transfer and application of the counter-kidnap knowledge. 
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Interviewees/Used Interviews 
Interviewee Occupation/role Location of Interview 
   
1 Member of NCA’s counter-kidnap team London 
2 Young female university student. Kidnapped in Greece. 
Held hostage for five days. Ransom paid by her father, 
around 10,000€.  
Greece 
3 Kidnapped victim in Greece. Businessman. Held hostage for 
17 days. A few million euros paid as ransom from his wife 
Greece 
4 The wife of the businessman Greece 
5 Mother of a kidnapped man from Cyprus. Kidnapped in 
Greece. A few millions paid as ransom (the ransom was not 
found) 
Cyprus 
6 Experienced negotiator and trainer in Greece. He has the 
most counter-kidnapping experience 
Greece 
7 Counter-kidnap police negotiator who also presented in 
the European Network for Advisory Teams (EuNAT) event 
in Romania 
Greece 
8 Counter-kidnap police negotiator Greece 
 
9 Counter-kidnap negotiator. He seemed to be the youngest 
and possibly the least experienced of those interviewed in 
Greece 
Greece 
10 CEO of a risk-management company in Belgium London 
11 Negotiator in Cyprus Cyprus 
12 Chief negotiator in Cyprus. He is the most experienced and 
also organises the annual week-long training-event on 
negotiations 
Cyprus 
13 Owns his own risk evacuations company and has worked, 
in a few occasions, with the United Nations 
London 
14 Retired member of the Greek police-negotiators team. He 
used to be the same trainer, with knowledge received from 
the UK and the US. He is currently working as a private 
negotiator and provides training sessions on negotiation 
techniques 
Greece 
15 Working in the Greater Manchester police and he is  
responsible for providing knowledge and training people 
involved in kidnaps. He has also helped produce the 
UNODC counter-kidnap manual 
London 
16 Greek-police kidnap negotiator Greece 
17 Negotiator for Cypriot police Cyprus 
18 Negotiator for Cypriot police Cyprus 
19 Negotiator for Cypriot police Cyprus 
20 A negotiator with whom I briefly talked with whilst I was 
waiting to interview another negotiator.  
Greece 
21 Responsible for the organisation of training and re-training 
events for police officers and students in the police 
academy 
Greece 
22 One of the few female negotiators Cyprus 
23 Ex-military in the US who now has his own counter-kidnap London 
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company 
24 Former secret intelligence US officer who now owns a 
company focusing on emergency recoveries  
London 
25 Retired UK military personnel who works for a Swiss 
counter-kidnap company 
London 
26 He is working for a private English company and is 
responsible for producing contingency plans for businesses 
and organisations 
London 
27 He owns an insurance company London 
28  Female Spanish insurer, working for a company in Spain London 
29 German citizen, kidnapped in the Colombian jungle. Held 
hostage for around 2 months. Released and later had to 
pay the costs of her release. 
London 
30 British citizen, kidnapped in Iraq. He was held hostage for 
around 2 years. 
London 
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Έν οἶδα ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα. 
